

# Dutch national identity in a majority-minority context: when the dominant group becomes a local minority

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## ABSTRACT

With increasing ethnic diversity in Western European cities, more and more inhabitants without a migration background find themselves a local minority in majority-minority neighbourhoods, where less than half of the inhabitants have no migration background. We investigate whether this affects how they define national identity. We compare Dutch inhabitants without a migration background in majority-minority neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam to a representative sample of the overall Dutch population without a migration background and investigate how people describe what they see as truly Dutch. We find that national identity content is seen in the same way by both groups. The majority views Dutch identity as mostly achievable but does attach some importance to ascriptive characteristics. A smaller class of people is more restrictive and attaches quite some importance to both ascriptive and achievable characteristics. The smallest class considers Dutch identity achievable and not ascriptive at all. All three national identity content classes involve drawing boundaries around the nation-state, but with different degrees of permeability. Our finding that these patterns are almost identical, both in majority-minority neighbourhoods as in the overall population, suggests an important role of national public discourse on national identity formation.

## ARTICLE HISTORY


Received 29 November 2021  
Accepted 18 July 2022

## KEYWORDS

National identity; ethnic and civic identity; majority-minority context; super-diversity; Dutch identity

## 1. Introduction

Ethnic diversity is increasing throughout European countries, the result of migration and globalisation processes (Vertovec 2019). Especially in urban spaces, more and more inhabitants have a migration background, i.e. they are born abroad or have parent(s) born abroad.<sup>1</sup> The diversity among migrants has also increased: more different origin groups but also more diversity within migrant and ethnic groups (Crul 2016). In a number of cities this has led to a substantive demographic shift: the population without a migration background has become a numerical minority. That is, the share of Dutch inhabitants without a migration background has dropped considerably over the years and has reached the point where less than half of the inhabitants are of

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Dutch origin. Numerically, they are now a minority group, living in the same area together with various minority groups of migrant origin. A prime example of this demographic change in the Netherlands is the two biggest Dutch cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The change is concentrated in so-called majority-minority neighbourhoods, neighbourhoods in which all ethnic population groups – including the group without a migration background – form a numerical minority group. There is no longer an ethnic or migrant majority group (Crul and Lelie 2019).<sup>2</sup> This shift implies that the nationally dominant group becomes a numerical minority at the local level, which might have consequences for hierarchies and power relations at the local level (Aptekar 2019).

And yet, despite the potential for changing hierarchies, one element tied to the dominance of the group without a migration background remains very relevant: the nation-state remains the main category of belonging in the modern world (Brubaker 2010). It also ‘remains the frame for the daily lives of most people in Western societies’ (Brett and Moran 2011, 204). Therefore, despite people living in diverse contexts, identifying in various different ways, and activating various categories of belonging, the way in which they relate to the nation-state and give meaning to national identity remains central for their identity, and for the way in which they act in the social world.

The question that arises is whether the meaning (i.e. content) of national identity becomes different for people living in majority-minority contexts. Does this exposure to diversity lead people to attach more importance to ascriptive aspects of national identity, or to the contrary, less importance? Evidence on how majority-minority contexts change social hierarchies suggests a move away from the focus on ethnic, ethnonational, and nativist perspectives (Mepschen 2019, Wessendorf 2014) as well as a general decrease in the relevance of national categories for daily life (Geldof 2016). However, Mepschen and Duyvendak (2018) show that living in a majority-minority context can drive experiences of cultural threat and influence people in thinking in terms of ethnonational belonging. When we take into account that overall, national identity remains central as a category of belonging, the question arises whether living in a majority-minority context makes a difference for how people give meaning to national identity. Moreover, while people without a migration background become local minorities in majority-minority contexts, they remain the largest minority group among all groups and exposure to diversity might not be as confrontational as some of the literature suggests.

In this study, we pursue this question further by comparing a majority-minority context with a non majority-minority context. We choose the Netherlands as a case study due to the demographic composition of its two largest cities, Rotterdam and Amsterdam. While Dutch people without a migration background remain a national majority, in both cities their share is less than 50% of the population and hence they are a local minority. Applying identical survey measurements, we are able to compare the national identity content of those without a migration background living in these two cities with their counterparts living across the Netherlands. The Netherlands is also an interesting case as in recent years radical right populist parties became more dominant in the political discourse and public concerns about immigration are rather salient. Hence, our research question is *‘How do patterns of national identity content differ between Dutch people without a migration background who are a local minority and those who are not?’*

Literature on national identity content covers a lot of ground as well as different ways of thinking about national identity. One of the most prominent conceptualizations is the juxtaposition between a civic and an ethnonational identity (Brubaker 1999). An ethnonational identity refers to seeing national identity as centred around a common ethnic heritage of the dominant ethnic group in a country, an identity which is ascribed and therefore cannot be achieved by others (Esses et al. 2005). By virtue of this, ethnonational identity is exclusionary and exclusive. On the other hand, a civic identity is centred around commitment to civic values of a national community, like respecting its laws and institutions (Esses et al. 2005). As such, people subscribing to a civic identity draw fewer boundaries around the nation-state, making national identity more accessible to other ethnic groups. The concepts are widely used to study national identity as well as to investigate its consequences for inclusion and exclusion of migrants and minorities (e.g. Esses et al. 2005; Reijerse et al. 2013; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2015; Wakefield et al. 2011). However, Brubaker (1999) points out that the two dimensions could be more closely related than usually treated in literature, and civic identity also contains exclusionist elements. For instance, Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou (2013) show that civic identity rhetoric can also be employed to exclude certain ethnic groups.

In this study, we aim to clarify the relationship between these dimensions by engaging explicitly with this criticism and using a methodological approach which moves away from this theoretically imposed dichotomous distinction to a more detailed representation of national identity content patterns. To that end, we use latent class analysis to conduct an empirical exploration of these dimensions.

Our research also relates to studies on superdiversity, the increased diversity between and within immigrant and ethnic minority groups (Vertovec 2019). Alba and Duyvendak (2019) point out that previous research on superdiversity does not engage very much with the mainstream context within which majority-minority changes take place. They see superdiversity as a helpful frame for understanding horizontal relations between groups living together in very diverse settings, but not so much vertical ones that reflect the social power of the national majority group. Our study engages explicitly with the mainstream context by turning to definitions and conceptualizations of national identity, as the power to define it remains arguably with the national majority (Lundström 2017; Simonsen 2022).

The main contribution of this study is therefore aimed at engaging with the mainstream and the majority group in a majority-minority context by comparing the conceptualisation of national identity between two settings: one where the majority group remains a majority, and one where it becomes a local minority. We explore whether national identity is given a different meaning in these two contexts. The secondary contribution concerns our empirical approach with latent class analysis to the criticism of the ethnic/civic distinction in national identity content.

As such, this study also places itself within larger societal discussions on changing (national) contexts and how that affects national identity. As national identity is increasingly politicised (Witteveen 2017), it becomes ever more pressing to understand how citizens themselves relate to it. For instance, populist parties across Europe are increasingly using civic identity rhetoric to establish themselves as more legitimate in the political scene, but also to draw more (and different groups of) voters (Duina and Carson 2020). It becomes therefore important not only to see how citizens reflect upon these discourses, but also how this reflection is shaped by social contexts.

## 2. Theoretical framework

### 2.1. *Ethnonational and civic identity*

The distinction between ethnonational and civic identity is both a main categorisation used to differentiate between policies and legislations of the nation-state as well as a categorisation reflected in the images of national identity that citizens hold (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2015). Therefore we use it as a starting point for understanding how people relate to and give meaning to the nation-state. The nation-state is seen as a form of sovereign community whereby the nation and the state are distinct, but interrelated concepts: 'the 'nation' is a particular form of political community, and the 'state' is the bureaucracy through which the sovereignty of this community is supposed to be realised' (Pehrson and Green 2010, 697). Authors like Gellner (1983) identify the assumption that nationhood and statehood should be congruent as the principle behind the nation-state. Historically, the nation, and as a result the nation-state, has been perceived as a homogenous ethnic group (e.g. Brubaker 2010). Even today many nation-states maintain this powerful symbolic boundary-making, whereby the national self is understood as an ethnic self, and is therefore exclusionary (Brubaker 1992).

This conception of the nation-state is related to a particularly ethno-nationalist national identity. This identity, often also called nativist identity, is based on the belief that national identity revolves around having been born in the country and being a member of the dominant religion, as well as in terms of 'bonds of kinship and a common ethnic heritage' (Esses et al. 2005, 320; Pehrson and Green 2010). Ethnonational identity can be seen as both essentialist and ascribed. One can only belong to the national ingroup if one was born from the 'right' parents and their parents before them and so on. Within ethnically homogenous interpretations of the nation-state, there is little place for the ethnic Other to truly be part of it. On top of being exclusionary in content, this form of identity is also shown to be related to more negative attitudes toward migrants (Esses et al. 2005; Pehrson and Green 2010), less support for migrants' political rights, (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2015) and to radical and populist right-wing voting (Filsinger et al. 2021; Lubbers and Coenders 2017).

However, nation-states are also polities based on shared public life rather than shared ancestry, and as such, often attempts are made to formulate the national group belonging therein in civic terms. Civic conceptualizations see national identity as based on a commitment to the laws and institutions of a country, as well as feelings of belonging to the national group (Esses et al. 2005; Pehrson and Green 2010). Civic national identity is about citizenship and participation in public life, and as such, anyone could belong to the national ingroup if they are committed to the laws and institutions of a country, feel themselves belonging to the national group, and participate in public life. Wakefield et al. (2011) for instance show that civic identity pushes respondents to see other ethnic groups more readily as part of the national ingroup. Consequently, civic identity is related to more positive attitudes and inclusive behaviour toward other ethnic groups.

However, some studies argue that civic identity revolves around an ingroup/outgroup distinction that shares exclusionary features with ethno-national identity (Filsinger et al. 2021). In the next section, we take a closer look at such criticism based on the argument that the two different forms of national identity concern a similar mechanism of inclusion and exclusion.

## 2.2. Criticism on the distinction as an ideal type

This distinction between ethnic and civic national identity has been widely used to understand the role national identity plays in how one relates to the so-called ethnic Other. Usually, scholars compare the effects of more exclusive understandings of the nation state (ethnonational identity) with more inclusive understandings of the nation state (civic identity). The distinction is conceptually maintained but also often empirically identified (e.g. Verkuyten and Martinovic 2015; see also Yogeewaran and Verkuyten 2022, for a literature overview). Nonetheless, criticism on the distinction points out that both ethnonational and civic identity are exclusive, only in different forms (Brubaker 1999). They both put boundaries around the nation-state and make it inaccessible to some people. Indeed, in their study on Northwestern European countries, Simonsen and Bonikowski (2020) show that civic conceptions of national identity are linked to exclusionary behaviours. Moreover, the populist right in many European countries specifically employs arguments related to civic identity, like highlighting civic values such as liberalism and tolerance in order to exclude certain ethnic groups who are seen as not embracing these values from the nation-state (Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013). Furthermore, writers like Schinkel and Van Houdt (2010) argue that a civic identity discourse is ultimately centred around a cultural assimilation discourse and has therefore ethnic elements.

It is also difficult to conceive of a situation in which people subscribe to a purely ethnic understanding of the nation state, but do not find civic elements important. For instance, Erhardt, Wamsler, and Freitag (2021) point out that ethnic and civic conceptualizations are overlapping. Aichholzer, Kritzinger, and Plescia (2021) also show how those that hold strong ethno-national identity views have a strong civic identity profile too. Another issue arises when we examine certain elements of national identity, for example language proficiency. Language proficiency can be seen as a marker of either civic or ethnonational identity (Oakes 2001). It can be a marker of ethno-national identity if it is constructed as a part of a nation's cultural heritage, but it can also be presented as a neutral agent that binds all those living in a country, regardless of ethnic background, therefore serving as a marker of civic identity (Oakes 2001).

While a number of studies do reproduce the dichotomy between ethnic and civic identity empirically, other studies have provided alternative, albeit inconclusive, empirical outcomes. Some research shows that there is only one factor, ranging from most to least exclusive and containing both ethnic and civic elements (e.g. Meeus et al. 2010). Yet other studies confirm the ethnic/civic distinction but show that a third factor focused on cultural aspects emerges (Eugster and Strijbis 2011; Reijerse et al. 2013). Dittmann and Kopf-Beck (2019) coded open answers of respondents and found four national identity classes that resemble, but go beyond, the ethnic/civic distinction.

Based on these considerations, we take leave from the bipolar scale which makes a theoretically imposed distinction between ethnic and civic national identity and aim to study national identity in terms of different patterns of inclusion and exclusion. We conceptualise these aspects of national identity in the same way as Canan and Simon (2019) and Wright (2011) who refer to aspects of national identity as ascriptive and achievable. Ascriptive refers to those elements of national identity that one can never acquire or that are inherited, reflecting what literature has mostly referred to as ethno-national elements,

while achievable refers to those elements of national identity that one can choose to take up, referred to more commonly as civic identity. This approach does not only make a difference in terminology, but also in conceptualisation as it maintains the distinction in the meaning and consequences of the two dimensions while addressing the criticism most often extended toward them: while the distinction between the two dimensions might not be as clear cut as previously suggested, the indicators do capture different aspects of national identity content, i.e. whether it is ascribed or achievable by ‘outsiders’. Theoretically then one could speak of different configurations of national identity, in which people hold varying degrees of beliefs regarding who can be a true national (e.g. people can consider both ascribed and achievable elements as important or unimportant, and people can consider only certain ascribed or achievable elements important).

We do not formulate specific directional hypotheses for this study. We aim to examine empirically which configurations of national identity emerge in an attempt to provide a framework that reflects the concept more accurately in its daily use. As such, we aim to provide an empirical approach to the critique on this distinction. We expect to find patterns of national identity content which combine ethnic and civic indicators of national identity in various ways rather than an ethnic/civic distinction only.

### **2.3. Different contexts, different expectations?**

National identity forming and perpetuation does not take place only at the national level and is not only a project of nation-state elites: national identity is also formed and negotiated in daily life (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). In fact, citizens’ construction of national identity can deviate from elites’ construction (Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck 2019). In general, the role of others is very important in how people define their identities (Svensson, Berne, and Syed 2018). Therefore, the context in which daily life takes place can be very important for national identity forming. The question arises whether people who live in a majority-minority context have a different sense of national identity than those who don’t. Research shows that the diversity people are exposed to in their daily life can indeed affect their sense of national identity, albeit the results differ. On the one hand, increased diversity has been shown to be connected to more familiarity with diversity (e.g. Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). Literature on common ingroup identity suggests that interethnic contact can lead ingroup members to expand group boundaries and to define the ingroup in broader terms (Gaetner and Dovidio 2012). By getting familiarised with the ‘other’, people can widen the definition of the national ingroup and find ascribed aspects of national identity less relevant for defining the national ingroup (e.g. Canan and Simon 2019).

On the other hand, research also connects increasing diversity to higher perceptions of ethnic threat (e.g. Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Strabac 2011). Based on this link, Wright (2011) argues that when confronted with more diversity, people respond by defining national identity more narrowly and in ascriptive terms, so that it is more exclusive of immigrants. In general, people also tend to feel threatened when established social hierarchies are challenged, and could react negatively to the challengers (Ridgeway, Johnson, and Diekema 1994; Rudman et al. 2012).

However, majority-minority contexts as a demographic development denote more than just exposure to diversity. Literature on superdiversity addresses the implications



of this shift more in-depth: in Western European cities, we see not only increased diversity, but also new hierarchies and power relations within society (Erel 2016; Vertovec 2019). For instance, changes in power hierarchies might make certain forms of identity less relevant and less prevalent in daily contexts: as Geldof (2016) argues, nationality stops being a useful category for understanding people living in superdiverse contexts given that inhabitants of these contexts subscribe to transnational lifestyles, combining places and cultures. Traditional takes on national identity which put the accent on ethnic elements could become obsolete in a context in which various ethnic groups share power more equally. Geldof's take is especially reflective of a bottom-up perspective which sees national identity and belonging as constructed in daily practice (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008).

Nonetheless, Geldof (2016) also highlights that local superdiverse contexts still exist within national contexts which have dominant policy frameworks mostly oriented toward the dominant culture, recognising therefore that traditional hierarchies still remain relevant.

In their work on Amsterdam New West, Mepschen and Duyvendak (2018) specifically address the role of the dominant culture and context. They show how nationally dominant discourses about the national culture can still be perpetuated and even enhanced in superdiverse neighbourhoods. In their study, they turn to culturalist discourse, by which they denote a focus on a national native ethno-culture. They find that people without a migration background living in a superdiverse neighbourhood subscribe to and (re)produce a rather culturalist discourse with regards to other ethnic groups (Mepschen and Duyvendak 2018). These findings can be placed in a top-down perspective on national identity, which argues that national identity is primarily an elites project and is then reproduced by the population at large (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). Even though national identity is constructed and reconstructed at the local level, it still takes the shape of the dominant national discourse.

Furthermore, it is important to note that in most majority-minority neighbourhoods in our study, although the share of those without a migrant background is less than 50% of the local population, they mostly remain a large group compared to the different migrant minority groups that reside in the neighbourhood. This could also play a role in prioritising dominant discourses.

In this part of the study, we once again do not formulate a directional hypothesis regarding differences between those who live in a majority-minority context and those who do not. On the one hand, it could be that people without a migration background who are a minority at the local level are more likely to draw fewer boundaries around the nation-state and focus less on its ascribed (i.e. ethnic) aspects. On the other hand, people exposed to diversity might experience more ethnic threat, and therefore tend to subscribe to more exclusive and ascribed configurations of national identity.

### 3. Method

#### 3.1. Data

In this paper, we zoom in on the Netherlands, a national context in which the national majority population (Dutch people without a migration background) have become a

numerical minority locally in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In 2021, 44% of the inhabitants of Amsterdam and 47% of those of Rotterdam had no migration background. Among the migrant population, the three largest groups were of Moroccan origin (9% in Amsterdam and 7% in Rotterdam), Surinamese origin (respectively 7% and 8%), and Turkish origin (respectively 5% and 7%).<sup>3</sup> We compare a nationally representative sample of people without a migration background with those living in Amsterdam and Rotterdam neighbourhoods, where they have become a minority. The dataset of people without a migration background living in Amsterdam and Rotterdam has been collected by the *Becoming a Minority (BaM)* project (BaM 2019). Using the municipal register, the population was sampled only in majority-minority neighbourhoods in both cities and approached by invitation letter. Response rate across both cities was 18.8%.<sup>4</sup> This response rate was rather low and we will discuss the comparability with the national sample in section 3.3. There are in total 850 respondents, 422 from Amsterdam and 428 from Rotterdam. 48.6% of the sample is female. The BaM project only researches people between 25 and 45 years of age<sup>5</sup>, and the mean age is 35 years old.

The nationally representative sample is collected as part of the LISS panel. The LISS (Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences) panel is administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University). The panel population is sampled using the population register of Statistics Netherlands and approached by invitation letter. We use a dataset collected in the summer of 2018. The response rate among the panel members was 80%.<sup>6</sup> To make it comparable to the BaM sample, we created a subsample in which we only keep people without a migration background between the ages of 25 and 45. In total, we have 1002 respondents, on average 35 years old with 56.7% of the sample being female.

### 3.2. Measures

In both datasets the same questions are available regarding ethnic and civic aspects of national identity. Respondents are asked whether they find the following issues important for being Dutch: ‘To have been born in the Netherlands’; ‘To have Dutch ancestry’; ‘To respect Dutch political institutions and laws’; ‘To be able to speak Dutch’; ‘To feel Dutch’. The sixth and final characteristic was phrased slightly differently, referring to either ‘To have Dutch citizenship’ (BaM) or ‘To have Dutch nationality’ (LISS). Nonetheless, both formulations refer to the same concept, being legally in possession of Dutch nationality, which manifests in practice as possessing a Dutch passport. Therefore we treat both items as covering the same issue.

We consider the first two items reflective of ascriptive national identity, and the last four items reflective of achievable national identity. The answer categories range from 1 to 5 (BaM) or from 1 to 4 (LISS). We recoded all items so that the lowest and highest scores refer to respectively, the least or the most importance attached to the criteria. Given that the comparison between the datasets will not be quantitative and statistically driven, the differing categories do not pose a problem, as the interpretation of the latent classes is based on the scores relative to each other within each of the two datasets.<sup>7</sup>

Additionally, we include covariates for relevant background characteristics, namely gender, age, income, educational level, and political orientation. These covariates are used to investigate whether they predict latent class membership. Educational level



and political orientation are slightly differently measured across both datasets. Once again, this does not pose a problem as the comparison between the datasets will be descriptive and not statistical. The BaM questionnaire used adjusted educational categories from the European Social Survey, while the LISS questionnaire used categories referring specifically to the Dutch context (see Table 2). Political orientation is recoded so that higher scores refer to a right-wing orientation. Income is measured as the net average monthly household income, and ranges from 1 (up to €1300) to 5 (€4600 and more). As we compare a national dataset with one from the two largest cities, we also include a covariate for the rate of urbanisation in the national analysis.

### 3.3. Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. As the answer categories for the national identity items differ between samples, the reader should refer to the minimum and maximum values when interpreting the mean. Taking into account these range differences, we see roughly the same results across both samples when comparing the mean to the minimum and maximum of the scales. In both samples, the ascriptive indicators (being born in the Netherlands and having Dutch ancestry) have means under the mid-point of their respective scales. The other four indicators (the achievable aspects) have means above the mid-points. The levels of the latent class indicators are therefore rather comparable across the two datasets.

When it comes to the covariates, we see that the BaM sample has a more equal distribution of gender (slightly less than half the sample is female, compared to 56.7% in the LISS sample). The age distribution is very similar, with a mean of respectively 34.9 and 35.5 and almost similar standard deviations. Regarding political orientation, respondents score on average slightly left of centre in the BaM sample, and slightly right of centre in the LISS sample. Income distributions are rather comparable across both samples. The BaM sample has relatively more higher educated respondents, with 77% having a tertiary education, compared to 55% in the LISS sample. In general, these sample differences do reflect that the population (without a migration background) in the two largest cities is relatively higher educated and has a relatively more left-wing political orientation.

### 3.4. Analysis

For each dataset, we conduct a Latent Class Analysis of the six national identity items and their covariates. LCA uses observed responses of individuals to classify them into subpopulations (the latent classes) (Geiser 2013). Therefore, LCA can help us to uncover underlying patterns with regards to the importance attached to different national identity aspects and to identify subpopulations (classes), as well as to see whether class membership is predicted by certain background characteristics. We use Latent Gold version 6.0 (Vermunt and Magidson 2021) and impute missing values using full information maximum likelihood for the national identity indicators and Latent Gold's imputation procedure for the covariates.

We test 7 model specifications, with the number of classes varying from 1 to 7. This is based on the theoretical literature on civic and ethnic national identity that mostly

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics.

	BaM sample				LISS sample			
	Nobs	Min	Max	Mean(SD)/ %	Nobs	Min	Max	Mean(SD)/ %
Born in the Netherlands	843	1	5	2.65(1.11)	930	1	4	2.42(.9)
Respect Dutch laws	842	1	5	4.39(.70)	935	1	4	3.4(.72)
Have Dutch ancestry	841	1j	5	2.3(1.03)	926	1	4	1.84(.81)
Speak Dutch	843	1	5	4.28(.76)	938	1	4	3.65(.6)
Have Dutch nationality	837	1	5	3.37(1.17)	936	1	4	3.18(.86)
Feel Dutch	831	1	5	4.08(.96)	929	1	4	3.27(.81)
Gender	848				1002			
<i>Female</i>	413			48.6%	568			56.7%
<i>Male</i>	422			50.9%	434			43.3%
<i>Other</i>	2			.2%	n/a			n/a
Age	849	25	46	34.86(6.19)	1002	25	45	35.45(6.17)
Income	780	1	5	3.57(1.20)	913	1	5	3.53(1.12)
Political orientation	781	1	7	3.43(1.45)	720	0	10	5.36(2.19)
Education level	831				1000			
<i>Less than lower secondary</i>	5			.6%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Lower secondary</i>	25			3.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Lower tier upper secondary</i>	71			8.4%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Upper tier upper secondary</i>	37			4.4%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Advanced vocational sub degree</i>	35			4.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Lower tertiary education, BA level</i>	186			21.9%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Higher tertiary education, MA level</i>	481			55.4%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Primary education</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	13			1.3%
<i>Intermediate secondary education</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	68			6.8%
<i>Higher secondary education/preparatory university</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	73			7.3%
<i>Intermediate vocational education</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	292			29.2%
<i>Higher vocational education</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	341			34.1%
<i>University</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	213			21.3%
Level of urbanisation	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	994			
<i>Extremely urban</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	161			16.2%
<i>Very urban</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	279			28.1%
<i>Moderately urban</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	213			21.4%
<i>Slightly urban</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	194			19.5%
<i>Not urban</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	147			14.8%

regards this as two dimensions, the combination of which could lead up to four configurations. As Latent Class models are usually tested on more classes than theoretically possible, we create some room by testing up to seven classes.

We examine both BIC and AIC (see Table 2) as indicators of model fit when comparing the different model specifications (Kuha 2004). Lower statistics refer to a relatively better model fit. While in both samples the models with more classes show improving statistics, the changes flatten after the three-class solution, as seen in Figure 1. Therefore, we continue with the interpretation of the three-class solution.

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Latent classes

The three classes with the six national identity indicators are presented in Figure 2a and b. Appendix 1 shows the respective class sizes and conditional probabilities (i.e. the probability of providing a specific answer to each item, given class membership). The classes

**Table 2.** Model fit of 1–7 latent class solutions in both samples.

	BaM Sample (majority-minority sample)			LISS Sample (nationally representative sample)		
	BIC(LL)	AIC(LL)	Entropy R <sup>2</sup>	BIC(LL)	AIC(LL)	Entropy R <sup>2</sup>
1 Class	12914,9449	12801,0592	1,0000	12097,5365	12009,1610	1,0000
2 Classes	12185,4404	11986,1405	0,7329	11385,1595	11198,5889	0,7212
3 Classes	11958,6060	11673,8918	0,7899	11264,9782	10980,2125	0,7282
4 Classes	11930,2665	11560,1381	0,7604	11234,9459	10851,9851	0,6791
5 Classes	11942,7004	11487,1577	0,7523	11261,6192	10780,4634	0,6900
6 Classes	11978,2353	11437,2784	0,7318	11315,5348	10736,1839	0,6962
7 Classes	12026,2404	11399,8692	0,7472	11398,0252	10720,4792	0,6848

have roughly the same size across both datasets. Latent class 1, ‘the semi-achievable identity class’, comprises 58% of the BaM and 59% of the LISS respondents. Latent class 2, ‘the all-round exclusionist class’, comprises respectively 26% and 27% of the respondents. Finally, latent class 3, ‘the achievable identity class’ comprises respectively 16% and 14% of the respondents. We discuss the classes below in the order of restrictiveness, from most to least restrictive regarding what respondents find important for being truly Dutch.


**4.1.1. ‘The all-round exclusionist class’**

Latent class 2 represents roughly one-fourth of the respondents in both samples. Members of this class find all included aspects of national identity content very important for being truly Dutch. The standardised means (displayed in Figure 2a and b) as well as the estimated conditional probabilities for each category of the six identity items (see Appendix 2), show relatively high levels of attached importance to all items. Respondents score high on both the ascriptive indicators, such as being born in the Netherlands, as well as on the achievable indicators, such as feeling Dutch and respecting Dutch laws and institutions.


This group formulates the least accessible pathway to being truly Dutch. As they attach value to all indicators, whether they are achievable or ascriptive, we call this class ‘the all-round exclusionist class’.

**4.1.2. ‘The semi-achievable identity class’**

Latent class 1 is with more than half of the respondents the biggest class in both samples (respectively 58% and 59% of the BaM and LISS sample). The standardised means and estimated conditional probabilities indicate that respondents in this class score rather high on less strict boundary making aspects (i.e. the achievable indicators), such as



**Figure 1.** Decreasing improvement of model fit for the 1–7 latent class solutions in both samples.



**Figure 2.** a. Latent classes among minority-majority respondents without a migration background (BaM sample). b. Latent classes among a national sample of respondents without a migration background (LISS sample).

respecting Dutch laws and institutions, speaking Dutch and feeling Dutch. Compared to the former ‘all-round exclusionist class’, they attach however less importance to the stricter boundary making aspects. They find those ascriptive indicators – being born in the Netherlands and having Dutch ancestry – rather unimportant.

As shown in Figure 2a and b, members of this class score in the middle between the other two classes. They consider being Dutch as less ascribed compared to the most exclusive class of the ‘all-round exclusionists’. Nonetheless, they still maintain some strict boundaries. Hence we label this class the ‘semi-achievable identity class’.

### 4.1.3. *'The achievable identity class'*

The third and smallest class in both samples represents 16% of the BaM and 14% of the LISS respondents. In this class, respondents score very low on the strict (i.e. ascriptive) boundary making items. That is, they consider being born in the Netherlands and having Dutch ancestry not important at all for being truly Dutch. In contrast, they do find the achievable indicators rather important, such as feeling Dutch and speaking Dutch, although to a lesser extent than the other two classes.

Beyond the strict boundary-making items, the main difference between this class and the large 'semi-achievable identity class' (class 1), is that this class attaches also less importance to the achievable identity indicators, with the exception of 'respecting laws and institutions'. Hence, latent class 3 does seem to be the group that draws the least boundaries. We label this class therefore the 'achievable identity class'.

## 4.2. *Covariates*

We now turn to the covariates to see whether these background characteristics predict class membership, and whether this differs across the two datasets. The results are presented in [Tables 3a](#) and [3b](#).<sup>8</sup> We observe that for the BaM sample, class membership is strongly predicted by right-wing political orientation. The more right-wing respondents are, the more often they belong to the 'all-round exclusionist class', and the less often to the 'achievable identity class'. Hence, the more right-wing someone is, the more restrictively they define national identity. Age also has a significant effect. The older the respondent the more often they belong to the 'all-round exclusionist class'. Next, class membership is also somewhat related to income: those with a higher income are more often found among the middle 'semi-achievable identity' class, compared to the most restrictive class.

We found no differences in class membership between those living in Amsterdam or Rotterdam. Finally, gender and, rather remarkable, educational level do not play a role either.

Turning to the nationally representative LISS sample, we found the same result with political orientation as the most important predictor. Again, those with a more right-wing political orientation are more often found among the 'all-round exclusionist class' and are less likely to belong to the 'achievable identity class'. In other words, the more right-wing, the more restrictive the definition of national identity. However, we also found some differences across the two samples. Most importantly, we found an overall effect of education in the nationwide LISS sample. People with a university degree define national identity in less restrictive terms, as they tend to belong less often to the 'all-round exclusionist class'. Controlled for this educational effect, age and income do not play a role for class membership in the LISS sample. Gender was not relevant in either sample.

In the nationwide LISS sample, we also controlled for the level of urbanisation. Overall we found a significant effect, with those living in slightly and moderately urban environments to belong more often to the 'all-round exclusionist class'. Hence, relative to those living in rural or very and extremely urban areas, those living in a slight to moderate urban environments tend to define national identity in more restrictive terms.

**Table 3a.** Covariates of a Latent Class Analysis predicting class membership of Dutch national identity (compared to the ‘semi-achievable class’ as reference class) in the majority-minority (BaM) sample in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Covariates	All-round exclusionist class	Achievable identity class	Z	b	s.e.	z	p
	b	s.e.					
<i>Intercept</i>	-5.48	1.70	-3.21	0.28	1.40	0.20	0.00
Female	-0.21	0.22	-0.98	0.03	0.23	0.15	0.57
Income	-0.17	0.10	-1.72	-0.22	0.10	-2.13	0.05
Age	0.06	0.02	3.46	0.00	0.02	-0.20	0.00
Education level ( <i>ref = primary education</i> )							0.70
<i>Lower secondary</i>	1.69	1.62	1.05	1.35	1.38	0.98	
<i>Lower tier upper secondary</i>	1.23	1.55	0.79	0.38	1.27	0.30	
<i>Upper tier upper secondary</i>	1.11	1.59	0.70	0.38	1.31	0.29	
<i>Advanced vocational sub degree</i>	1.15	1.59	0.72	-0.40	1.41	-0.28	
<i>Lower tertiary education, BA level</i>	0.59	1.54	0.39	0.38	1.23	0.30	
<i>Higher tertiary education, MA level</i>	1.25	1.52	0.82	0.40	1.23	0.32	
Right-wing political orientation	0.59	0.09	6.79	-0.32	0.11	-3.08	0.00
Rotterdam ( <i>ref = Amsterdam</i> )	-0.15	0.21	-0.72	-0.27	0.23	-1.18	0.45

**4.3. Comparing classes across samples**

All in all, there are only few differences between the samples in terms of how national identity content is constructed. Importantly, across both datasets, the same classes of national identity content emerge in terms of patterns, interpretation, and size. Furthermore, in both samples, right wing political orientation is related to the more exclusive

**Table 3b.** Covariates of a Latent Class Analysis predicting class membership of Dutch national identity (compared to the ‘semi-achievable class’ as reference class) in the national representative (LISS) sample.

Covariates	All-round exclusionist class	Achievable identity class	Z	b	s.e.	z	p
	b	s.e.					
<i>Intercept</i>	-2.17	1.12	-1.94	0.87	1.25	0.69	0.06
Female	-0.28	0.19	-1.49	0.05	0.25	0.20	0.28
Age	0.00	0.02	0.21	0.01	0.02	0.37	0.93
Income	-0.08	0.10	-0.88	-0.12	0.13	-0.96	0.50
Education level ( <i>ref = primary education</i> )							0.01
<i>Intermediate secondary education</i>	-0.15	0.92	-0.17	-12.19	17.77	-0.69	
<i>Higher secondary education/preparatory university</i>	-1.19	0.93	-1.28	-0.23	0.99	-0.24	
<i>Intermediate vocational education</i>	-0.79	0.87	-0.91	-1.33	0.96	-1.38	
<i>Higher vocational education</i>	-1.10	0.87	-1.26	-0.78	0.94	-0.83	
<i>University</i>	-1.55	0.90	-1.72	-0.97	0.96	-1.01	
Right-wing political orientation	0.37	0.06	6.03	-0.28	0.07	-4.21	0.00
Urbanisation level ( <i>ref = extremely urban</i> )							0.01
<i>Very urban</i>	0.34	0.36	0.95	0.59	0.36	1.67	
<i>Moderately urban</i>	0.64	0.36	1.75	-0.41	0.44	-0.94	
<i>Slightly urban</i>	0.91	0.36	2.51	0.07	0.43	0.17	
<i>Not urban</i>	0.59	0.38	1.55	-0.41	0.50	-0.82	



national identity class. Differences are only to be found in some of the other covariates predicting class membership. While income and age only play a role in the majority-minority (BaM) sample, the level of education only plays a role in the nationally representative (LISS) sample. This difference may be attributed to the fact that the BaM sample is relatively higher educated with less variance in education compared to the nation-wide LISS sample.

In this paper we asked the question whether people without a migration background who are exposed to diversity in a way fundamentally different from their counterparts elsewhere in the country, will also relate to national identity differently. Given the few differences we found in this comparison of latent class results between the two datasets we can answer this question by highlighting that people without a migration background that live in a majority-minority context and those that do not, do not relate to national identity differently.

## 5. Discussion and conclusion

We investigated whether living as a minority affects the way people without a migration background construct the content of national identity. We compared people without a migration background living in the majority-minority cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam with people without a migration background throughout the entirety of the Netherlands. Our comparison was qualitative: we compared descriptively the results of two separate analyses. We saw three classes emerge across both groups of people, and the classes could be interpreted in the same way, therefore both groups exhibited the same patterns of national identity. Members of these classes differ in what they find important for being truly Dutch. The size of the three classes was almost identical across both samples.

In order to study the content of national identity and what is considered important for being truly Dutch, we took up the critique on the ethnic/civic distinction (Brubaker 1999) which points out that both forms of national identity denote exclusion from the nation state, just in different forms, and followed Dittmann and Kopf-Beck's (2019) example in designing a latent class analysis in order to identify emerging patterns of national identity. Therefore we aimed to offer an empirical solution to the critique on the ethnic/civic distinction in the discussions on national identity. Following Canan and Simon (2019) and Wright (2011) we approached the distinction as one between ascriptive and achievable aspects of national identity. We also pointed out that theoretically speaking, the two forms are more complementary than mutually exclusive, unlike how they are often treated in literature. The classes that emerge confirm that the distinction in how people define national identity content is not dichotomous between ethnic and civic aspects, but more nuanced across an axis of levels of achievability of national identity.

This indicates that the criticism on the dichotomy between civic and ethnonational identity holds ground, and that is one of the two major contributions of this paper. As we see in this study, the distinction is not so much between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity, and it is also certainly not a dichotomy. The content of national identity in this sense could be seen more in terms of the degree to which an 'Outsider' can claim Dutch identity. It is noteworthy that no class emerged in which none of these aspects of Dutchness were considered important: all respondents put conditions on

the ability to claim Dutch national identity, which means that they all construct at least some boundaries around Dutchness. Nonetheless, how accessible Dutch national identity is to outsiders depends on the class.

Importantly, we noted that the ‘semi-achievable identity class’ is the biggest group. This result fits within what some have called the ‘civic zeitgeist’ (Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013), which according to the authors sometimes is even captured by radical right wing parties. Therefore the ‘most’ dominant discourse is a civic one, as we see reflected here in terms of achievable national identity characteristics. However, it is important to note both that this ‘semi-achievable identity class’ subscribes to a civic understanding that still contains a few ethnic elements and that the most exclusive group, which attaches a lot of importance to ascriptive characteristics, makes up slightly more than 1/4th of each sample. This indicates the relevance and weight of an ethno-national discourse in the Netherlands, both in a majority-minority and a national context.

These results also show why the ethnic/civic distinction is problematic and insufficient in covering national identity content. In a Dutch context, it is evident that subscribing to more ethnic (i.e. ascriptive) aspects of identity does not take place in a vacuum and is paired with a strong civic (i.e. achievable) identity as well. Therefore they cannot be seen as opposite to each other.

### **5.1. Majority-minority context**

To determine whether the majority-minority context plays a role in national identity definition, we looked at the size and composition of the latent classes across both the majority-minority and the general population sample, and we showed that the classes are roughly of the same size and have the same composition. Furthermore, in both samples right-wing respondents belonged to the most exclusive class more often, which fits within the literature which shows how right wing parties partially drive the discourse on ethnonational identity (Rydgren 2017).

The populations only differed in some of the other covariates which we used to predict class membership. For instance, in the national sample, those with a university level education are less likely to draw restrictive boundaries around national identity, in line with previous research (e.g. Coenders and Scheepers 2003). However, in the majority-minority context of the two largest cities, education has no effect. This difference might be attributed to the differing context, as social class boundaries might become less salient in a majority-minority-context where people share other identities with their neighbours. Alternatively, the difference could also be explained by a lack of dispersion in education in the BaM sample, where most respondents of the two largest cities are highly educated.

Income was only relevant for class membership in the majority-minority (BaM) sample. This might reflect that lower income groups – who define national identity somewhat more restrictively – are more often living in the poorest neighbourhoods of the largest cities, which are also the most diverse, and where interethnic tensions might be more prevalent. Finally we found, again only in the majority-minority sample, that higher age is related to a more restrictive national identity view. This might reflect that older respondents without a migration background in these two largest cities have witnessed a very strong change in the composition of their city and own neighbourhood. Younger people living in majority-

minority neighbourhoods could have been born or grown up in these neighbourhoods, therefore being more familiar with such an environment.

All in all, despite these slight differences in the effect of covariates in determining class membership, the emerging classes and their interpretation are very similar across the two contexts. We conclude that in both samples, the same patterns of national identity emerge: people without a migration background that are a minority did not show more or less exclusive patterns of national identity as compared to those that are not a minority.

## **5.2. Limitations and further research**

The comparison made in this paper remains largely descriptive and limited in time and space. Firstly, more refined analyses of differences in other local contexts are important. In this paper, we investigated national identity content in two cities in which on average, people without a migration background are a minority, and we focused specifically on majority-minority neighbourhoods. To further disentangle the effect of population composition at the city level and at the immediate neighbourhood environment, larger comparative analyses are needed of neighbourhoods and cities with more variance in the share of migrant population. Secondly, future research could focus on international comparisons, given that national contexts can differ in national identity discourses. Although we believe our findings are relevant for other Western European countries where public concerns about immigration are rather widespread and the populist radical right is on the rise, more cross-national empirical studies are needed. Furthermore, future research should also consider longitudinal studies, to take into account changing dominant discourses on national identity and the growing number of majority-minority contexts.

Future research should also address the degree of identification with the nation that respondents display on top of the content of national identification discussed here. It could be that while a majority-minority context does not affect the content of identity, it affects the degree of identification, which might in turn attenuate or strengthen the effects of the content of national identity on exclusionary attitudes and behaviours toward other ethnic groups. Previous research already shows that the level and type of national identification can work in tandem in how they affect exclusionary behaviours (Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck 2019).

Furthermore, future research should address the interplay between national and local identities. While national identity might reflect overall public discourse, people might negotiate at the local level when it comes to their local identities. Alternately, local identities could take importance over national identity, a way in which a majority-minority context could have an effect on daily life.

## **5.3. Contribution and implications**

The main contribution of this paper shows that there is no difference in the patterns of boundary-making around national identity between a national context and a majority-minority one. Therefore the content of national identity is given meaning in the same way by Dutch people without a migration background that are a numerical minority locally, and Dutch people without a migration background that remain a majority.

These result goes against both streams of research we outlined earlier. On the one hand, we looked at literature which expects the relevance of national identity to decrease in majority-minority contexts. On the other hand, there is literature that expects people to embrace even more ascriptive understandings of national identity in majority-minority contexts. Instead, we find that people embrace the same understandings of national identity across contexts. The result could be an indication that conceptions of national identity are very deep-seated and confrontation with diversity does not change such conceptions. National identity is formulated and conveyed at the national level. These constructions of national identity are available to everyone equally, and accessed by everyone, whether they are constructs of exclusion, inclusion, or even resistance to the way national identity is conceptualised in public discourse. Therefore, for the way in which people draw ethnic boundaries around the nation state it might not matter whether they live with diversity or not, because they are exposed to more or less the same discourse on national identity. This supports a top-down understanding of national identity: an elites project wherein the everyday construction of national identity is still reflective of the dominant discourse (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008).

This finding has implications not only for the study of national identity in majority-minority contexts, but also for understanding ethnic boundary making in contemporary societies. The enduring importance of national level discourse in the face of local changes indicates that dominant hierarchies could be more stable than suggested by some research. At the same time, people without a migration background do not react as negatively to the changing local context as suggested by other research, which is more promising for boundary unmaking. We also note that although those without a migration background are no longer the numerical majority group in majority-minority local contexts, they remain the largest group in the local context. Together with the dominant national discourse, this could additionally explain why we find no substantial differences between those living in a majority-minority local context and those who do not. One may argue that in other contexts, if the size of one specific migrant group is larger than the size of the group without a migration background, the local context could be more relevant for inhabitants' view of national identity.

The second contribution of this paper concerns the ethnic/civic distinction often used to study national identity. In this paper we show that ethnic and civic indicators of national identity content do not necessary follow the distinction made in most literature. Nonetheless, the ascriptive and achievable aspects of national identity remain very important elements of how people define national identity. By attaching importance to ascriptive aspects of Dutchness, the most exclusive group does put accent on ethnicity, which means that ethno-national discourses remain present in Dutch society. Likewise, achievable aspects of Dutchness were important for every group (albeit to different degrees) which indicates that it remains important for research to keep studying how people give meaning to national identity through both ascriptive and achievable dimensions.

## Notes

1. We follow the official definition of Statistics Netherlands in which people with a migration background are those born abroad, or those who have at least one parent born abroad.

Everyone who was born in the Netherlands, from parents both born in the Netherlands, is designated as a person without migration background. According to this definition, those who only have grandparents that were born in another country (i.e. third generation migrants) fall under people without a migration background. However, their share in the adult population is still rather small.

2. In line with Crul and Lelie (2019) we operationalize a majority-minority context as one where residents without a migration background are not (or no longer) the numerical majority group. Note that such neighbourhoods typically have a large degree of ethnic diversity and there is plurality in the origin of migrant groups.
3. Figures per 1 January 2021 derived from the local population registers, available via <https://onderzoek.amsterdam.nl> and <https://onderzoek010nl>.
4. This is the minimum response rate, or RR1, as defined by AAPOR (2016).
5. This age group is at a particular life phase in which they make active choices regarding housing, schools for their children and so forth. Due to living in a majority-minority context, they have to consider diversity rather actively in making these life choices.
6. At the start of the LISS panel, 48% of the sampled households registered as panel member (Scherpenzeel 2009). In our specific survey, the response rate among the panel members was 80%. A common practice in such multistage sample designs is to multiply the rates from both stages (AAPOR, 2016). Hence, the total response rate, or RR1, as defined by AAPOR (2016) is 38%.
7. As the answer categories in LISS contain no midpoint of the scale, we looked at frequency distributions to see whether this led to different answer patterns (see Appendix 2). We note that the frequency distributions were largely the same for the equivalent items across both samples and the lack of a midpoint in LISS did not impact the answer distribution in a meaningful way.
8. As *p*-values are not provided in Latent Gold per latent class and per separate category of categorial predictors, we refer to *z*-values to investigate the effect of the covariates on class membership. We regard all covariates with an absolute *z*-score above 1.645 as statistically significant (one-sided test at  $p=.05$ ).

## Acknowledgements

The LISS panel data were collected by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands) through its MESS project funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. We would also like to thank Paulina Pankowska and Maurice Crul for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this manuscript.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## Funding

This work was supported by the European Research Council [grant agreement ID: 741532].

## Ethics approval

Ethics approvals for questionnaire research among adults are not required in the Netherlands. In general, both Becoming a Minority (BaM) data and CentERdata abide by the European 'General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)'. In both cases, respondents

are also asked to read and agree to, respectively, the BaM or LISS informed consent forms before submitting their answers to the surveys.

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## Appendices 1.

### Class size and conditional probabilities of the three latent classes in both samples.

**Table A1.** Probability means for latent classes for BaM and LISS samples.

	BaM sample (majority-minority)			LISS sample (nationally representative)		
	Class 1 'Semi-achievable identity' P(Y class 1)	Class 2 'All-exclusionist class' P(Y class 2)	Class 3 'The achievable identity' P(Y class 3)	Class 1 'Semi-achievable identity' P(Y class 1)	Class 2 'All-exclusionist class' P(Y class 2)	Class 3 'The achievable identity' P(Y class 3)
Class size	58%	26%	16%	59%	27%	14%
Class indicators						
<i>Born in the Netherlands</i>						
Not important at all	.06 (.01)	.00(00)	.85(.04)	.05(.02)	.00(00)	.85(.07)
Not important	.47 (.03)	.04(01)	.15(.04)	.63(.02)	.06(.02)	.15(.07)
Neither important, nor unimportant	.36(.02)	.24(03)	.00(00)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Somewhat important	.11(.02)	.57(.04)	.00(00)	.30(.02)	.48(.03)	.00(00)
Very important	.00(00)	.15(.02)	.00(00)	.02(01)	.46(.04)	.00(00)
Mean	2.53(.05)	3.83(.07)	1.15(.05)	2.28(.04)	3.40(.06)	1.15(.07)
<i>Dutch ancestry</i>						
Not important at all	.16(.02)	.00(00)	1.00(01)	.38(.03)	.07(01)	.97(.03)
Not important	.56(.03)	.09(02)	.01(01)	.53(.02)	.47(.03)	.03(.03)
Neither important, nor unimportant	.26(.02)	.45(.03)	.00(00)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Somewhat important	.02(01)	.36(.04)	.00(00)	.08(01)	.32(.03)	.00(00)
Very important	.00(00)	.10(02)	.00(00)	.01(00)	.14(.02)	.00(00)
Mean	2.14(.05)	3.46(.07)	1.01(01)	1.72(.04)	2.53(.06)	1.03(.03)
<i>Respect Dutch laws and institutions</i>						
Not important at all	.01(00)	.00(00)	.03(01)	.02(01)	.01(00)	.04(01)
Not important	.01(00)	.00(00)	.02(01)	.09(01)	.04(01)	.12(02)
Neither important, nor unimportant	.06(01)	.02(01)	.09(02)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Somewhat important	.47(.02)	.33(.03)	.52(.02)	.40(.02)	.30(.02)	.43(.02)
Very important	.46(.02)	.65(.04)	.34(.04)	.48(.02)	.65(.03)	.41(.04)
Mean	4.36(.03)	4.63(.04)	4.13(.08)	3.35(.03)	3.61(.04)	3.21(.08)
<i>Speaking Dutch</i>						
Not important at all	.00(00)	.00(00)	.05(02)	.01(00)	.00(00)	.05(02)
Not important	.01(00)	.00(00)	.07(02)	.03(01)	.00(00)	.11(02)

(Continued)

Table A1. Continued.

	BaM sample (majority-minority)			LISS sample (nationally representative)		
	<i>Class 1 'Semi-achievable identity' P(Y class 1)</i>	<i>Class 2 'All-exclusionist class' P(Y class 2)</i>	<i>Class 3 'The achievable identity' P(Y class 3)</i>	<i>Class 1 'Semi-achievable identity' P(Y class 1)</i>	<i>Class 2 'All-exclusionist class' P(Y class 2)</i>	<i>Class 3 'The achievable identity' P(Y class 3)</i>
Neither important, nor unimportant	.08(.01)	.00(.00)	.22(.03)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Somewhat important	.57(.02)	.19(.03)	.55(.03)	.31(.02)	.00(.00)	.44(.03)
Very important	.34(.02)	.80(.03)	.11(.02)	.65(.02)	1.00(.00)	.40(.05)
Mean	4.24(.03)	4.80(.04)	3.60(.09)	3.61(.03)	4.00(.00)	3.20(.09)
<i>Having Dutch nationality</i>						
Not important at all	.06(.01)	.00(.00)	.27(.04)	.03(.01)	.00(.00)	.21(.04)
Not important	.17(.02)	.02(.01)	.34(.03)	.18(.02)	.00(.00)	.41(.04)
Neither important, nor unimportant	.34(.02)	.11(.02)	.27(.03)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Somewhat important	.33(.02)	.40(.02)	.10(.02)	.52(.02)	.03(.02)	.33(.04)
Very important	.10(.01)	.47(.04)	.01(.00)	.28(.02)	.97(.02)	.05(.02)
Mean	3.25(.05)	4.32(.06)	2.24(.11)	3.05(.04)	3.97 (.02)	2.22 (.11)
<i>Feeling Dutch</i>						
Not important at all	.02(.01)	.00(.00)	.09(.02)	.04(.01)	.01(.00)	.08(.02)
Not important	.04(.01)	.01(.00)	.11(.02)	.15(.01)	.05(.01)	.22(.03)
Neither important, nor unimportant	.14(.01)	.06(.01)	.22(.02)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Somewhat important	.45(.02)	.37(.02)	.40(.02)	.40(.02)	.29(.02)	.41(.02)
Very important	.35(.02)	.57(.04)	.18(.03)	.42(.02)	.65(.03)	.30(.04)
Mean	4.06(.04)	4.48(.05)	3.46(.12)	3.20(.04)	3.58(.04)	2.92(.09)

Note: Standard errors provided in brackets.

**2. Distributions of the six latent class indicators for national identity.**

