

The fundamental importance of social insurance for health equity

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Abstract

People need to consume goods and services that support health, such as nutritious food, medical care, and quality housing, throughout their lives. Many of these goods and services are allocated using markets, which means that people need income to provide purchasing power for these goods and services. However, everyone has times when supporting themselves through paid labor is not possible, so many individuals will not receive the income needed for a healthy life if income distribution is tied solely to economic production. Therefore, a key political economy of health goal is to put in place income-support policy that gets income to those unable to engage in paid labor. The 3 main forms of income-support policy—social assistance, social insurance, and guaranteed income—offer different strengths and limitations. I argue that social insurance, because of its focus on getting income to people in situations in which they cannot or should not engage in paid labor, is a fundamental part of a political economy that supports everyone's health.

Key words: income; social determinants of health; social insurance; socioeconomic status.

In their pathbreaking article, “Health and Political Economy: Building a New Common Sense in the United States,” Roy et al¹ demonstrate how economic institutions contribute to poor health overall and the inequitable distribution of poor health. Moreover, they make clear the importance of reforming income-distributing institutions for better population health. In this commentary, I argue for the essential role of 1 set of distributive institutions—social insurance—in a political economy that promotes the health of everyone.

Income and health

The general relationship between income and health is that income provides purchasing power that allows individuals to consume goods and services necessary for health (eg, nutritious food, health care).^{2–8} These health impacts accumulate over time, and financial security facilitates prioritizing health. Cash income, in particular, gives flexibility in addressing personal priorities. Moreover, income can affect social status and thus how people relate to each other. Indeed, the connection between income and health is one of the most robust in social epidemiology.^{2–4,6,9} Of course, income is not all that matters for health, and income distribution is not the only explanation for health inequities. But income surely matters.

Income distribution

Income is of 2 types: factor income (received in exchange for goods and services, such as wages for paid labor or dividends for the use of assets) and transfer income (received without exchange of goods or services).¹⁰ In market economies, the factor

payment system, which distributes income under contractual terms for supplying “factors” of production (labor, land, or capital), is the primary income-distributing institution. However, this creates a problem. People engage in paid labor for, at most, part of their lives (and typically own little income-generating property), but have consumption needs throughout their lives. Thus, distributing income solely through the factor payment system would lead to many individuals not receiving the income needed for a healthy life.¹¹ From a political economy and health perspective, the factor payment system must be supplemented with additional income-distributing institutions. Broadly, these can take 3 forms: social assistance, social insurance, or guaranteed income.¹²

Social assistance provides income support based on need—that is, having insufficient income and assets (sometimes called “means-testing”). US social-assistance programs include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).

Social insurance provides income support based on risk—specifically, risk of insufficient income stemming from inability to engage in paid labor.² Viewed narrowly, social insurance is “contributory,” covering only individuals who have “paid in,” like with some unemployment insurance or retirement pension programs. However, I think we should view social insurance more broadly—encompassing all programs that provide income support to those with a “covered” reason for not engaging in paid labor. Using the term like this does expand its meaning,¹³ but there is a similarity in the logic of such programs, providing income support during times in which engaging in paid labor is infeasible, which supports

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thinking of them as forms of social insurance. Examples of social insurance programs are Social Security Administration Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI; commonly referred to as "social security checks") and Social Security Disability Income (SSDI).

Finally, guaranteed income provides income support to an entire population, regardless of need or risk. Guaranteed income programs are uncommon, but the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend is one example.^{14,15}

When is social insurance needed?

Social insurance protects against the risk of insufficient income for people in 6 important social "roles" that can occur across the life course: childhood (approximately to age 18 years), pursuit of higher education, caregiving, work-limiting disability, unemployment, and older age (approximately from age 65 years). About half of the US population is in one of these roles at any given time (Figure 1): 40% are under age 18 or over 65 and 10% are between 18 and 65 and are full-time students or caregivers (eg, for children or sick relatives), have a work-limiting disability, or face temporary unemployment.

The key distinction between social insurance and social assistance is the policy's logic. If a program is meant to provide income support during a time when a person cannot or should not be expected to primarily support themselves through paid labor, so as to prevent the risk of experiencing material deprivation (and the health harms that that brings), then I think it makes sense to think of it as a form of social insurance. If the intent is to provide relief only after a person's income drops below a certain level (for whatever reason), then I consider that a type of social assistance. The goals of social assistance and social insurance are both laudable, but the different intentions underlying them create substantive differences in program design and implementation that have important impacts on a policy's real-world effects.

Why social insurance?

Why should we structure income support as social insurance rather than social assistance or guaranteed income? In short, social insurance is effective, reaches those who are eligible, and minimizes macroeconomic costs.

To be clear, social assistance programs are certainly better than no income support at all. For example, studies of SNAP; the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) all show improvements in health when benefits reach individuals, compared with not receiving income support.¹⁶⁻¹⁸ However, there are several reasons that building an income-support system around social assistance is a suboptimal choice for population health. First, because social assistance requires that people first experience low income before they can receive benefits, it is analogous to treating the problem after it occurs, rather than preventing it (the goal of social insurance). Experiencing low income can create health harms that subsequent income-support programs may not be able to undo. Second, because social assistance programs are focused on ensuring that only those in need receive benefits, they often have substantial administrative burdens related to eligibility determination and recertification.^{19,20} These burdens can create stigma, adversarial program administration, and ultimately reduce take-up, such that many eligible

individuals do not receive benefits.¹⁹⁻²¹ Next, because social assistance programs are meant only for those in need, rather than as more universal benefits, it has empirically been difficult to fund benefits at levels that effectively alleviate poverty. Indeed, international comparative studies make clear that social assistance less effectively reduces poverty and material deprivation than social insurance.²²⁻²⁹ Finally, phasing-out benefits as factor income increases creates high effective marginal tax rates, resulting in "poverty traps" that make it difficult to get ahead.^{2,10,28} For all of these reasons, the overall population health impact of an income-support system that emphasizes social assistance is not as great as it could be. A policy regime that emphasized social insurance could get income support to people before a lack of income harmed health. Of course, having a more limited role for social assistance programs as a backup plan can be a good idea. But the more poverty can be effectively prevented by a country's social insurance system, the less social assistance would be needed.

Guaranteed income avoids many of the harms of social assistance but presents other issues. There is no clear mechanism for responding to large and unexpected expenses, and it likely would need to be structured as a complement, not a substitute for, other income-support programs. If there were to be a national guaranteed-income program, approximately half of individuals included would already be engaging in paid labor, and thus at lower risk for insufficient income in the absence of the program. Relative to a social insurance approach focused on individuals not engaging in paid labor, this could mean fewer health benefits for a given fiscal cost. Indeed, a recent randomized trial in which many participants were working observed few health impacts.³⁰ Another concern sometimes raised is the macroeconomic costs of such a program. Those costs could relate to "income" effects that may slightly discourage paid labor (among those who might otherwise work)—although empirical evidence suggests that such impacts are small^{31,32}—and "substitution" effects that could discourage paid labor among those taxed to finance the program (if not financed through social wealth fund dividends, like the Alaska Permanent Fund).^{31,33} However, empirical evidence also suggests that such substitution effects are likely not a large concern in the United States at present.^{34,35} Of course, these concerns apply to social insurance as well, but since social insurance covers fewer people than guaranteed income (requiring less financing for a given benefit level) and covers people unlikely to engage in paid labor in the absence of the program, the macroeconomic costs of guaranteed income, if any, are likely to be larger than for social insurance. Overall, then, I think guaranteed income offers few marginal benefits over a system of social insurance.

Current social insurance and goals for improvement

The above-mentioned roles are part of the fabric of society, and each has existing income-support programs. However, these programs currently fall short, leading to preventable problems.

Older age

A mix of programs provide income support after retirement. The bedrock is OASI, which prevents poverty and improves health.³⁶⁻⁴⁰ Additional programs are tax-advantaged accounts (eg, 401(k) plans), and enterprise benefits (eg, pensions offered




Figure 1. US population and “roles” relevant for social insurance. The figure depicts the distribution of the US population across social categories relevant for social insurance (“roles”). The numerals represent the percentage of the population in each category. Children are defined as those under 18 years of age; older adults are defined as those 65 years of age and older. The remaining “working-age” adults are categorized as having a disability if they report not working in the past year and a disability being the primary reason for that, being a student if they report not working in the past year and attending school as the primary reason for that, being a caregiver if they report not working in the past year and providing caregiving as the primary reason for that, being unemployed if they report not working in the past year but actively looking for work, being a paid worker if they report working for pay in the past year, and “other” if they report not working for pay in the past year but not for any of the other reasons. Source: Author’s analysis of US Census Bureau Current Population Survey 2023 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, downloaded via IPUMS.

by former employers).^{41,42} Because tax-advantaged accounts and enterprise benefits disproportionately favor individuals paid more highly during their working years, the current mix of income supports disadvantages those who faced educational and labor market discrimination earlier in life, particularly women and those who are racially minoritized.⁴³⁻⁴⁵ For that reason, OASI should be emphasized. Moreover, if there truly are solvency issues in the benefit system for older individuals, it would be better to reduce tax expenditures on tax-advantaged accounts,^{46,47} which primarily benefit the well-off, rather than cutting OASI benefits, the subject of recent congressional proposals.⁴⁸

Children

Ensuring that children grow up with adequate income would be both health- promoting and a form of “investment” that has long-term social benefits.⁴⁹⁻⁵² Current children’s benefits are mostly implemented through the tax code. Major programs include the Child Tax Credit (CTC), the child-related part of the EITC, head of household filing status, and dependent tax deductions. Tax code–based implementation has many problems, including not reaching non-filers (typically those with low income), lump sum payments that make income smoothing difficult, and lack of refundability for some benefits (meaning those with lower tax liabilities receive less support).⁵³⁻⁵⁶ Moreover, the current EITC and CTC explicitly exclude those with the lowest income and intentionally provide less support for low-income families as the benefits “phase-in.”^{57,58} This means that children at greatest risk of poor health due to insufficient income receive the least support. A better approach would be a single program that issues monthly payments for each child (to a parent or

guardian as payee). This could be partially financed through consolidation of the CTC, the child-related part of the EITC, and dependent deduction, and head of household tax expenditures. Moreover, greater social insurance spending may reduce the need for social assistance spending (eg, TANF, SNAP, and WIC).

Work-limiting disability

Work-limiting disabilities can reduce labor income and create additional expenses for medical care and adaptive strategies.⁵⁹⁻⁶¹ In thinking about disability income programs, it is helpful to separate short-term and long-term disability. At present, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides some short-term job protection but no income support (and excludes many workers).⁶² A few state and local programs, along with enterprise benefits, offer short-term income support (such as paid sick leave), but there is no national program. Adding a national system of short-term disability income is likely to provide meaningful health benefits.⁶³⁻⁶⁵ For long-term disability, SSDI is the main public program (Supplemental Security Income provides social assistance for those without an SSDI-qualifying work history). However, access is difficult, resulting in many eligible individuals not receiving benefits.^{66,67} Further, benefit amounts are low, and limits on the amount of income that can be earned while still receiving benefits may prevent individuals from engaging in paid labor to the extent they are able.⁶⁸ One model for reform is the Veterans Affairs system of disability benefits, where benefits are set through an initial disability determination without subsequent earnings limits, avoiding labor disincentives.⁶⁹ There is strong evidence that this approach improves health.⁷⁰

Students

Pursuing advanced education typically precludes full-time employment, and thus students need a source of income support during this time of their lives. Basing support on loans and family transfers likely discourages advanced education for those with less family support and contributes to high rates of food insecurity among students.^{10,71} Thus, while perhaps not commonly thought of in this way, providing income support for those pursuing advanced education could fit well under the logic of social insurance. Given the clear connection between education and health, increasing the capability of individuals to pursue advanced education is likely to be health-promoting,⁷²⁻⁷⁵ although this does not address other issues such as financing of advanced education, a topic separate from social insurance. Another approach that could be seen as a new area for social insurance is to provide income support during the years after compulsory education (approximately ages 18–24). Doing so addresses the risk of insufficient income that many face at this time (whether because they are pursuing advanced education or because they have had little time to accrue skills valued by the labor market), is neutral between those who do and do not pursue advanced education, and helps lessen pressure to forgo college so as not to burden one's family.

Unemployment

US unemployment insurance has federal standards but is administered by each state. This creates wide variability in rules and benefits, along with underinvestment in system infrastructure.⁷⁶⁻⁷⁹ Many workers remain uncovered, income replacement rates are low, and benefits are hard to access.⁸⁰ Key goals for reform include federalization of administration, expanding eligibility (including adoption of a “job-seeker” approach without work history requirements), and increasing replacement rate and benefit duration. Since better unemployment insurance helps individuals meet basic needs and improves mental health, such reforms would bring important health benefits.⁸¹⁻⁸⁷

Caregiving

Caregiving benefits are health-promoting,⁸⁸⁻⁹¹ but there is no national program, only the FMLA (unpaid job protection) and some state and job-based programs.^{62,92} Social insurance for caregivers is often presented as paid “leave,” meaning benefits for someone stepping away from paid work. However, since caregiving precludes paid work even if not previously employed, it would be better to envision universal caregiving benefits, without work history or earnings requirements. Such eligibility criteria are hallmarks of most current proposals⁹³ but would exclude many.⁹⁴

Improving factor income distribution

Social insurance is principally for those with barriers to paid labor. For this reason, efforts to improve the distribution of factor income, also a key part of a political economy of health agenda,¹ are complementary to, rather than substitutes for, efforts to improve social insurance. Such efforts include facilitation of collective bargaining (eg, unionization and sectoral bargaining) to work against employers' monopsony power,⁹⁵⁻⁹⁹ minimum wage laws,^{100,101} and full employment macroeconomic policy.^{102,103} These efforts will improve population health,^{96,97,103,104} but individuals not directly

attached to the factor payment system—those for whom social insurance is meant—would benefit only indirectly. For example, despite recent full employment conditions that cut by one-third 40 years of wage-inequality growth,¹⁰⁵ food insecurity and poverty increased substantially when COVID-19–related social-insurance programs ended.^{106,107} Efforts to improve factor income distribution are clearly important but are no substitute for social insurance.

Achieving social insurance reform

Social insurance reform will require an organized political coalition.^{108,109} Potential beneficiaries are a natural constituency, but because social insurance protects against risk from situations that occur commonly across the life course, it can help organize those who do not immediately stand to benefit. For instance, those who are not currently caregivers or parents can still rally around the fact that they may need to care for a loved one eventually, or the desirability of smoothing the costs of raising young children over longer time frames. The broader applicability of social insurance programs may be an important political asset.²⁰ A key trade-off emphasized in policy debates over social assistance vs social insurance is that social insurance tends to have greater fiscal costs than a similar social assistance program restricted only to those with low income.²⁸ This greater fiscal cost could be seen as a political liability as it may require greater taxation to finance it. However, empirical work has demonstrated that it is often easier to generate political support for more inclusive social insurance programs, even with their larger budgets.^{22,28} Whereas those with middle-range incomes might see little benefit from supporting social assistance for those with low incomes, a social insurance program they can benefit from, along with those with lower incomes, may be more feasible. Indeed, this has been the trajectory of older-age pensions in many countries, starting as poverty relief but growing to encompass virtually the entire older population.^{27,110}

Conclusion

People have consumption needs throughout their lives, but they can engage in paid labor during, at most, part of it. If income distribution is related solely to economic production, many individuals will not receive the income needed for a healthy life. Tackling this cause of poor population health requires reforming our income-distributing institutions: we must get income to those unable to engage in paid labor. Social insurance is the mechanism for this, and is thus a fundamental part of a political economy that supports everyone's health.

Supplementary material

Supplementary material is available at *Health Affairs Scholar* online.

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Conflicts of interest

Please see ICMJE form(s) for author conflicts of interest. These have been provided as supplementary materials.

Notes

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