



Hate crime supporters are found across age, gender, and income groups and are susceptible to violent political appeals

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Hate crime is a pervasive problem across societies. Though perpetrators represent a small share of the population, their actions continue in part because they enjoy community support. But we know very little about this wider community of support; existing surveys do not measure whether citizens approve of hate crime. Focusing on Germany, where antiminority violence is entrenched, this paper uses original surveys to provide systematic evidence on the nature and impacts of hate crime support. Employing direct and indirect measures, I find that significant shares of the population support antirefugee hate crime and that the profile of supporters is broad, going much beyond common perpetrator types. I next use a candidate choice experiment to show that this support has disturbing political consequences: among radical right voters, hate crime supporters prefer candidates who endorse using gun violence against refugees. I conclude that a significant number of citizens empower potential perpetrators from the bottom-up and further legitimize hate crime from the top-down by championing violence-promoting political elites.

hate crime | political violence | extremism | radical right | political behavior

Hate crime is a pervasive problem. In the United States, 2021 was a particularly violent year as bias-motivated attacks targeting Asian Americans more than tripled, while recorded anti-Semitic incidents were at an all-time high (1, 2). In Europe, refugee inflows in the 2010s unleashed a wave of antirefugee and anti-Muslim attacks (3). Deadly violence against members of LGBTQ communities also remains an urgent global concern (4).

Bigoted violence and harassment against ethnic, religious, sexual, and other minorities cause victims physical and psychological trauma and can have other harmful consequences. For example, due to fears of experiencing hate crime, members of victimized groups avoid moving to certain neighborhoods or bypass job opportunities, thereby entrenching spatial and economic segregation (5, 6). In light of these severe repercussions, many democracies have enacted laws that aim to punish and deter bias-motivated crime (7).

Yet, hate-based violence persists amid increased criminalization. One reason for this persistence could be widespread citizen support. Ethnographic accounts (8, 9) and perpetrator studies, *c.f.* refs. 10, 11 consistently point to the significance of community support. The social environment sends strong messages about what behaviors are acceptable and desirable, and this extends to hate crime. Where attitudes toward hate crime are permissive, scholars argue, offenders believe that they act on behalf of their community and may even reap social rewards from their criminal actions (12, 13). Accordingly, the presumed connection between community support and hate crime incidence could explain why most hate crime is committed by ordinary citizens who do not feature deviant psychological profiles or belong to organized hate groups (11, 14).

Though community approval appears to be central in leading a minority of actors to commit hate crime, we know very little about the nature of this support. To the best of my knowledge, no surveys measure the extent of hate crime support and study its correlates and consequences. It is possible that perpetrators are mobilized within a small and contained social circle of hate crime supporters that they themselves seek out. Alternatively, hate crime support could be more widely distributed across social groups, thereby extending its reach beyond friends and neighbors and potentially also heightening its impact by percolating upward to political or media elites.

Since hate crime may spread when potential offenders feel emboldened by community support, it is critical to study the nature and extent of this support as well as its consequences. This paper provides such an analysis, focusing on hate crimes against refugees in Germany. I fielded original surveys that develop list experiments and direct

Significance

Despite increased criminalization, bigoted violence and harassment against minorities continue to cause serious harm. To combat hate crime, policies need to target not only perpetrators but also the communities of support that produce them. It is critical to measure hate crime support and its consequences, which remain largely unknown. I fielded surveys in Germany—Europe's most populous country with the continent's largest foreign-born population—measuring support for antirefugee hate crime. I estimate that sizable shares of citizens (between 14% and 19%) across gender, age, and income groups endorse hate crime. Moreover, experiments demonstrate that hate crime supporters prefer political candidates who promote violence against refugees. These results help explain the persistence of hate crime and the radicalization of politics.

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


Fig. 1. Composition of hate crime supporters by gender, age, and income. Percentage of respondents who agree that “Attacks against refugee homes are sometimes necessary to make it clear to politicians that we have a refugee problem” (responses from waves 2, 3, and 4).

questions to assess antirefugee hate crime support and that employ a candidate choice experiment to gauge the political consequences of this support.*

These surveys yield three key findings: First, the coalition of hate crime supporters is broad: between 14% and 19% of the population approves of hate crime, and this support more than doubles in certain subgroups. Community support goes well beyond the typical young male perpetrator, spanning populations of different ages, incomes, and genders. While perpetrator studies across countries document that hate crime offenders are almost exclusively young men and frequently of low socioeconomic status (11, 13), Fig. 1 shows that the support base for their crimes is much wider: nearly half of hate crime supporters are women (47%) and well over half (58%) are older (40 and above) and economically secure.

Second, hate crime support is not simply an extension of antirefugee sentiment. Many citizens who hold negative views about refugees reject antirefugee hate crime. It is therefore necessary to collect separate measures of hate crime support.

Third, mass-level hate crime support has far-reaching consequences for the radicalization of politics. The candidate choice experiment demonstrates that among voters of the radical right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), hate crime proponents show a strong preference for candidates who promote antirefugee violence. Citizen hate crime support thus provides incentives for the radicalization of democratic politics.

These findings make several contributions to our understanding of hate crime and extremist politics. By showing that antirefugee hate crime support is anchored across the citizenry, my results align with the view that extremist acts and party preferences are products of mainstream society, rather than aberrations from universally shared norms (15–17). It is not productive to consider hate crime as a pathological mutation of a select few; it is embedded within a broad coalition of support.

Additionally, this paper provides the individual-level foundations on which studies about the incidence of hate crime rest. Research associates structural factors such as demographic shifts (18, 19), economic competition (9, 20), or minority political power (21–23) with hate crime. Other work highlights situational triggers involving minorities as perpetrators (24–26) or the demonizing of minorities in relation to public events, such as Brexit (27) or the COVID-19 pandemic (28, 29). A tension in these accounts is that structural trends or momentary triggers are experienced by many, but hate crimes are committed by few. Studies therefore implicitly recognize that many citizens should support antiminority violence in response to these shocks but that this support spurs only a small minority into action. This paper helps resolve this tension by confirming that the assumption of broad community support is indeed valid.

Finally, this study connects bottom-up and top-down accounts of antiminority violence. Supply-side accounts argue that political elites and public discourse affect the incidence of hate crime by shaping the opportunities and constraints for violent mobilization (30–32). By demonstrating that individual beliefs condoning antirefugee attacks can help elect elites that further propagate such violence, this paper offers a bridge between supply- and demand-side accounts of intergroup violence, making it clear that elite-level discourse reflects mass attitudes toward hate crime. Moreover, I show that these individual-level attitudes are in fact sufficiently widespread that—even in a liberal democratic setting—some political elites will find it electorally profitable to advocate violence.

Data and Measures

This study was fielded in Germany, where antirefugee hate crime has long been a serious problem (19, 25). I conducted four online surveys (with an approximate size of $N = 3,000$ per survey) between September 2016 and December 2017 with the firm Respondi. The Princeton University Institutional Review Board approved the survey. Participation required respondents’ consent. The samples are designed to be nationally representative of age

*This work was carried out with Winston Chou, Naoki Egami, and Amaney Jamal.

(18 and above), gender, and state.[†] To ensure working with valid responses, I exclude respondents who failed an attention check (see ref. 33).

The survey period coincides with large-scale refugee inflows (predominantly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan). Though public discourse was initially mostly favorable, emphasizing Germans' humanitarian response, the mood shifted as inflows continued and negative news coverage intensified.[‡] The AfD capitalized on the issue and won 12.6% of the vote and 94 seats in the 2017 federal election. The survey results thus best generalize to—increasingly common—situations where immigration of ethnically and culturally distinct refugees is highly salient and where elite discourse is polarized.

I developed four questions to measure hate crime support (fielded in waves 2, 3, and 4; see also ref. 34), listed in Table 1. Because different types of appeals or local discourse may incite individuals to commit hate crimes, this battery includes, respectively, violence that is general and specific in its target selection. Homes, for example, makes an unambiguous reference to refugee homes, whereas Only means is more general in nature. Moreover, some items indicate an instrumental motivation whereby hate crime is employed to achieve a certain outcome (e.g., to reduce the number of refugees in town) or to act as a signal to politicians. Perpetrator studies have identified such instrumental reasoning as an important motive (35). Research on the local determinants of hate crime further demonstrates that citizens may resort to antiimmigrant violence to communicate their grievances to the political establishment, especially when they do not perceive the democratic process as a viable alternative to voice their concerns (22, 36). These instrumental drivers exist alongside other motives, such as thrill-seeking or the desire to act out aggression (37).

Though the anonymous nature of online surveys reduces the risk of social desirability bias (i.e., respondents biasing their answers in ways they think are socially accepted), I carried out list experiments that elicit support indirectly.[§]

Comparing answers across question types, results are consistent with the idea that respondents are at least as likely to support hate crime when asked directly as they are when asked indirectly; social desirability bias does not appear to suppress respondents' endorsement of hate crime (*SI Appendix, sections 2.1–2.6* include details and robustness checks).

Hate Crime Support and Its Correlates

The list experiments indicate that hate crime support can be reliably measured. A related question is whether it is necessary to do so or whether one can rely on questions about immigrants and refugees that standard surveys frequently ask. The affirmation of prejudicial beliefs and hierarchical social orders can be a motive behind hate crime as members of dominant groups attack minorities to assert their power and to convey the minorities' inferior status (38). As a result, individuals who

[†]I do not examine change within respondents over time. *SI Appendix, section 1* includes details on survey administration. As with other online surveys, the sample is slightly more educated than the population at large; *SI Appendix, section 4* includes analyses using weights.

[‡]A significant break occurred in the aftermath of New Year's Eve 2015 to 2016 when refugees were accused of sexually assaulting German women (25).

[§]Concretely, a randomly assigned treatment group was exposed to three nonsensitive statements unrelated to hate crime, plus one hate crime statement. A randomly assigned control group was presented with the three nonsensitive items only. Both groups were asked how many—not which—of the statements they supported. The mean difference across groups is an estimate of the proportion of respondents who support hate crime. I further compare this proportion to the proportion of respondents who support hate crime when asked directly.

Table 1. Hate crime support

Question	Wording	Support (%)
Only means	When it comes to the refugee problem, violence is sometimes the only means that citizens have to get the attention of German politicians	17.7
Homes	Attacks against refugee homes are sometimes necessary to make it clear to politicians that we have a refugee problem	16.7
Justified	Hostility against refugees is sometimes justified, even if it ends up in violence	18.7
Settlement	Xenophobic acts of violence are defensible if they result in fewer refugees being settled in town	14.2

Support indicates the percentage of respondents who strongly or somewhat agreed with the statements (the remainder strongly or somewhat disagreed; *SI Appendix, Table S13* lists all response categories).

oppose refugees could significantly overlap with individuals who endorse antirefugee hate crime.

Fig. 2 displays the distribution of views about refugees by answers to Homes (*SI Appendix, Fig. S2* shows the other hate crime variables). Antirefugee Sentiment measures agreement (4-point scale) with 8 questions about aspects of refugee migration (e.g., cultural, economic, security-related; *SI Appendix, section 2.7*) coded such that higher values indicate increased antirefugee views. These distributions make clear that it is essential to collect separate measures of hate crime support. The upper-left histogram shows that strong opponents of hate crime feature a wide range of refugee-related sentiments. More than a quarter (26.7%) of respondents who are strongly opposed to hate crime hold negative views about refugees (i.e., values of 3 or higher; the mean and median value of Antirefugee Sentiment is 2.8). Among respondents who “somewhat” disagree with Homes, well over half report moderate-to-strong agreement with antirefugee statements. The correlations between the four hate crime measures and Antirefugee Sentiment range between .48 and .52 ($P < .000$). In short, using views about refugees to predict hate crime support would lead to significant misclassification.

Given the unlawful nature of hate crime, this divergence may relate to views about law and order. Offenders and their supporters may feel justified to resort to antirefugee violence because they do not trust the police to “put refugees in their place.” When citizens feel that the police are not sufficiently committed to pursuing crimes perpetrated by refugees, they may turn to vigilantism in the form of hate crime.

When examining respondents' trust in the police[¶] I indeed find that trust declines as support for hate crime rises. Of note, 90.7% of respondents who strongly disagree with Homes express trust in the police. This figure decreases to 86.7% among those who somewhat disagree, to 80.6% among those who somewhat agree, and it drops to 69.6% among those who strongly agree with Homes (a similar linear decline occurs for the remaining three hate crime questions). By contrast, mapping attitudes toward refugees against trust in the police, we observe a curvilinear relationship: Those with the most and least positive

[¶]Respondents were asked how much they “trust each of the institutions listed below” (4-point scale), with the police being one option.




Fig. 2. Antirefugee sentiment and hate crime support.

views about refugees exhibit the lowest levels of trust in the police. *SI Appendix, section 2.7* provides further evidence that a distinguishing characteristic of hate crime supporters when compared to critics of refugees is their relative distrust of the police.

I next examine how hate crime is distributed across the population. Perpetrator studies document that the typical offender is young (aged 15 to 25), male, and of relatively low socioeconomic status (11, 13). Focusing on Germany, reports confirm the overwhelmingly male bias and estimate the share of men among right-wing extremist hate crime offenders between 85% and 97%. With respect to age, research conducted in the 1990s found that German offenders were largely adolescents or young adults, but average ages have increased since then (11, 39, 40). Socioeconomically, hate crime offenders tend to be relatively less educated and to hold jobs with low earning potential (11, 41).

Do these characteristics also describe the community of hate crime supporters or is the support base more expansive? Fig. 3 disaggregates responses to the four hate crime statements by gender, age, income, and education. It demonstrates that the profile of hate crime supporters is much broader than the profile of perpetrators. The discrepancy is particularly striking with respect to gender. Though barely any women engage in hate crime, many of them endorse it nonetheless. The share of women supporting hate crime is only somewhat lower than the share of men who do so (across questions, the average support among men and women is 17.8 and 15.8%, respectively). This finding lines up with accounts of right-wing extremism that emphasize the critical roles that women play behind the scenes. Women often do not commit hate crimes themselves but provide logistical help and coordination that facilitates it (39, 42). My data similarly suggest that treating hate crime as a male problem misses the mark.

Another striking divergence relates to age. Hate crime support is not a trait of youth. Middle-aged respondents (aged 40 to 49 y) are just as likely to approve of hate crime as younger ones (aged 18 to 29 y), with 30- to 39 y-olds being the most likely to do so. By implication, potential perpetrators likely hear messages condoning hate crime in a wide range of settings—at home, work, school, and their neighborhood—going well beyond their immediate peer group.

Perhaps most surprising, embracing xenophobic violence cuts across income levels. Support for hate crime does not change much when moving from the first to the fourth income quintile. Support does ebb somewhat when comparing those with the lowest to those with the highest income. But these differences are much smaller than what one would expect from the typical hate crime offender profile.

By contrast, we do observe a clear trend with respect to education, consistent with offender types. Respondents with the lowest years of education are significantly more likely to agree with the four hate crime items, whereas support drops sharply among the most highly educated group. In the bottom quintile, between 21.0% and 26.4% of respondents condone hate crime; in the top quintile, respective figures are 8.4% and 11.6%.^{||}

Finally, to get a sense of how widely hate crime support is distributed within groups whose members may more frequently interact with one another, I break down education groups by gender and age. The bottom middle panel shows that men aged 18 to 39 with low educational attainment are especially likely to back xenophobic violence, with support exceeding 40%, a staggering level. The demographic groups who are overrepresented among offenders are thus also particularly likely to condone hate crime. But we also see a similar, if more muted, trend among low-educated women, who very rarely engage in hate crime (bottom right).^{**}

Summing up, though only a small number of individuals commits crimes of hate, these results demonstrate that the support base behind these acts is far larger and more diverse than what perpetrator profiles might suggest. While the majority of Germans do oppose hate crime, substantial minorities across gender, age, income, and education groups do not. In short, hate crime support is not a fringe phenomenon.

Political Consequences of Hate Crime Support

The results thus far are compatible with accounts that describe how permissive social environments embolden the actions of

^{||}These results complement those of ref. 43, which found that hate crime diffuses to areas in Germany with a high share of school dropouts.

^{**}Among respondents aged 18 to 39, hate crime support among women is between 3 and 6% points lower than among men.




Fig. 3. Hate crime support by group. Group means and 95% CIs.

a few. Even if most Germans disapprove of hate crime, many will also encounter individuals who view hate crime approvingly. Hate crime support is especially widespread among low-educated citizens, and it extends across income groups and genders. Furthermore, the messages of a bounded social environment can be amplified beyond its perimeters once national figures adopt them. I therefore next investigate whether hate crime support has political consequences at the level of political parties and candidates, fielding a candidate choice experiment in wave 4.

The survey indicates that a plurality of hate crime supporters vote for the AfD. Depending on the question, between 38.7% and 42.5% of hate crime supporters in wave 4 stated that they voted for the AfD in the 2017 federal election. The next largest share—between 15.1% and 20.7%—voted for the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU). Close to half of the AfD’s electorate approves of hate crime (43.0 to 51.4%). Among CDU voters, these figures range between 11.8% and 14.7%. In light of these support coalitions, it is particularly meaningful to assess whether AfD candidates can shore up support among their base when promoting violence against refugees. Alternatively, these more radical candidates could be reigned in by voters who, while welcoming the AfD’s antiimmigration agenda, fall short of condoning antirefugee violence or even by hate crime supporters who do not think that such extreme candidates are electorally competitive. Analyzing CDU voters is also of interest given the party’s large voter base and the pivotal role center-right elites and voters play in either normalizing or countering far-right positions (44, 45).

I implemented a conjoint experiment in which respondents were asked to decide between four hypothetical candidates (this occurred five times per respondent), one each from the far-left Die Linke, the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), the center-right CDU, and the far-right AfD. These candidates take randomly varied positions on several issues, including violence against

refugees.^{††} Candidates cannot legally offer explicit support for hate crime, and in most democratic contexts, elites intent on instigating violence deploy more subtle language that nonetheless conveys a permissive attitude toward violence. For example, in the German case, though the AfD did not have a unified position on antirefugee violence and candidates varied in their extremism, prominent AfD figures called on the border police to use gun violence (“Waffengewalt”) against refugees who entered via another safe country.^{‡‡} To ensure that the candidate position is both realistic and legitimizes violence, I chose the following statement: “The German border police [should/should not] be allowed to use gun violence against refugees who come to Germany illegally.”

When interpreting the experiment, it is important to keep in mind that citizens’ views are already influenced by elite discourse about refugees and possibly also about violence against refugees. The goal is thus not to separate out elite from public opinion. Rather, I explore a possible dynamic whereby individuals who embrace violence against refugees help elect elites who do the same, thereby legitimizing this violence and further potentially radicalizing elites and masses.

Table 2 displays the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of the violence-endorsing candidate attribute, broken down by respondents’ hate crime and party support. The AMCEs indicate how much the probability of choosing a candidate changes if the candidate calls for gun violence against refugees (46) (*SI Appendix, section 3.2* provides estimated marginal means, c.f. ref. 47). The first row shows that AfD candidates who endorse violence are never penalized by AfD voters who disapprove of hate crime, but they are significantly rewarded (between 6.8

^{††}To reduce choice complexity, the Greens and the FDP are excluded. To maintain realism, I did not assign a violence-endorsing position to the SPD. *SI Appendix, Table S15* includes the list of attributes.

^{‡‡}See <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-01/frauke-petry-afd-grenzschutz-auf-fluechtlinge-schiessen>.

Table 2. Effect of candidates endorsing violence on candidate support

	Overall	Homes		Justified		Only means		Settlement	
		No support	Support	No support	Support	No support	Support	No support	Support
AfD candidate (far-right)									
AfD voters	0.0436*	0.0180	0.0764**	0.0281	0.0684*	0.0179	0.0675*	0.0215	0.0861**
	(0.0220)	(0.0325)	(0.0293)	(0.0325)	(0.0298)	(0.0334)	(0.0290)	(0.0315)	(0.0292)
N	2,070	1,095	975	1,025	1,045	1,005	1,065	1,180	890
All voters	-0.0156*	-0.0191**	0.0107	-0.0184**	0.0141	-0.0241***	0.0285	-0.0191**	0.0248
	(0.00607)	(0.00611)	(0.0186)	(0.00605)	(0.0177)	(0.00594)	(0.0181)	(0.00611)	(0.0195)
N	15,095	12,520	2,575	12,225	2,870	12,240	2,855	12,745	2,350
CDU candidate (center-right)									
CDU voters	-0.0755***	-0.0864***	-0.0104	-0.0864***	-0.0207	-0.0824***	-0.0354	-0.0864***	-0.0046
	(0.0170)	(0.0180)	(0.0537)	(0.0184)	(0.0457)	(0.0181)	(0.0491)	(0.0180)	(0.0511)
N	3,780	3,300	480	3,225	555	3,310	470	3,335	445
All voters	-0.0351***	-0.0474***	0.0237	-0.0488***	0.0232	-0.0519***	0.0334*	-0.0464***	0.0261
	(0.00706)	(0.00783)	(0.0160)	(0.00796)	(0.0149)	(0.00799)	(0.0146)	(0.00773)	(0.0171)
N	15,095	12,520	2,575	12,225	2,870	12,240	2,855	12,745	2,350

Dependent variable: Vote choice (0/1) for a given candidate. Independent variable: Candidate endorsement of violence against refugees. Results are broken down by respondents' hate crime support (columns) and by parties' voters/all voters (rows). In Germany's mixed electoral system, voters choose a candidate and a party. Respondents are coded as supporting the AfD/CDU if they gave their candidate or party vote to the AfD/CDU in the 2017 federal election. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered on respondent in parentheses (* $P < 0.05$, ** $P < 0.01$, *** $P < 0.001$).

and 8.6 points, $P < .05$) by hate crime supporters. Voters who have made the decision to align themselves with the AfD likely do not view violence endorsement as too much of a deviation from the party's brand and therefore do not penalize violence-promoting candidates, even if they themselves oppose hate crime. Meanwhile, proponents of antirefugee hate crime welcome the overt advocacy of violence. When examining support among all voters, championing violence is a losing proposition for AfD candidates among those who do not approve of hate crime and does not gain votes among those who do. However, since most voters generally do not consider voting for the AfD, the losses are quite modest (between 1.8 and 2.4 points).

Turning to center-right CDU candidates, proposing gun use against refugees always generates more vote losses than gains. CDU voters who do not support hate crime harshly penalize candidates who deviate from the more moderate party line and from their own views. CDU voters who do support hate crime are likely more ambivalent, weighing candidates' departure from the party brand against their own preferences about antirefugee violence.

To summarize, among the radical right AfD, calling for violence against refugees consolidates its base. Though AfD candidates cannot expand their coalition by endorsing violence, sending these messages generates enthusiasm among a sizable portion of its electorate. Violence-promoting candidates have a clear edge among radical right hate crime supporters.

Discussion

Despite its increased criminalization, hate crime continues to spread. Bigoted violence will be difficult to root out if perpetrators enjoy societal support. This paper therefore establishes the nature and extent of this support, presenting survey-based evidence of antirefugee hate crime support and its political consequences.

The results are sobering. Sizable minorities embrace violent xenophobia. While the typical hate crime offender is young, male, and of low socioeconomic status, the "typical" hate crime supporter also features women, the middle-aged, and the economically comfortable. Wide segments of German society support antirefugee violence, giving fuel to offenders who are ready and willing to act on their behalf.

These findings call for policy interventions that recognize the everyday nature of extremism. As Miller-Idriss (16) reveals about extremism in the United States, youth are increasingly radicalized by encountering far-right messages and activists in ordinary spaces. This mainstreaming is a deliberate strategy. My survey evidence makes clear why this strategy is successful: A large group of citizens is already predisposed to espousing far-right ideas of hate and violence. The challenge for extremist organizations hoping to grow their base then lies less in persuasion and more in mobilization and recruitment.

Future work should adapt this survey to other settings to assess whether these conclusions travel beyond Germany and extend to other groups, including religious and sexual minorities. In doing so, it can refine the current survey by probing what victim characteristics and public discourse are particularly conducive to generating a violent response.

Another research avenue relates to the role of elites. Bridging elite and mass accounts of hate crime, I show that citizens' embrace of hate crime incentivizes some political elites to further propagate violence. What is less clear is whether this dynamic can unleash a spiral of violence, drawing in citizens who previously may not have considered engaging in hate crime. Future studies can explore this possibility—as well as the potential for countermobilization by opponents of hate crime^{§§}—while being mindful of ethical concerns that arise when manipulating the appeal of violence.

A limitation of the present study is its inability to test where, when, and how hate crime proponents express their support. While some supporters may feel pressure to censor their attitudes toward xenophobic violence, others may thrive on expressing them vocally. The same applies to hate crime opponents. The list experiment gives us confidence that respondents answer sincerely within the survey context. To study how these views are broadcast in social or online spaces requires a different approach (see ref. 50). As hate crime research progresses, integrating this paper's

^{§§}Based on research on immigration attitudes (48) and online hate speech (49), an effective counter mobilization strategy could be generating empathy with the victimized group.

survey-based analysis with designs that vary social and political environments promises to be a fruitful approach.

Data, Materials, and Software Availability. Data and code needed to replicate all analyses presented in the paper and in the *SI Appendix* have been deposited in Harvard Dataverse <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WUVTRF>.

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