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PART FIRST.

Analytical and Critical Reviews.

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ART. I.

1. *Rules and Bye-Laws of the Manchester Medico-Ethical Association.*—1848. 8vo, pp. 12.
2. *On the Nature of the Scholar and its Manifestations.* By JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. Translated from the German by WM. SMITH.—1847. 8vo, pp. 220.
3. *Claims of the Missionary Enterprise on the Medical Profession: an Address, &c.* By D. J. MACGOWAN, M.D., Medical Missionary at Ningpo, in connexion with the American Baptist Board of Foreign Missions.—1847. 12mo, pp. 52.
4. *The Pre-Adamite Earth: Contributions to Theological Science.* By JOHN HARRIS, D.D.—London, 1848. 8vo, pp. 367.

THE long interval of almost uninterrupted peace and tranquillity which Europe has enjoyed, and which is now disturbed not so much by international quarrels as by intestine commotion, has left the minds of men at liberty from the engrossing thoughts and efforts which war demands; and the result has shown itself,—and, we trust, in spite of a temporary check, will continue to show itself,—in the advance of all the arts and sciences. The sciences of morals and of mental philosophy have received their share of consideration; and consequently we find metaphysical theology, religious doctrines, formulæ and ceremonies, and ecclesiastical government and discipline, occupying the thoughts of a large and influential portion of the community. The medical profession is not exempt from the general movement; and, while we have to note with pleasure amounting to delight the wondrous progress that the medical sciences have made during the last thirty years, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the moral or ethical relations of the profession have not been neglected. Of recent years each European language has afforded at least one contribution to medical deon-

tology and medical ethics; and if, in our own country, the formal theory has attracted little attention, the practice of the great body of the profession has been in full accordance with its soundest teachings. No class of men—not even the clerical order—has exerted itself more disinterestedly and benevolently for the welfare of mankind; at home and abroad, we find the severest toil, the most dangerous duties, undergone with a cheerfulness and alacrity which can only result from a deep inherent sense of the claims of suffering humanity upon medical skill; and besides those whose official duties carry them to the remotest parts of that empire on which the sun never sets, numerous individual members of our body have been enlisted into the service of Christian missions, and Asia, from the coasts of Syria to the rivers of China, has felt the presence of practitioners, who carry succour for the souls of men in their right hand, and in their left help for their ailing bodies.

The little tract entitled 'Claims of the Missionary Enterprise on the Medical Profession,' by Dr. Macgowan, an American medical missionary at Ningpo, contains facts and arguments of interest to every practitioner who looks beyond this earth, and the pains and sorrows he has to alleviate; nay, of deep and surpassing interest, because if truly Christian, he must see that the medical missionary is therein more closely assimilated to the founder of his holy religion than any other. "Of the physician it is the high and honorable boast that with him science is merely the necessary means to an important end—that all his knowledge is eminently practical, and its great purpose benevolent. It is his province to assuage human suffering in all its varieties and aggravations, and, in imitation of the Saviour, 'to heal all manner of diseases.'" When, however, he passes the boundaries of European civilization (and we, of course, include the civilized states of the New World within them), his labours become far more valuable and far more effective. In highly-civilized nations medical science has interpenetrated the social condition of the people; and much of the prophylactic and practical knowledge of the profession is in daily application without the assistance of individual practitioners. The abounding numbers, too, of skillful hands and well-stored heads, lead to a lower estimate of the value of a skilled practitioner. He is no longer considered as "more than armies to the country's weal." But if we turn our eyes to half-civilized nations or to barbarous tribes, and mark the treatment of the sick and the ravages of disease amongst them, the glory of the medical profession—its power to save from misery and death—stands forth in brilliant clearness. "Behold Dr. Grant," says Dr. Macgowan, "armed only with his needle for the removal of cataract, forcing mountain passes, and, amidst ferocious warriors, winning his way to their homes and their hearts. On account of his professional skill he was enabled to traverse in safety regions heretofore untrodden by civilized man, and in whose defiles an army would perish in effecting an entrance." The destruction from epidemical diseases is frightfully appalling, especially from smallpox; and the sad traces of syphilis apparent amongst distant tribes, since they have become familiarized with Europeans, show that medical aid to the sufferers is called for alike as an act of moral duty and of Christian love. The treatment of the sick in many countries is truly cruel, either from ignorance, superstition, or apathy. The Brahmin priest chokes the sick Hindoo with mud from the Ganges, and the weak, the aged, and the dying are left ex-

posed on its banks to the glare of a burning sun, or are held up in the river and its sacred water poured down their throats until they expire. Immense numbers of blind, we are told by Dr. Macgowan, are seen in the streets of Chinese cities, and their blindness is frequently the result of a simple ophthalmia, easily cured by suitable remedies. Dr. Bradley, who is stationed at Bankok, in Siam, states that the relatives and friends of many who were literally all corruption, "helpless and hopeless," brought them to his door and then forsook them. His abode was almost constantly the scene of the groaning, the dying, and the dead.

Medical missionaries have not gone forth from Europe and the United States as missionaries of medical art and science exclusively, or even principally, but rather with the intent of rendering medical science and art subservient to the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Macgowan enumerates five American missionary societies, five British, and one French, as sending out thirty-five medical missionaries; and this list we happen to know is imperfect, as both the Church of England and the Wesleyan body have professional men thus engaged. They are to be found in Africa, India, China, Syria, and the Islands of the Pacific. The object of the persons by whom Dr. Macgowan's address has been reprinted and circulated—the Edinburgh Medical Missionary Society—is to stir up the members of the medical profession in Great Britain to consider their own duties and responsibilities in connexion with the great object of Christian missions to the Heathen; and, in fact, to raise up a new order of missionaries, who shall combine, as of old, in their own persons the sacred functions of teaching religious truth and curing bodily infirmities. The Scotch editor of Dr. Macgowan's address, in a note attached thereto, does not hesitate to call upon "practitioners of some experience," and "not very young men," to go forth and give their personal services; and adduces circumstances and considerations fitted and intended to warn us, that some or even many amongst us may one day be constrained personally to consider and answer the question, "Am I fitted, and if fitted, am I willing and ready to obey the call of my Divine Master to become a fellow-helper to the truth, in devoting my professional skill and personal exertions to the promotion of the spread of the Gospel?"

The facts and views we have just detailed are sufficient of themselves to show that medical deontology and medical ethics have risen from their cradle, and present to the physician a much wider field of thought and moral action than has hitherto been assigned to him. We think, however, that a due consideration of the true position and duties of the physician demands a more comprehensive tone and method than these exhibit. The physician's proper study is MAN in every possible relation. He has to study man as a spiritual being, and as a mere animal; as a moral creature, and as a piece of vital machinery; as in the "image of God," and as an unreasoning brute. In considering him as a spiritual and moral being, the physician, in common with the philosopher, trenches upon theology and moral philosophy, and is bound to study all questions thence arising in connexion with the structure, functions, and disorders of the brain and nervous system. It cannot be matter of surprise that with such a wide scope of inquiry, and a scope which it is imperative that the physician should occupy, the physician has come to conclusions not always in accordance with the principles of dogmatic theology, or of the popular

code of morals ; that he has been lenient in his judgments, slow to punish, ready to plead human infirmity in excuse for crime, thrown the shield of professional opinion over the thief and murderer ; looked not for uniformity of faith and practice, pleaded for toleration, has been latitudinarian in his principles, and, in short, has been pronounced a simpleton, a fool, a protector of felons, a heretic, a materialist, an irreligious person, an atheist. An irreproachable life, and gratitude for services rendered in the hour of need, may have often shielded the practitioner from persecution by the religious zealot, but oftener his discretion and caution have stood him in better stead. Feeling the impossibility of convincing, he has kept a watchful silence, or given a verbal assent to dogmas and doctrines which he could not comprehend, or which he suspected to be groundless.

Much of the infidelity of medical practitioners is due to the ill-directed zeal, the ignorance, and the presumption of certain teachers of theology. Very few of those who have addressed themselves to the task of combating their scepticism have placed themselves in the position of the heretic, and fairly met the arguments which determined his belief. Entirely unacquainted with physiology, and, in some instances, even with natural philosophy, they have trod in the beaten track of controversialists, from a period when modern science scarcely existed, and Christian truth was inculcated rather by the terrors of a brutal superstition than by the irresistible allurements of moral suasion. And although the sceptical practitioner might not be ruthlessly doomed to the flames of hell or of purgatory by his theological foe, or made to swear, on penalty of exclusion from practice, that he will defend the doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary ; yet the ban of society has often been fixed upon him as a "materialist," and that man has been shunned by good and pious, but weak-minded persons, who, to all the graces of the Christian character, and all the morality of the Christian life, added a firm and unalterable adherence to what, after long thought and mature deliberation, he had determined to be TRUE.

There are many reasons, however, why the investigator, and expounder, and applier of the science of human nature should no longer shrink from his duty as a seeker and teacher of moral truth. The sciences of which the medical profession has been the foster-father, and even originator, are becoming more and more popularised ; entering the popular mind, they will produce all the evil effects of truths imperfectly comprehended ; and a large and influential class will soon be formed, who will secretly disbelieve in the dogmas and even doctrines of Christianity. And the denunciations of the ministers of religion will never touch them, if, as with the medical profession, the beaten path of controversy be not departed from, or if the great truths of the Christian religion be not harmonized with the great truths of natural religion and moral philosophy. Some few clerical and lay writers on theology and morals have, it is true, addressed themselves to this important task, either directly or indirectly ; we shall shortly allude specially to Fichte's philosophy, and to Dr. Harris's 'Pre-Adamite Earth ;' for although the latter is addressed mainly to meet the superficial scepticism which a shallow consideration of the facts of geology might engender, it is a book eminently suitable to the scientific practitioner, and will enlighten his understanding as well as confirm his faith.

Writers on medical ethics and deontology too hastily and crudely assume that all medical practitioners are Christians. It is certain that by far the greater proportion are nominally such; but of this, how many are Christians from conviction, and how many, under a profession of zeal, conceal a rooted scepticism and even dislike of Christian doctrines and discipline? We allude, of course, to the medical profession in every part of Christendom, whether Greek, Roman, or Protestant. There is a small portion of the profession which is not even nominally Christian, and this portion will increase both amongst the Pagans of India and China, and the Mahometans of Turkey, Africa, and Syria. If we leave out of consideration altogether the conflicting doctrines of Christian sects, it is evident from this circumstance only—the formation of a medical profession in the East—that a system of medical deontology or ethics must have a more extended basis than that which Christian writers usually supply. If that basis be fixed upon the acknowledged principles of philosophical inquiry and research, and be proved to be not only consistent but connate with the great Christian verities, we apprehend that medical philosophy may thus in Pagan countries be made the herald of Christian civilization, in a way the promoters of medical missions at home have not yet dreamed of, and may at the same time serve to check the scepticism of its own half-educated members, and of the popular mind, more effectually, because more convincingly, than the whole phalanx of exclusively theological arguments and mediæval sophisms.

But it may be advanced with perfect propriety, that the science of human nature, of which the medical profession are the recognised cultivators and applicers, has a mighty future mission to fulfil towards humanity. From the earliest periods of Christianity a second advent of Christ has been expected, and therewith a more perfect condition of morals. For such a great and glorious event, the daily and hourly prayers of Christendom are offered up in the words taught by Christ himself—“Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth as it is in Heaven.” How such events will be brought about, we are not taught; but if we seek for information in experience, and judge the future by the past, they will arise with fundamental changes in existing forms and ceremonies, and with a clearer and more perfect manifestation of God’s infinite wisdom and goodness. Science, and especially the science of human nature, may be expected to have a large share in the agencies that will effect this. As the Mosaic ritual excelled the patriarchal, and as Christian doctrines surpassed and abrogated the Mosaic, so may the second advent be expected to eclipse the first. It cannot be denied that the principles and ceremonies of the Christian religion are even now being closely sifted and weighed in the balance of a severe philosophy; and while all that is essential and fundamental is rendered more sure and credible, that which is non-essential and accessory is being discarded. Such changes cannot and will not take place without much antagonism and much strife; but the stigma of scepticism can never be truly and fairly affixed to the study of human nature, as practised and taught by the enlightened members of the medical profession. If an undevout astronomer be mad, how much more mad the educated and instructed but undevout practitioner, to whom God’s handiwork is revealed, and the operations of infinite wisdom laid open in the living creation, and especially in man, the image of God? This imputation

of infidelity was strongly repelled by Dr. Gregory, who observed in his Lectures :

“ Medicine, of all professions, should be the least suspected of leading to impiety. An intimate acquaintance with the works of Nature elevates the mind to the most sublime conceptions of the Supreme Being ; and at the same time dilates the heart with the most pleasing prospects of providence. The difficulties that must necessarily attend all deep inquiries into a subject so disproportionate to the human faculties, should not be expected to surprise a physician who, in his daily practice, is involved in perplexity and darkness, even in subjects exposed to the examination of his senses.”

It is, we think, true in some small degree, nevertheless, that the members of the medical profession generally are sceptical as to the truths of Christianity, especially in Roman Catholic countries, where freedom of thought and of discussion is restrained. But this restraint is the true cause of the scepticism, and not professional studies. Let any mind honestly seek truth, asking for the guidance of God's Holy Spirit, and we have every reason to believe that it will find both ; but if that mind be already illuminated by natural religion, and by a knowledge of the wisdom and goodness of God in creation, are we to conclude that it will, just in proportion as it is illuminated, go astray from the truth? Is it not a wavering and unworthy faith which holds as nothing the daily revelations of physical truths by God to mankind, and sets up a dull, sapless ignorance as the best qualification to an attainment of the highest, most perfect, most glorious knowledge?

But we would not dare to advise the profession thus boldly to assert their prerogative, and, casting aside the trammels of sectarian theology, seek to link philosophy with Christianity, if experience had not proved the value and practicability of such a step. We would not thus bid our brethren to dare to think, did we not feel assured that such bright and burning thoughts would result, as would render Christian truths more brilliant and more priceless ; lead on the human race to social progress and a holier civilization ; and quench the fetid smoulderings of real scepticism, the disbelief in a moral governor of the universe, and a moral and spiritual world. After the practitioner has thus dared to think, he will come to the conclusion of Johann Gotlieb Fichte, and say :

“ The whole material world, with all its adaptations and ends, and in particular the life of man in this world, are by no means in themselves, and in deed and truth, that which they seem to be to the uncultivated and natural sense of man ; but there is something higher, which lies concealed behind all natural appearance. This concealed foundation of all appearances may, in its greatest universality, be aptly named the *Divine Idea*.” (p. 124.)

The work of Fichte, on ‘ The Nature of the Scholar,’ from a translation of which, by J. Smith, we have taken the preceding quotation, is one which must inevitably arrest the attention of the scientific physician, by the grand spirituality of its doctrines and the pure morality it teaches.

It consists of a course of public lectures, which was announced on the roll by the Professor of Erlangen, under the title of “ De Moribus Eruditorum.” Generally speaking, morality means a direction of character and conduct according to rule and precept. But Fichte demurs to this idea ; and considers it true in only a limited sense. Whatever is to be manifested in the thoughts or acts of man, must first be in his nature, and indeed

must constitute it. That which lies in the essential nature of man, must necessarily reveal itself in his outward life, shine forth in all his thoughts, desires, and acts, and become his unvarying and unalterable character. This nature, as manifest in the scholar, it is Fichte's task to describe; and after expanding the definition of the "Divine Idea," which we have just quoted, he propounds the doctrine that a certain part of the meaning of this Divine Idea is accessible to every cultivated mind, and conceivable by it; that those who attain to the attainable portion are possessed by a higher and more spiritual life; and that "in every age, that kind of education and spiritual culture, by means of which the age hopes to lead mankind to the knowledge of the ascertained part of the Divine Idea, is the learned culture of the age; and every man who partakes of this culture is the scholar of the age." There may be the apparent scholar and the true scholar; the former has gone through a course of learned education; the other, through the learned culture of the age, has arrived at a knowledge of the "Idea."

"In individual human beings the eternal Divine Idea takes up its abode, as their spiritual nature; this existence of the Divine Idea in them encircles itself with unspeakable love; and then we say, adapting our language to common appearance, this man loves the Idea, and lives in the Idea,—when in truth it is the idea itself which, in his stead and in his person, lives and loves itself; and his person is only the sensible manifestation of this existence of the Idea. . . . In the true Scholar the Idea has acquired a personal existence, which has entirely superseded his own, and absorbed it in itself. He loves the Idea, not before all else,—for he loves nothing beside it—he loves it alone;—it alone is the source of all his joys, of all his pleasures; it alone is the spring of all his thoughts, efforts, and deeds; for it alone does he live, and without it life would be to him tasteless and odious." (p. 129.)

We might multiply quotations of this kind, were it necessary, as well from other works of Fichte, as from this before us, but one or two more must suffice :

"The true-minded Scholar will not admit of any life and activity within him, except the immediate life and activity of the Divine Idea. This unchangeable principle pervades and determines all his inward thoughts and outward actions. With respect to the first—as he suffers no emotion within him that is not the direct emotion and life of the Divine Idea which has taken possession of him, so is his whole life accompanied by the indestructible consciousness that it is one with the Divine Life—that in him, and by him, God's work shall be achieved, and his will accomplished; he therefore reposes on that will with unspeakable love, and with the immovable conviction that it is right and good. Thus does his vision become holy, enlightened, and religious; blessedness arises within him,—and in it, changeless joy, and peace, and power,—in the same way as these may be acquired and enjoyed by the unlearned, and even the lowliest among men, through true devotion to God, and honest performance of duty viewed as the will of God." (p. 191.)

And again :

"Whatever man may do, so long as he does it for himself, as a finite being, by himself, and through his own counsel—it is vain and will sink to nothing. Only when a foreign power takes possession of him, and urges him forward, and lives within him, in room of his own energy, does true and real existence first take up its abode in his life. This foreign power is ever the power of God. To look up to it for counsel—implicitly to follow its guidance,—is the only true wisdom in every employment of human life, and therefore most of all in the highest occupation of which man can partake—the vocation of the true Scholar." (p. 192.)

Shall we be presumptuous if we recommend these views to our professional brethren? or if we say to the enlightened, the thoughtful, the serious, this—if you be true scholars—is *your* vocation? We know not a higher morality than this, or more noble principles than these: they are full of TRUTH.

In his third Lecture, Fichte treats of the progressive scholar, and in particular of genius and industry. He points out the nature and bearing of the two qualities, and the characteristics of those in whom they are deficient. Whenever a man, after having availed himself of existing means of mental improvement, remains inactive, satisfied with his acquirements, and proud of his powers, then he has neither the "Idea" nor "Genius," but only a vain ostentatious disposition, which assumes a singular and fantastic costume in order to attract attention. Fichte thus compares this man of Dutch metal with one of sterling ingot.

"Such a disposition shows itself at once, in self-gratulatory contemplation of its own parts and endowments, dwelling on these in complacent indolence, commonly accompanied by contemptuous disparagement of the personal qualities and gifts of others; while, on the contrary, he who is restlessly urged on by the Idea, has no time to think of his own person;—lost with all his powers in the object he has in view, he never weighs his own capacities of grasping it against those of others. Genius, where it is present, sees its object only,—never sees itself;—as the sound eye fixes itself upon something beyond it, but never looks round upon its own brightness. In such a one (one who contemplates his own brightness) the Idea does certainly not abide. What is it, then, that animates him—that moves him to those eager and active exertions which we behold? Is it intense pride and self-conceit, and the desperate purpose, in spite of Nature, to assume a character which does not belong to him?—these animate, impel, and spur him on, and stand to him in the room of genius." (p. 150.)

Such is Fichte's description of that man in whom study and science have worked but imperfectly; parallels we fear are to be found too numerous amongst the members of the medical profession, although most assuredly not exclusively there. Self-contemplation, self-admiration, and self-flattery, though the last may remain unexpressed, and even carefully concealed from every observer, these, with indolence, and disdain of the treasures already gathered into the garner of science, are signs of the absence of the genius common to every profession. But as the medical profession has a wider sphere of scientific culture, and a deeper insight into the greatest of knowledges,—the knowledge of human nature,—by so much should he be free from these marks of imperfect cultivation of the moral powers. It may happen that there is a natural tendency in the mental constitution of individuals to think more highly or more lowly of themselves than they ought to think; but even with these, true scientific or learned culture will have much weight. To those we would say with our philosopher: No one need pride himself upon genius, for it is the free gift of God; but of honest industry, and true devotion to his destiny, any man may well be proud; indeed this thorough integrity of purpose is itself the Divine Idea in its most common form, and no really honest mind is without communion with God.

In the fourth Lecture, on Integrity in Study, the same high tone of morals is maintained.

"The honest scholar," observed Fichte, "is to us the only true scholar."... "If knowledge appears to those who want both genius and integrity, only as a means



to the attainment of certain worldly ends, she reveals herself to him who, with honest heart, consecrates himself to her service, not only in her highest branches, which touch closely upon things divine, but down even to her meanest elements, as something originating in, and determined by, the eternal thought of God himself." (p. 161.)

Fichte thus inculcates on the student integrity and trust in God :

"Whatever thou doest, do it with integrity; if thou studiest, let it guide thy studies; and then, as to whether thou shalt prosper in what thou doest, leave that to God; thou hast most surely left it to him when thou goest to work with true and honest purpose;—with the attainment of that integrity thou wilt also attain unbroken peace, inward cheerfulness, and an unstained conscience; and in so far thou wilt assuredly prosper." (p. 156.)

Nor is this a mere scintillation amidst the gloom of a sterile and comfortless philosophy. "Man shall BE and DO something," he adds; "his temporal life shall leave behind it in the spiritual world an imperishable result." And again, discoursing on integrity, he says, in reference to this being and doing :

"He in whom this integrity has become a living idea cannot conceive of human life in other way than this; from this principle he sets forth, to it he constantly returns, and by it he regulates all his other modes of thought. Only in so far as he obeys this law, and fulfils this purpose, which he recognises as his being's end and aim, is he satisfied with himself; everything in him which is not directed to this high end—which is not evidently a means to its attainment, he despises, hates, desires to have swept away. He looks upon his individual person as a thought of the Deity; and thus his vocation—the design of his being—is to him as a purpose of God himself." (p. 156.)

It is to the physician that the Divine image in man becomes a grand reality; and his professional studies fully carried out to their results, lead him to say with Fichte—

"Man is not placed in the world of sense alone, but the essential root of his being is in God. Hurried along by sense and its impulses, the consciousness of this life in God may be readily hidden from him, and then, however noble may be his nature, he lives in strife and disunion with himself, in discord and unhappiness, without true dignity and enjoyment of life. But when the consciousness of the true source of his existence first rises upon him, and he joyfully resigns himself to it till his being is steeped in the thought, then peace and joy and blessedness flow in upon his soul. And it lies in the Divine Idea that all men must come to this gladdening consciousness—that the outward and tasteless Finite Life may be tasted by the Infinite and so enjoyed." (p. 142.)

As to the mode in which this integrity shows itself, we have it discussed in a distinct lecture. In the first place, the holiness and grandeur of his vocation will be impressed on his mind and determine the acts of the true scholar. He enters upon his vocation in consequence of the conviction that it is the purpose of God in him and for him; it is his providential course, fixed by God, and therefore holy and great. And thus his person as well as his vocation, become to him before all things, honorable and holy.

"This thought, with its indestructible certainty, enters and fills the soul of every honest student;—this, namely,—'I, this real, this expressly commissioned individual, as I may now call myself, am actually here—have entered into existence for this cause and no other—that the eternal counsel of God in this universe may, through me, be seen of men in another, hitherto unknown, light,—be made clearly manifest, and shine forth with inextinguishable lustre over the world; and this phase of the

Divine Thought, thus bound up with my person, is the only true living being within me; all else, though looked upon even by myself as belonging to my being, is dream, shadow, nothing; this alone is imperishable and eternal within me." (p. 159.)

Thus impressed, he shuns the contact of the vulgar and the ignoble; he is no boasting depreciator of his brethren; no vulgar quack; no base raker-up of riches; no pilferer of the merits or reputation of his compeers. He shuns everything which weakens spiritual power;—idleness, drunkenness, sensuality, pride, self-contemplation.

"Lastly, everything is vulgar and ignoble which robs man of respect for himself, of faith in himself, and of the power of reckoning with confidence upon himself and his purposes. Nothing is more destructive of character than for a man to lose all faith in his own resolutions, because he has so often determined, and again determined, to do that which nevertheless he has never done..... Not so the upright student; he keeps his purpose, and whatever he has resolved to do, that he does, were it only because he has resolved to do it. For the same reason,—that he must be guided by his own purpose and his own insight,—he will not become a slave to the opinion of others, or even to the general opinion. It is doubtless of all things most ignoble, when man, out of too great complacency, which at bottom is cowardice and want of spirit, or out of indolence—which prevents him thinking for himself, and drawing the principles of his conduct from his own mind—gives himself up to others, and relies upon them rather than upon himself." (p. 171.)

There are other lectures "On an Academical Freedom," "On the Finished Scholar," "On the Scholar as Ruler," "On the Scholar as Teacher." We may have an opportunity of noticing more of the views therein contained, before we part from our readers.

The truly spiritual Christian cannot fail to recognise in the doctrines and precepts we have quoted, some fundamental Christian verities; and not the less Christian because translated from modern German instead of ancient Greek. The first of Christian philosophers, St. Paul, anticipated Fichte, when he wrote, "Man is the image and glory of God;" and throughout his active life and immortal correspondence, the hero and the martyr blend. The man who can only recognise divine truths in the conventional phrases derived from the ancient words of revelations, believes without having faith; we would not condemn such an one, but we would question his fitness to be a judge of what is orthodox. We would add here that, while the absence of all reference to Christian truths, as such, would render such moral philosophy as that of Fichte more acceptable to philosophical Pagans and infidels, by not wounding their prejudices or their pride, it cannot prevent the Christian man rejoicing that philosophy is thus made the handmaid and promoter of Christian truth, nor hinder the Christian philosopher from recognising with deeply solemn and grateful feelings a continued revelation of truth to man.

But if metaphysics and moral philosophy thus lead the earnest inquirer to a knowledge of his God, of himself, and his duties, how much more attractive and convincing must be that philosophical theology which grapples with science, and firmly binds it to revelation? Hitherto scientific truths have had little consideration in theological discussions; a dogmatic theology has fostered a dogmatic system of metaphysics, and the fierce controversialists of all sects have only suspended their bickerings to growl an anathema maranatha against natural philosophy. Such conduct could only injure the cause of true religion; the conscientious judgment and

enlightened understanding instinctively avoided the fellowship of such defenders of the faith, and therewith, it is to be feared, religion itself. To all men of this class, Dr. Harris's book must be welcome, whether as reconciling natural philosophy with Christian truth, or as an elegantly written and profoundly philosophical work. Yet Dr. Harris himself cannot enter upon his subject without an apology for his undertaking.

“Of the connexion,” he observes, “between theology and natural science generally, it may be assumed that every one who admits that there is a true theology and a true science of nature, will admit also that there is a sense, whatever it may be, in which the two are related. The mind which elicits and embraces both is one; so that, however distinct the processes by which it arrives at a knowledge of each, and however different the sources and kinds of evidence on which that knowledge rests, both branches evince their inherent unison, in the unity of the knowing mind itself. On this conviction it is that men no sooner begin to think, than they next proceed to examine the laws of thought; if they collect facts, they next inquire for the causes of those facts; and when they have succeeded in developing any of the sciences, they then look for the internal bond of union which makes them all one. And for such a *nexus* they seek under the unquestioned conviction that it exists; for the conviction simply implies that, as reasoning concerning each separate science is possible, so reasoning concerning collective science is possible. Well it had been for theology and philosophy if the bond which unites them had been clearly ascertained, and never dissevered.” (Preface, p. vii.)

It is refreshing to the medical mind, honestly inquiring after this connexion, to find a kindred spirit illumining his path from that profession which has so almost invariably demanded the surrender of mental freedom, and peremptorily said, yield or be excommunicate. It is encouraging to meet with a divine who proposes to show a theology in nature which is ultimately one with the theology of the Bible; who attempts to deduce principles and apply them to the successive stages of creation, on the assumption that the whole process of divine manifestation, including nature, is to be viewed in the light of a sublime argument in which God is deductively reasoning from principles to facts, from generals to particulars. It is pleasing to find a theological writer who hesitates not to adorn his page with names celebrated in the history of science. We would particularly refer the reader to the fifth part of Dr. Harris's work, which treats of sentient existence as “the third stage of the divine manifestation,” and treats of the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as manifested in the animal creation, with a comprehensiveness of thought and a clear perception of many obscure facts in animal physiology, that cannot fail to charm the scientific practitioner. A few more such writers will render religious scepticism almost an impossibility with the practitioner.

Having established his faith on broad and comprehensive principles, the medical practitioner can hardly become sectarian; and the question necessarily arises, how shall he comport himself with reference to the various forms and shades of religious belief current among men, and especially among Christians? We apprehend this must be decided by the individual, or rather will be decided for him, according to his education and domesticities. If emancipated from the bias of these, the advice of Fichte is, we think, judicious, and in accordance with the practice of the wisest men, even among Pagan nations:

“The true-minded student will not make himself a slave to common opinion; nevertheless, he will accommodate himself to established customs where they are in themselves indifferent, precisely because he honours himself. The educated youth grows up amid these customs; were he to cast them off, he must of necessity deliberately resolve to do so, and attract notice and attention to himself by his singularities and offences against decorum. How should he, whose time is occupied with weightier matters, find leisure to ponder such a subject?—and is the matter so important, and is there no other way in which he can distinguish himself, that he must take refuge in a petty peculiarity?” (p. 171.)

In idolatrous or infidel countries, many established customs are not indifferent; they are, on the contrary, deep offences against truth and humanity, and as such must be met. With regard to Christian sects, the peculiarities are not so important; but even some of these must be considered in their political results, and the practitioner will then perhaps feel himself called upon to assert the dignity of human nature, and the priceless worth of civil and religious freedom; to fight for the truth in its purity; and feeling that through him God works to reveal and do His will, assume the sacred mantle, and go forth undismayed to his duty.

Nevertheless, the medical philosopher must look with a pitying eye upon the religious strife and persecution so rife among men. Seeing so much diversity of temperament, of prejudices, and of education, arising from causes which must themselves be counteracted or changed before unity of faith or practice can be attained; and knowing that nothing short of a miracle can counteract or modify those causes, he looks upon the persecution of religious sects as totally useless for the object it has in view. The moral agitation may develope truth; but it also develope evil. Dr. Lettsom, in his ‘Observations on Religious Persecution,’ has put the necessity of a difference of feeling and belief amongst men in a strong light.

But, while the practitioner is tolerant even to latitudinarianism, and allows to every man that freedom of opinion that he claims for himself, as the sacred gift of God, and as the emanation of the godlikeness of human nature, he pities those aberrations in religious principles and practices which throw ridicule on sacred things, and give an air of folly or knavery, or both, to religious professors. To him there is no essential difference between the asceticism of the fanatical Hindoo and the self-inflicted penances of the fanatical Christian. The sainted hermit, dwelling on the top of a pillar, differs in nothing from the sainted faquir, swinging from a pole, with a hook in his back. The tinsel tawdry of imagery is to him equally removed from the true spiritualism of human nature, whether visible in the islands and shores of the South or North Pacific, or in the peninsula of Italy or India. In the vagabond life of the faquir or friar, he sees only a modification of that appetite for restless movement and objectless action, which impels the professional mendicant to endure cold and hunger and the restraint of the lock-up, rather than the toils of honest industry. The delirious ecstasies of pious women he often knows to be none other than anomalous forms of hysteria, founded partly on fraud, partly on vanity, partly on insanity. The convulsive seizures and cries of multitudes in popular assemblies, induced in excitable persons by impassioned apostrophes or terrible denunciations, are not to his experienced eye the solemn manifestations of the Holy Spirit of God, such as he loves to recognise in the pages of inspiration, but only the unmeaning and

neurotic phenomena of an excited brain and nervous system. He hesitates to accuse the sufferers of hypocrisy or blasphemy; he denies that they are inspired by God. He pities their weakness; he maintains the truth.

It may be asked, to what extent should the medical practitioner interfere to propagate the religion he professes. We already find Christian medical missionaries abroad in the earth, and we are led to think that more will be influenced to go. Upon this point we think the free-will and conscience of the individual must decide. What we concede to the Christian, we cannot deny justly to the Hindoo. The liberty that we demand for the Protestant cannot be refused to the Jesuit. The only condition we have to demand is, that the mission be done honorably. But if the medical practitioner seeks, through the weakness and folly of his patients, to insinuate his creed and propagate his religious tenets, he is criminal: such conduct is only tolerable in the bigoted and crafty ecclesiastic, if in him. Many good and well-meaning people would have the practitioner to hold up the terrors of death before the eyes of his confiding patient, and extort from his fears and enfeebled mind, what his sound and perfect judgment refused to concede. They would have the physician to preach a sermon at the bedside, and the apothecary to pray. It is reasonable and a duty to warn a patient of his approaching end, or of his danger, and to hint that an attention to the duties of religion is incumbent upon him, and a good thing. This may be so done that the chance of recovery, slight although it may be, shall not be entirely destroyed, and that the life which the practitioner has intrusted to him to save be not extinguished. Where the practitioner is in attendance on a co-religionist, a closer bond exists, and he may with propriety engage with his patient in those spiritual exercises, to which, during health, they have been both alike accustomed; but still he must remember that the care of the body is his chief concern,—the care of the soul is the duty of another; with him he may co-operate, but his place should not be usurped. Frequently the sectarian practitioner is the least learned and skillful; for the time that he devotes to his religious exercises and public services is necessarily taken from that which ought to be devoted to his studies. A high spirituality is by no means inconsistent with professional eminence; but a minute and slavish adherence to forms, or a usurpation of clerical duties, always is. It is, we think, certain that the path of duty lies to the professional man, in the exercise of his profession with Godlikeness, and with integrity and love. He is the revealed hand of Providence to suffering man; the earthly means whereby God softens the weight of the primal curse. To do this with singleness of purpose, should be his first and greatest duty; for it comprises love towards both God and man, and is the vocation to which God has called him.

The punishment and reformation of criminals will ultimately come within the pale of medical science. Many a wretched man has been hung and quartered, burnt at the stake, broken on the wheel, or racked with merciless cruelty, simply because he had had chronic cerebral inflammation; and many a poor, uneducated creature, abandoned by society to his own way, trained up, from no fault of his own, but from the neglect of his fellow-men, in the practice of every vice, is forced, when comparatively innocent, to consort with hardened mockers at everything good and virtuous; and then, when the necessary results have followed, and he has

injured society, society turns upon him in the sacred name of justice, and with its dread formalities, inflicts, not punishment, but revenge; seeks not to amend and reclaim, but to injure and annoy. Yet sound philosophy and genuine Christianity must and ought to, and we believe will, plead against such blind vengeance and unmeaning, useless cruelty; and will appeal to medical science for the means and the mode whereby mercy and justice may be linked together. If a criminal cannot be reclaimed, he may be restrained. At present, the antagonism between the ermine on the bench and the rags at the bar, is too unnatural to be right; the dignity of human nature is outraged not more in the culprit than in the judge.

The relations of medical ethics to political economy, or, in other words, to political parties and strife, constitute a delicate subject for discussion, and perhaps admit here only of the consideration of general principles. The practitioner may set out from one of two opposing principles, or may adopt the *juste milieu*. If he be of opinion that man is like the beast that perisheth; if he adopt a naked materialism, either in theory or practice, and regard the spiritual nature of man as of little importance or non-existent; if he allow him no freedom of thought and action, as a morally responsible being; if he look upon the mass of mankind as a herd of creatures, for whose merely animal appetites and wants it is sufficient to provide; who have to be subservient to the minds of a chosen few above them; to submit without murmur to their caprices, to receive their benefits as favours, with deep thankfulness, to accept their creeds without inquiry, and believe in their God without a thought; if a medical practitioner sincerely thinks this, let him carry out his views and repress exertion. But if, on the contrary, man appears to him a dignified spiritual being, with God-like powers, moral responsibilities, and freedom of thought and action—a being, whose duty, as well as privilege, it is to *think*; if he believe that, in these respects, all men are equal; that a future state and a greater knowledge of the Divine Mind and its divine creations is the final cause of man's existence, and that his moral position in this world will determine his place of dignity in the next; then is the practitioner bound by the sacred principles of natural and revealed religion to exert himself for the improvement of his species. All those legislative measures and philanthropic efforts which have this object in view, will receive his cordial support. On the question of education, he will decide that it be carried to its utmost limits: for, believing that, in a future world, the spiritual dignity will be in proportion to the spirituality attained in this; that the ways of Providence are in perfect harmony, and that order is heaven's first law; that just in proportion as the mind is evolved here, it will be evolved there; that, as the soul is nearer to the Deity in wisdom and knowledge here, as well as in grace and goodness, in that proportion will it be nearer to the Deity in that future state of existence, the nature of which he can theorize upon but dimly, but of which he knows this much,—that it will be a state of happiness, and that the happiness will be in proportion as the soul knows and loves God, or the Divine Idea,—believing all this, the communication of knowledge will be to him a duty of transcendent importance. This better state of knowledge can only be attained by a training and development of the faculties; these are best to be attained by a knowledge of physiological laws, and therefore the medical

practitioner will not only be anxious that education be pushed to its utmost limits, but that it be conducted on sound scientific principles; for it is not sufficient that the mere organs of mental action be developed, but it is also required that they be developed with a reference to the motives from which they will act, and to the final cause of their action; otherwise, the training, so far from being a good to man, may be an evil, by affording him greater power for the commission of evil and of departure from God.

The movement in favour of a systematic application of the principles of public hygiene to society, acquires greater importance and a grander moral aspect, when it is remembered that its object is to allay moral as well as physical evils. To the intelligent practitioner it is melancholy to witness the ravages of death amongst the poorer classes of the population; to see domestic ties dissolved, poverty induced, widows and orphans struggling with adversity, and a large amount of suffering inflicted, all which might in some degree be prevented or diminished. It is he who sees the arrows of fever, invisible to all else; who helplessly watches their havoc, and who knows whence they come and how they may be stayed. But the physical evils are slight in comparison with the moral: sickness, poverty, and crime, so often linked together by the tongues of men, walk really hand in hand; where there is much poverty and sickness there is much crime; where there is much crime and poverty there is sickness, and therewith a helplessness of degradation, a clouding of the faculties, a dullness of the moral sense, a prostration of the God-like powers of humanity, that leave little to hope for the position of beings in the next world, so degraded, so debased in this.

The relief of the sick poor is a duty which has ever been diligently performed by the conscientious practitioner; and, so long as society leaves the poor partially or wholly uncared for in this respect, that duty ought still to be performed. But it should be performed to fulfil a duty, rather than to display an active benevolence; from an active principle of humanity, rather than to gain applause. Indiscriminately gratuitous relief of the sick poor is like indiscriminate almsgiving; sickness, like hunger, is not accidental, but the common lot of man; and they differ only in this, that the one occurs regularly and at short and certain intervals,—the other is of uncertain recurrence. It is a necessity for which the individual, or society for him, is bound to provide, and not a class of educated men. Relief of poverty from the public purse, as a social right, is one of the characteristics of modern civilization; and this principle should be further extended, to include relief of sickness. Kindness, tenderness, and gentleness should, however, ever accompany the administration of this public relief. The poor man, bowed down by disease, has a large claim upon the sympathy of the practitioner; and perhaps the greater, now that a number of sects prevail. Formerly, when the priest of the parish was the special guardian of the poor, the poor man had in him an influential advocate, and one intimately acquainted with his necessities. Now it is the union surgeon or dispensary physician who is brought exclusively into this intimate relationship, and it is he who has to fight the battle of poverty against the proud man's contumely and the greedy man's avarice.

Although the relief of the sick poor is seldom withheld, it is to be lamented that the officers of public charities often diminish the value of their

services by a want of punctuality in their attendance. Few consider how wearisome it is to the sick man to wait; how valuable is the poor man's time, how much loss and suffering is inflicted, when the medical officer either comes late to his duties, or neglects them altogether.

But, while it is maintained that the burden of relieving effectually the sick poor ought to be borne by the community at large, and not by the medical profession, there are individuals whom the practitioner will be glad to relieve from both poverty and sickness. Multitudes of persons may be found, who, with honest pride, endure hunger and pain rather than suffer what they think to be a degradation, by applying to the dispenser of the public dole. These have seen "better days;" they have been accustomed to give and not to receive, and to them the change is grievous. Such examples of penury are peculiarly the charge of the practitioner; and their relief should be secured to them with the utmost delicacy, and the tenderest regard for their feelings. We have known an instance in which the practitioner was made the channel of relief from the board of guardians, and a poverty-stricken lady received her weekly stipend until her death, without ever knowing the bitter degradation of feeling herself a pauper. To fallen, educated affluence, the practitioner should be gentle as a ministering angel.

In advocating the application of medical science to political economy, we think it needless to notice those minor methods which have been brought before the public by imaginative physiologists, especially on the Continent, with no other effect than to bring themselves and their subject into contempt, and to expose their brethren to ridicule. One seeks to render all men equal by an equal development of their faculties, and thus prevent all those evils which inequality in power and position produces. Another sees in large cities the greatest scourge of mankind, and, by annihilating them, would restore man to pristine simplicity and Arcadian happiness. An enthusiastic phrenologist would have the whole machinery of society regulated by his favorite principles; he would choose a servant or a judge phrenologically, conduct his amours by craniology, and educate his child with exact reference to the development of the "organs." A favorite means for the improvement of mankind is with one to be found in a perfect system of gymnastics; with another in the scientific crossing of races; with another in the admission of women to political rights. Some would fix the age of marriage; some advocate polygamy and divorce physiologically; some would forbid persons having hereditary diseases to marry at all. The suppression of prostitution, and the eradication of the diseases thence arising, have occupied others; while a host of customs and habits, as the use of stays, garters, and breeches, of tobacco and snuff, of flesh as an article of diet, of tea, coffee, and chicory, &c., have each had their crotchety reformers.

There can be no doubt but that medical science is to be a mighty moral agent for centuries to come, and that its application to social and political economy promises the most brilliant results. The arrest and extinction of epidemics is one of these; another is the highest salubrity attainable by architectural arrangements and domestic sewerage. These and the like must await the evolution and development of medical science itself; but the minor points referred to above are within the power and judgment of the individual practitioner. He is a social reformer in the



highest sense of the word. Everywhere he comes in contact with misery and vice, with degraded habits and injurious customs, with the numerous families of the poor, and the sterile pampered homes of the rich. To all he can give advice with benefit, and in every sphere of labour diffuse a knowledge of hygiene. If there be a "disgrace to the family," it may be within his power to show that it is a species of eccentricity, bordering on insanity, which guides the culprit's actions; and it is education and moral culture that will reclaim him, not punishment. The matrimonial alliances of those families that give him their confidence, may be rendered safer and happier by his skill and knowledge as to the detection and demonstration of hereditary diseases. If a family become inconveniently numerous, from the indolence of the mother, he can show that, in many instances at least, the natural check is prolonged lactation and a diligent attention to maternal duties. And thus the enlightened and conscientious practitioner can act with the multifarious relations of hygiene.

The question may arise, how far the communication of this knowledge should be oral and private, and how far oral and public, or even published? The widely-extended circle of readers, the multiplication of institutes of popular science and literature, and the greatly increased number of dabblers in philosophy and physic, render this question of some importance. But it appears to us that it is already decided as to the main point, that such knowledge shall be communicated. Lecturers at temperance meetings demonstrate the anatomy of the abdominal viscera and the physiology of digestion; institutes of popular science include anatomy and physiology in their curricula; and, more decisively still, some of the men that have been most distinguished in the profession have laboured by precept and example to diffuse a popular knowledge of hygiene and of the medical sciences related to it. In short, such a diffusion is really one of the necessities of the age,—the age of great cities and large masses of men. All attempts to attain a higher degree of salubrity amongst such will be comparatively failures, so long as the people do not appreciate them with the earnestness of enlightened judgments. The requisite degree of information can never, we think, be communicated by the desultory efforts just mentioned; nothing short of the method by which other fundamental and necessary departments of knowledge are imparted will serve the purpose; and we therefore think that the science of public and individual hygiene, in a popular form, should constitute a part of primary education. In the mean time, all existing opportunities may be seized of imparting the necessary knowledge, provided always that it be done with integrity; not with the sordid intent of surpassing a rival and gaining a meretricious popularity, but with the nobler object of making men wiser, happier, holier.

We might discourse on the duties of the physician in relation to society at much greater length; for, as his proper study is man, and his peculiar sphere of action is man's welfare, his release from disease and suffering, his advancement to a higher and better state of being, and, finally, the enhancement of his moral dignity, even so wide and comprehensive might be our theme. Let, however, the practitioner feel the grandeur of his mission and the power of his knowledge, and he will rightly regulate his conduct. He will say with Fichte:

"What is more noble than the impulse to action, to sway the minds of men,

and to compel their thoughts to the holy and divine?—and yet this impulse may become a temptation to represent the holy in a common and familiar garb for the sake of popularity—and so to desecrate it! What is more noble than the deepest reverence for the holy, and disdain and annihilation of everything vulgar and opposed to it? And yet this very reverence might tempt some one to reject his age altogether—to cast it from him, and cease to hold any intercourse with it. . . . It is evident from these considerations, that, for his peculiar vocation, the scholar needs shrewd practical wisdom, a profound morality, strict watchfulness over himself, and a fine delicacy of feeling.” (p. 180.)

The duties of the practitioner to the sick and to his brethren have been so well discussed by various writers, that little need be said. A broad distinction should, however, be drawn between offences against morals, and offences against etiquette or propriety. Unquestionably the latter are often more offensive than the former, and their less importance is forgotten amidst the angry feelings excited; and then the punishment awarded is widely disproportionate to the fault, and a gross act of injustice is perpetrated. The principal offences of this kind originate from vanity and cupidity. Inasmuch as the worldly success of the practitioner depends so much upon the opinion of his skill and professional learning entertained by the public, and, in fact, upon a preferential opinion, and therefore implying a comparison with others in his favour, he is apt to bring his claims before the tribunal in a way which displays selfishness, meanness, and duplicity; he puffs his own merits—he depreciates his neighbour's. He is well aware that the tribunal before which he brings his cause is incompetent to decide between himself and his brother practitioner—that ignorant prejudices have to be pandered to, and an overweening conceit of knowledge flattered; and hence arise all those paltry attempts to depreciate the merits of a rival and exalt his own. We find one class who assume superior skill and talent on the ground of having been educated at a celebrated school, or at a school which they sedulously praise for the talent of its teachers, the length of its curricula, or the difficulty of its examinations; and will diligently inculcate the idea that a rival, educated at some other school, or holding the diploma of some other examining board, has completed his education and passed his examination at an inferior institution, and is therefore less able to treat disease successfully, and less to be trusted professionally than himself. The public knows little of the relative merits of the schools and examining boards, and is perhaps quite unaware of the fact that a perfect blockhead may make his way through any, or a paragon in industry and genius be ignominiously repelled; lay people, therefore, can only award the palm to the most plausible and the most loquacious, and hence arises a rivalry in petty arts of disparagement and self-laudation. The licentiate of Apothecaries' Hall will pass in disdain the licentiate of the Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow; the Oxford or Cambridge “man,” looks down with a certain condescension of manner upon the “Scotch doctor;” and the “fellow” of a college will chuckle in his imagined superiority over the simple “licentiate.” There is truly no substantial difference; but the result of this is mutual re- crimination and the disparagement of all.

A very shallow and common method is the publication of a work in a popular form; but this method is not always adopted. Some empirical practitioners will write a superficial monograph on some interesting subject of nosology, and so use technical terms as to give it the air of a true

professional work. On analysis, it is found, however, to contain nothing worthy the notice of the profession; but the writer, remembering the proverb, *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, distributes it gratuitously amongst his patients and neighbours, and hopes thereby to secure an opinion in favour of his professional powers from the lay public, which he knows must be based on false grounds, and which is not awarded by his brethren. Another method is, under a pretence of love of humanity, of science, and of scientific truth, to directly depreciate the skill and ability of a rival, or to seize upon a real error, and upon that erect their own character for superior ability and integrity. Like the runaway thief, the offenders cry "stop thief." This ungenerous form of criticism is far too common amongst even the higher ranks of the profession; and is so prevalent in smaller towns and villages, where rival interests more directly clash, and where more is directly gained by depreciating an opponent, as to embitter all the relations of life. A striking illustration of this form of ethical aberration appeared lately in one of the weekly medical journals.

Whether a mere profession of religion, and the restraint of the ecclesiastical police which such profession involves, can check aberrations from the true principles of medical ethics, would appear from the preceding and similar instances to be somewhat doubtful. The heart of man "is deceitful above all things;" and, while the religious professor flatters himself that he is doing his full Christian duty, by a strict attention to the forms and ordinances of the church, the spirit and essence of Christianity is wanting, and he forgets its fundamental principle of conduct, the law of Divine Wisdom and Love, "Do unto others as ye would that men should do unto you." This only can be the foundation alike of medical ethics and medical etiquette. Much, no doubt, is to be gained by a natural suavity of demeanour and humility of feeling, by gentlemanly training and associations, and by a fear of the results consequent upon a breach of etiquette or ethical manners; but the only true and universally safe principle is that principle thus announced. And we would commend the comment of St. Paul on this new law of love, revealed by Christ, to be found in his letter to the Christians of Corinth, as the best code of medical etiquette, and as comprising all that is necessary for soothing or preventing those bickerings, jealousies, rivalries, and deadly enmities, felt and too much indulged by some professional men. "Love," St. Paul says, "is forbearing, obliging; love is not envious; love is not arrogant, is not proud, is not rude or selfish, or irritable or slanderous. It has pleasure in truth, and not in falsehood. It is content with all, confides in all, trusts to all, bears with all. The highest rank, the greatest skill, the profoundest learning are, without this, nothing; the greatest performances and accomplishments in literature and science without it are vain as the jingling cymbal." Such are the sentiments, freely translated as to form, but correctly translated as to the spirit, of the inspired philosopher and martyr of early Christianity. How much, from time to time, has there been occasion to regret that these sentiments have not influenced the feelings of many even distinguished philosophers and practitioners in the course of their intercourse, whether personal or literary!

We have brought to the test of these principles the rules of the Manchester Medico-Ethical Association. This institution was founded to frame a code of etiquette for the guidance of its members, to decide

upon all questions of usage or courtesy in conducting medical practice ; to support the respectability and maintain the interests of the profession ; to promote fair and honorable practice ; to correspond with bodies or individuals in other parts of the kingdom on any matter touching professional interests ; and, by its moral influence and the exercise of a judicious supervision, to prevent abuses in the profession.

The following are the bye-laws which regulate the disqualification for membership :

“ Any practitioner who may act in opposition to the principles involved in the eight succeeding laws, shall not be eligible to the membership of this association ; and if already a member, he shall, on infringing the same, be liable to expulsion.

“ 1. No member shall practise, professedly and exclusively, homœopathy, hydro-pathy, or mesmerism.

“ 2. No member shall, by advertisement, circular, or placard, solicit private practice.

“ 3. No member shall be the proprietor of, or in any way derive advantage from the sale of, any patent or proprietary medicine.

“ 4. No member shall give testimonials in favour of any patent or proprietary medicine, or in any way recommend their public use.

“ 5. No member, who may keep an open shop, shall sell patent medicines, perfumery, or other articles than pharmaceutical drugs and preparations.

“ 6. No member shall enter into compact with a druggist to prescribe gratuitously, and at the same time share in the profits arising from the sale of the medicines.”

Looking at these bye-laws, with reference to medical ethics, the first consideration which strikes us is the total absence of any fundamental principles of medical morals or etiquette, the exclusively trade character of the laws, and their inadequacy to the purpose aimed at. If a member may not be permitted to practise any *one* of the three leading varieties of the day exclusively, there is nothing on the face of the laws to prevent him practising them conjointly. If a member may not solicit private practice by advertisement, circular, or placard, he may fee a reporter to publish a speech or a puff, or he may advertise a professional publication in the newspapers, get a paragraph inserted in the same as to the successful use of chloroform, or permit a friend to admire in print a singularly skillful operation. The three laws as to the ownership, recommendation, and sale of patent medicines are of questionable wisdom. The demand for remedies having specific objects, and according to approved formulæ, is one that is universal ; it is felt *in* the profession as well as *out* of it. The authorized Pharmacopœia is a proof of the one ; the “ antibilious pills,” “ antiscorbutic drops,” “ family pills,” and the thousand *nostra* of the quacks, are the proofs of the other. The demand then being certain, why leave the sale of these specific compound remedies exclusively to the ignorant pretender ? Why not let the bye-law run that the practitioner shall not patent, recommend, or sell any remedy, the composition of which is not known to the Society and approved of by them ?

We observe with pleasure that the sale of drugs and pharmaceutical preparations is permitted to the practitioner. It is certain such an acknowledgment of professional status to the shop-surgeon will be received by that class with gratitude, and will add dignity to each person so practising. It is the man of the *res angusta domi* ministering to the man of the *res angusta domi* ; and the poor are glad so to get from the surgeon-

chemist what otherwise they *must* get from the drug-chemist, or not have at all—that is, aid in sickness, unless they seek a medical charity. The true method would be for the profession to have a fixed number of such authorized shops in each town, managed by qualified practitioners, but placed under the surveillance of the associated profession residing in the locality. At such establishments the poor could be chiefly supplied with drugs and advice across the counter, and depôts established for the sale of the popular medicines of the faculty.

We are well aware that there may be objections raised against such a plan, on the ground that it would impugn the respectability of the profession. The word respectable is perhaps the most ill-used word in the vocabulary; it is the phrase of a bilious mediocrity; generally speaking, the attempt to be respectable is nothing more dignified than a mere pandering to dullness. Anything that is poor, or ministers to the wants of the poor, is not respectable. The union surgeon is, according to those who pride themselves upon this quality, anything but respectable; the practitioner who prefers to walk rather than to drive a pair, is not respectable; the man who has his surgery to the street, and red and green bottles glaring in his window, is not respectable. This twaddle is by no means peculiar to the medical profession; the clerical is quite as bad. An Irish clergyman, it would appear from the papers, is somewhat of a pariah in the diocese of London; a “St. Bees’-man” is hardly respectable; the Cambridge graduate thinks his degree decidedly more respectable than that of Durham; Oxford prides itself as being more respectable than either. It will well become the medical profession, however, to throw off such petty prejudices and consider the ends of their being, their training, their glorious knowledge of human nature. Everything is respectable which helps on man to fulfil more pleasantly his weary pilgrimage; everything respectable by which the profession, as the interpreter of Divine Providence, holds out the hand of succour to suffering man, relieves his woes, develops his powers, elevates and refines his nature, and fulfils all those duties which we have already ventured briefly to shadow forth. A Medico-ethical Association should therefore make these objects the aim of its institution; its bye-laws and rules should centre round these, and with its members thoroughly imbued with a sense of their high calling, we should have less need for those minute regulations comprised in the Manchester code of etiquette, and which seem so obviously proper, that it appears almost superfluous to express them in writing. An ethical association should take the passage we have quoted from St. Paul for the motto of its code of etiquette: “*Love is obliging; love is not envious; is not arrogant, is not proud; is not rude, or selfish, or irritable, or slanderous.*”

The ethical relations of practitioners in their corporate capacity, and as having public duties to perform as members of medical corporations towards the public and the profession, are of sufficient importance to merit special notice. Many, if not all, the remarks made with reference to medico-ethical associations apply specially to these. An inquiry into the ethical history of our corporations is not one which affords a pleasing retrospect. If we take the bye-laws of the London College of Physicians, they will not bear a comparison with those of the Medico-ethical Association of Manchester. We find no principles of ethics laid down; no rules to

guide the physician in his ethical relations towards the public or his patients, but simply a code of etiquette based on collegiate exclusiveness. Every physician, whether fellow or licentiate, shall attach to each prescription which he writes, the day of the month, the name of the sick man, and his own initial, on pain of being fined five pounds. No member of the College shall hold a consultation in London, or within seven miles, with a physician not being a member, on pain of the same penalty. Such are examples of the College bye-laws.

This exclusive dealing and narrow adhesion to the mere civic privileges of the College, although degrading to what aspires to be a National institution, would have some merit if it created a feeling of brotherhood amongst the London physicians; and if the College, like the other civic guilds of the city of London, were remarkable for its hospitality and good-fellowship. But the history of the College is one tissue of squabbles, lawsuits, and recriminations. We find few of the results of that law of love which we have proposed as the fundamental principle of medical etiquette and ethics. Love is not arrogant, but the "fellows" of the College forgot this when they treated the licentiates as an inferior class. Love is not rude or selfish; but the fellows appear to have been both to their humbler rivals for fame and practice. Love is forbearing and obliging; we fear the licentiates will not say that the fellows have been so to them.

The recent parliamentary inquiry has caused the opinions held by leading members of the College to be made public; and to persons at a distance from the battle-field of professional rivalry, it seems incredible that men presumed to have high general and professional attainments, should show so little nobleness of mind or greatness of purpose. Those attainments seem rather to have narrowed their views and contracted their feelings, than to have expanded or enlarged them. Cockneyism and club-exclusiveness seem to be their guides, and consequently offences against sound ethics and etiquette abound. We will supply a few illustrations; and we do this with an unaffected desire to correct what we think grave errors, prejudicial to the profession at large, but especially so to the class of physicians. We should be sorry to be thought censorious; all we propose is, to lay down certain principles of ethics, and then try how far the conduct of medical corporators is in accordance with those principles.

Dr. Paris thinks that "a higher order of physicians should be secured for the metropolis." By a higher order Dr. Paris means physicians educated to a greater extent. Thus the inhabitants of London are, in the opinion of the President of the College, to have more efficient physicians (if a better education and greater efficiency go together) than the inhabitants of Bristol or Liverpool, Leeds or Manchester. But how can this be reconciled with the great principle of moral duty? Supposing it to be granted, as Dr. Paris assumes, that the metropolitan physicians *are* more highly educated than the provincial, that such a system "has always worked very well, and has preserved very much the dignity of the profession," as Dr. Paris gravely asserts, would it not have added still more to the dignity of the profession to have had the physicians of the teeming millions without the seven-mile circle, as highly educated as the physicians to the two millions within it? Would they not have had a deeper feeling of their moral responsibility, a higher estimate of their powers for good, a

greater earnestness of resolve to exercise their powers, and obtain that good for poor, suffering, debased humanity? Would not, we ask Dr. Paris, such results as these be greater and holier than that increase of dignity—another word for respectability, which seems only in his case to have had the effect of an overweening estimate of the qualifications possessed by a London physician? But after all, it is but an assumption of the aged man of Dover street, that the physicians of Bristol, and Liverpool, and Leeds, and Manchester, and Birmingham are less educated than their metropolitan brethren. For him, it appears, the press has worked and the literary and scientific labours of the provinces have been poured forth in vain; but love boasteth not itself, and Dr. Paris, as the President of the metropolitan body, should not thus have arrogated for himself and his brethren a superiority of education and qualification; it is nothing less than an imputation (as compared with themselves) of ignorance in the provincial physicians.

Let us take another example from the same quarter. Dr. Burrows is one of the Censors of the College of Physicians, and acknowledges that a part of his duty is to exercise a considerable moral control over the members of the College. This acknowledgment implies a study of the principles of medical ethics on the part of Dr. Burrows; let us then see with what effect he has prosecuted those ethical studies. Dr. Burrows was asked whether, in his opinion, the number of students in London had diminished in consequence of the reputation of the provincial schools; in reply, he disparages "the goodness of the article," to use his own phrase, sold at the provincial schools; it is cheap, but not good; for eminent men in their localities will not give their time to tuition. Before Dr. Burrows hazarded this opinion, had he made himself acquainted with the facts? Had he actually inquired as to the staff of these provincial schools, and ascertained whether the eminent physicians and surgeons of the towns in which the schools are established were connected with them or not? We venture to assume that Dr. Burrows had not made inquiry, otherwise he would not have uttered the opinion. But when it is remembered that Dr. Burrows is himself a teacher in a London school, and therefore a competitor with his provincial brethren for pupils, are we not justified in saying that Dr. Burrows has not acted according to those principles of medical etiquette we have laid down? His offence is, we think, to be placed in the same category as that of Dr. Paris. If it be wrong to enhance our own merits by depreciating the merits of our rivals, then both the President and Censor of the Royal College of Physicians have done that wrong; done it before a lay tribunal, and by so doing, have lowered, so far as their opinions may be esteemed valid, the reputation and dignity of the physicians and teachers of the medical sciences out of London. They have injured the profession at large without the city boundary, by diminishing, so far as their opinion can diminish, the confidence and esteem which members of the legislature may have hitherto afforded the higher class of the profession, and by so much they lessened their weight in society, and their influence for good. We do not say how much, and we honestly think it is not much; but the offence against a sound code of medical ethics is not the less because the offender is impotent for evil.

Let us take another example of metropolitan arrogance and club-exclusiveness, and compare it with the conduct which a healthful line of gentle-

manly feeling and medical morals would induce. Dr. Seymour, who it appears was formerly a censor, and ought consequently to know some little of medical etiquette, is asked, "You say that you consider the extra license an abomination?" He boldly answers, "I do; it is very injurious to the profession in every way, and ought to be done away with, unless we wish to have *officiers de Santé* in this country." Upon further questioning, Dr. Seymour states apparently the grounds of his opinion; and these appear to be, that the examinations are not upon paper for three days, nor are examinations in Greek and Latin instituted; and very recently the examinations have been greatly increased in severity. We cannot comprehend how all this could raise up a class of such inferior practitioners as the *officiers de santé* in France; an examination greatly increased in severity is the best-acknowledged means of securing diligence in study, and an extended education. But this discrepancy in his evidence is not the greatest offence against medical etiquette, which Dr. Seymour has committed in his corporate capacities. Two hundred and fifty-five practitioners hold the license thus stigmatized as "an abomination;" they have in virtue of that license an equal legal right to the honours and privileges of physicians, with the graduates of Oxford and Cambridge; the curriculum of study required from them previously to examination, is of the same extent as that required from the candidates for the London license; and they have all been examined by the proper authorities and declared competent to practise medicine. The greater number are physicians in actual practice, and some of them have contributed largely to medical literature. No individual is on a *lower* footing than individuals amongst the general practitioners, the *intra-licentiates*, or even the fellows. Is this conduct compatible, we ask, with that true gentlemanly feeling which is not "rude, proud, selfish, slanderous; which has pleasure in truth and not in falsehood?"—we quote the words of St. Paul; or can Dr. Seymour be fairly acquitted of a breach of those principles of medical ethics which we have laid down?

We have not made these remarks, we feel conscious, in a captious or censorious spirit. We have propounded certain principles of morals for the guidance of professional conduct, whether the individual acts in his individual or in his corporate capacity. We have taken certain public deeds and doings by public men solely to illustrate our views, and without the slightest personal feeling to any. We have, we venture to state, a higher object than the exposure of small delinquencies, committed, we believe, from an imperfect appreciation of what is morally right, and therefore to that extent excusable. The conduct of practitioners in their individual and corporate capacity, becomes of a higher importance when we remember that, as the conduct is dignified and regulated by a high standard of ethics, just in that proportion will the dignity of the profession generally be enhanced, and its usefulness increased. It is undoubtedly to the interest of society, that the medical profession be accounted dignified and honorable; for then honorable and dignified minds will seek to enter it. But how can members of Parliament and the educated classes esteem a profession, the members of which mutually disparage each other? It can never follow in the judgment of the educated and enlightened portion of the public, that the discoverer of the moles in his brother's eye has his own free from them; while they believe as to the moles in the



one case, they will suspect the existence of a beam in the other; and thus a low estimate is entertained of all. This is no imaginary evil; for we happen to know an English nobleman, who, struck with the depreciating tone in which his London physician spoke of the provincial practitioner, mentioned it to the latter; and the result was a reciprocity of crimination, injurious to the character of both. We believe that that grace, which yields with candour the palm of superiority to a competitor, and which praises a rival rather than depreciates him, is to be attained by minds of the highest order only; but we think that if physicians and surgeons were to remember, that every disparagement of their rivals and their brethren was virtually an injury to themselves, the feeling of self-interest would come into operation, and place that check upon their actions which a higher principle would not supply.

Leaving, now, the principles of ethics already stated to be applied by our readers to individual conduct, and to be used as the test and touchstone of such acts as we have alluded to in the preceding pages, we take up the question of professional education in relation to ethics, with the view of offering a few suggestions in regard to it. Considering the wide scope of medical studies and their intimate relation to mental philosophy, we do not, we think, claim more for them than we ought to claim, in designating them as containing the elements at least of that learned culture which leads men "to the attainable portion of the Divine Idea." Looking at these studies in the abstract, we cannot but think that there is some radical defect in the plans of the directors of those studies, and of the agents of that learned culture, since so little of that grandeur of principle, that deeply pious feeling, that elevation of sentiment found in the doctrines of Fichte, as well as in the Gospel of Christ, are found in the sentiments and opinions expressed by leading members of the profession, and especially by those who assume to themselves the duty of directing the learned culture of the medical student. On looking through the evidence given by distinguished individuals in the metropolis before the Parliamentary Committee on Medical Registration, that is to say, by the presidents and examiners of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of London, we find no reference whatever made to ethics as a part of the learned culture of the students; we do not find the sentiment once expressed that the pursuits of the student should be directed towards the attainment of higher objects than the successful and lucrative performance of mere professional duties; we find, not merely no reference to the "nature of the scholar," but no reference whatever to those moral duties which are taught in the fundamental doctrines of our common Christianity. We fear that a higher tribunal than ours would say of such leaders of professional culture, it is the blind leading the blind; or if Fichte could rise from his grave, he would not quote the first part of the inscription on the tall obelisk that surmounts it, as being applicable to them: "THE TEACHERS SHALL SHINE AS THE BRIGHTNESS OF THE FIRMAMENT,"—so runs the funereal legend;—is it, or can it be made, applicable to the teachers of the medical schools?

Surely, it is time that medical ethics took a higher position than this! Surely, there should be in each school, if not a chair of ethics, the means, at least, of a moral culture afforded. We think men competent to the task of teaching them would be rare; so few estimate rightly the im-

portance of the nexus between religion and science; so few have the force of intellect that could seize the vast extent of the two branches of human knowledge, and weld them into a compact and efficient form. But who knows? Some medical Fichte may arise and glad the ears and hearts of listening thousands; some bravely and eloquently wise man may appear in the field of medical culture, and head the crowd of young and enthusiastic aspirants to moral glory; and so with them, both the first and second part of the inscription on Fichte's funereal obelisk will be fulfilled:

"THE TEACHERS SHALL SHINE  
AS THE BRIGHTNESS OF THE FIRMAMENT;  
AND THEY THAT TURN MANY TO RIGHTEOUSNESS  
AS THE STARS FOR EVER AND EVER."

Seed may be sown by the scholar as a teacher on an unfruitful soil; he may feel that he has failed in guiding the studies of his hearers to the most essential study of all. Yet, after all, he may not have laboured in vain; and this, indeed, is *our* hope.

"He can never know that he has not thrown into the soil some spark which, though now unapparent, will blaze forth at the proper time. Even in the worst possible event,—that he has not accomplished so much as this,—his activity has still another object; and if he has done something for *it*, his labour has not been utterly lost. If he has, at least, upheld, and in some breasts quickened or renewed the faith, that there is *something* worthy of the reverence of men; that by industry and honour men may elevate themselves to the contemplation of this object of reverence, and in this contemplation become strong and happy; if some have only had their occupation made holier in their eyes, so that they may approach it with somewhat less levity than before; if he can venture to hope that some have left his hall, if not precisely with more light, yet with more modesty, than they entered it;—then he has not entirely lost the fruit of his exertions." (p. 206.)

It is not, truly, as a lecturer alone, that the scholar is a teacher; as an author, he may have a more widely numerous audience. There is no class of professional men, to whom some well-defined principles of morals are more necessary than this. The direction of the mind exclusively to one object of pursuit is apt to narrow the intellect, and render the man bigoted and intolerant of all those who interfere antagonistically with that sole object. A mind so warped is deformed. It sees no beauty in others; it indulges in self-contemplation, self-admiration, and self-flattery, and entertains ideas of its own powers far beyond those of bystanders or antagonists. And the object thus pursued is very often pursued by such a mind, if not at first, certainly after awhile, not for its own sake, or for the greatness or moral grandeur inherent in it, but for the sake of the pursuer, and to lead *him* to greatness and grandeur. He makes the object of his pursuit a stepping-stone to wealth and fame; and thus selfishness joins with prejudice to render the man more intolerant of doubt or contradiction, more dogmatic, presumptuous, and dictatorial.

The claims to the honour of certain discoveries set forth by authors are ordinarily rendered doubtful, or are announced so as to embitter all the relations of professional and literary life, by feelings of this kind. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that men of mediocre intellect and abounding vanity are apt to jump up behind the genius, and attempt to filch from the latter the fame and honour belonging to it. Such literary

footpads and pirates abound; but we apprehend that attempts of this kind always fail. It may be sooner or later—there may be a difference as to the skill with which the merits of another may be appropriated or depreciated—but sooner or later the fraud will be detected. The false plumes will be stripped from the pretender; the spurious coin will be nailed to the counter of the literary world.

Very often those who have done good service to the profession, and have added to the garnered treasures of science, estimate their labours too highly, or resent with too great warmth and too intemperately the piracy or depreciation of others. They forget their vocation; its integrity, its objects, its duties. They look too much to self; the fine gold of their “Genius” becomes dim; their “Integrity” is lost or diminished. Proper self-appreciation is undoubtedly compatible with the highest integrity and the noblest genius; but neither are compatible with an intemperate, ignoble, vulgar mode of asserting claims to notice and fame. No man should lie down to be kicked; but he may, both as a matter of policy and morals, while firmly asserting his claims, turn the other cheek to the scoffer.

Professional intolerance is often shown in an undue estimate of the *artistic* skill of rivals; the practitioner not only esteems himself more skillful than he really is, but thinks his competitors less skillful than they really are. Self-contemplation and selfishness have blinded his eyes to his own demerits, and quickened his perceptions of the demerits of his rivals. We may all say, indeed, in this matter, so universal is the failing in some form or other—

“Oh, wad some power the giftie gie us  
To see oursel as others see us!”

There are a large class of professional prejudices which belong to the whole profession. All bodies of men are intolerant of any departure from principles and practices that have become conventional. Although such departure may have nothing whatever in it morally wrong, yet it is visited “with the utmost rigour of the law”—that may have been conventionally established. Thus physicians fully engaged in practice will bitterly regard the young physician who, feeling the pressure of the *res angusta domi*, may exercise any surgical talent he may possess, or who, suspecting that his medicamina are not well compounded, or of a spurious quality, may look to the manufacture of his powder, or point his own guns. A submission to conventionalism is demanded in preference to submission to a moral or professional duty, and the patient must die, rather than the physician be guilty of bloodletting or pharmacy. But in the face of the great duties of the professional man, what sad trifling is this!

The obloquy and abuse which has been showered by the regular and conventionally practising physician or surgeon upon the various modern sects which modern times have produced in such abundance, arises from the same source as indicated above. The homœopathic, hydropathic, or mesmeric practiser, addressing himself to that large portion of society in whom superstition and credulity are influential, succeed for a time in eclipsing the conventional practiser, or “allopath,” as his antagonists have termed him, and hence no little ill-will and envy arise. But, independently of this inroad upon the sources of pecuniary gain, perpetrated

by the homœopath and his congener, there is the outrage on current doctrines and conventional methods of treatment, which, to that numerous portion of the profession not given to change, is an unpardonable sin. In accordance with this feeling have been the denunciation of the medical heretic and schismatic by his orthodox brother; who, regardless of what there might be of truth in the new ideas and ways, has poured forth upon them the full vials of his unmitigated wrath. To any hints at moderation he has turned a deaf ear; all inquiries into the utility and veritableness of the new doctrines he has met with a scoff.

Such conduct is, we think, perfectly useless for any beneficial object. Nay, it is worse than useless, because the estimation in which homœopath or hydropath is held by the imperfectly informed public is not decreased by such unreasonable denunciations, but rather increased. They look upon him as the victim of unjust persecution, as a martyr to the cause of truth and honesty. Unreasonableness begets unreasonableness; and the defence therefore is as the attack. It is worse than useless, because the truth there may be in the system being thus rejected by the allopath, he is looked upon by the public as bigoted to his own ways, inapt to learn from others, unsafe to trust in sickness. Intelligent laymen, seeing that good has resulted from these new methods of treatment, cannot sympathise with that blind conventionalism which wages war to the knife with the doers of that good, and this the more decidedly, because in the ranks of the schismatics, men of science, or, at least, of a regular professional education and some position in the profession, are to be found.

We would then advocate a different course of conduct, not only as ethically right, but as expedient for the interests of the profession. Let the pretensions of the new sectarians be received in silence; let the results of their treatment be carefully investigated; let their methods and views be fully inquired into, in a spirit of enlightened and philosophical courtesy; let all that is good be selected and appropriated, and all that is bad rejected. This may be done with nothing more bitter than a laugh; may be done, too, with immense benefit to the practitioner and the public; and may be *so* done, that the empiric will at last find his level. When we hear of quacks carrying the public with them, we may be sure it can only be that they are better tacticians than the regular troops; but why should this be? The profession ought to know that human nature is a thing full of frailties and infirmities, and should be treated accordingly.

We perhaps should here refer to those bickerings and disputes between the members of different sections of the profession at large on points of etiquette, and the material duties and relations of practice. It too often happens that a petulant general practitioner will depreciate the skill and talents of his brother the physician, while the latter (perhaps too often in self-defence) asserts his superiority over the former. It is very clear that some rules for the definition of the relations between these grades or sections are wanting, or there never will be an end of bickering. If the physician be required to keep his place as the consultee, it should not be occupied by the general practitioner. If the physician be not allowed to act as surgeon, the surgeon ought not to be allowed to act as physician. Dr. Gregory discussed this question of grades and distinctions with his usual good sense. "As a doctor's degree," he observes, "can never confer sense, the title alone can never command regard; neither should the want

of it deprive any man of the esteem and deference due to real merit. If a surgeon or apothecary has had the education and acquired the knowledge of a physician, he is a physician to all interests and purposes, whether he has a degree or not, and ought to be respected accordingly." We should scarcely have made reference to this point of medical ethics, had we not seen an essay published in a popular periodical, entitled a "Plea for Physicians," so utterly wanting in sound principles of morals, as to call for the unqualified reprobation of the whole class.

And this brings us to our final division of our subject, namely, the organization and unity of the whole profession. Whatever the *individual* is required to do in accordance with sound principles of ethics, so much is incumbent on the *whole* profession, as a part of the body politic. Hence all those duties which have a relation to political economy devolve upon it; and all that discipline and legislation which is required for the individual practitioner, should emanate from it. How far this is practicable amidst the jar of contending interests and the clash of prejudices, is more than doubtful. The profession seems little better than a chaos; the whole mass is upheaving; decomposition and recomposition are going on; but we can discern no great principles by which coherence and strength may be given to the discordant elements. It is quite impossible that the intelligent lay public will notice the professional desire for organization and legislation, so long as the impelling motives are nothing more dignified than sectional interests, grade prejudices, or interested clamours in a pecuniary sense. The first principle should be unity to carry out the moral objects of the profession. Let "good-will towards men" be the rallying cry of those who seek an organization; let the list of their demands include every means whereby the profession may be made more extensively useful to mankind; in short, let religion and morals, in some such sense as we have so imperfectly set forth, be the sole object of their union. With these principles to guide, the humblest apothecary will find his place, and be made useful; every man of good principles and high feelings will be made welcome, however high or however low he may be; and so union and strength will arise. Then from every grade of the profession a higher tone of feeling may be looked for with reference to each other, and while all honorably compete for the public favour, the wisest and best will be at the head, and govern. The conventionalisms of differences of education and title, and the hundred pettinesses which set professional brother against brother, will appear in their true character as utterly insignificant, when compared with the gloriously beneficent and grand objects which a united profession might compass.

It is, indeed, remarkable, that while in those societies devoted to the cultivation of medical science and art, as the Royal Medico-Chirurgical Society, and as the numerous medical societies in the provinces of the United Kingdom, all grades combine and act in harmony, without complaining, and without selfishness or pride, the educational institutions raise their Shibboleth before the public, before Parliament, and in the profession, and establish their differences where there is scarcely any distinction. Of the leading men in the College of Surgeons in London, how few are there who have not only the qualifications of physicians, but the practice also. Take away the cases requiring medical treatment from the practice of the surgeon, and the best portion is gone. To all purposes,

and in every way, the surgeon is a physician, with the ability to operate chirurgically superadded to his medical acquirements, and is conventionally permitted to operate, prescribe, and receive his fee, so long as he calls himself "surgeon." But let him but add M.D. to his name, and conventionalism forthwith binds up his right hand, severs him from his college, and circumscribes the sphere of his usefulness; he is at once disabled and disfranchised chirurgically: he *may* possibly attain to office in the College of Physicians, but the College of Surgeons is to him hermetically sealed. Now, if it could be proved that this line of demarcation, already obliterated in the voluntary associations, is of any use whatever to either the profession or the public when drawn between two classes of practitioners, in which the difference of education and attainments is *now* at least really but nominal, we would acquiesce at once in the arrangement. But it has yet to be shown that a union of these two educational institutions, and a reorganization on a broad base of ethical principles, would either render the surgeon less skillful, or the physician less educated or intellectual. The whole matter is indeed hardly capable of serious argument. It is manifest that the private interests and feelings alone of influential metropolitan practitioners maintain the *status quo*; we cannot doubt, however, that the enlightened practitioners in the provinces will ultimately address themselves to the question, place the organization of the profession on its proper basis, and, looking to the kindred professions of the Church and the Bar, take that which is worthy of imitation from both. It is true that the Church, at least in some degree, has lost that perfection of organization and unity of action which it once possessed; but the plan and the principles remain, and are worth the study of him who would apply medical science and art, and a numerous body of its practisers (numbering tens of thousands), to the improvement of society, and the amelioration of man's moral and physical nature.

We have finally to consider what are the ethical relations which society ought to bear towards the medical profession, or, in other words, what are the duties of society and the rights of practitioners. If the profession were an organized body, like the clergy of various sects, and if, by a comprehensive system of corporate government, the minds of its members were so trained and disciplined as to take that line of conduct which the true principles of ethics point out as just and therefore expedient, we could not doubt for a moment that it would attain to a higher importance in the estimate of mankind, and would share in those external marks of esteem and gratitude which society has conferred upon the clerical and legal professions. We should not doubt to see its dignitaries sitting amongst the peers of the realm, or its representatives amongst the representatives of the people. Poverty there would also be amongst us, as there is amongst the clergy; and men amongst us, who would disgrace their calling; but we think all history teaches the important lesson, that wise and mighty schemes of benevolence, carried out by the combined powers of educated men, never failed to aggrandize the agents. Still the riveting bolt of high and holy principles must unite them; personal aggrandizement must only be sought by the advancement of the general weal; the selfish instincts must be disciplined into docility; otherwise the profession will remain as it is—a chaos of conflicting elements.

[P. Laycock]