

1 **Major Article**

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3 **Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 sub-lineages show reduced pathogenicity and transmission**
4 **potential than the early SARS-CoV-2 D614G variant in Syrian hamsters**

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6 Wen Su^{1§}, Ka Tim Choy^{1§}, Haogao Gu¹, Sin Fun Sia¹, Ka Man Cheng¹, Sarea Islam Nuha
7 Nizami¹, Pavithra Krishnan¹, Yuet Mai Ng¹, Lydia Dai Jia Chang¹, Yingzhi Liu¹, Samuel MS
8 Cheng¹, Malik Peiris¹, Leo LM Poon¹, John M Nicholls², Hui-Ling Yen^{1*}

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10 ¹ School of Public Health, ² Department of Pathology, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The
11 University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China

12 [§]These authors contributed equally. *Correspondence: HL Yen (hyen@hku.hk).

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14 **Running title:** Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 in Syrian hamsters

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16 **Notes:**

17 (1) The authors have no commercial or other association that might pose a conflict of
18 interest.

19 (2) This study was supported by National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the
20 National Institutes of Health, USA (U01AI151810 and 75N93021C00016), Research Grant
21 Council Theme-based Research Schemes, Hong Kong SAR, China (T11-712/19-N and T11-
22 705/21-N).

23 (3) Correspondence: HL Yen (hyen@hku.hk).

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1 **Abstract**

2 **Background.** The epidemiological advantage of Omicron variant is evidenced by its rapid
3 spread and the ability to outcompete prior variants. Among Omicron sub-lineages, early
4 outbreaks were dominated by BA.1 while BA.2 has gained dominance since February 2022.
5 The relative pathogenicity and transmissibility of BA.1 and BA.2 have not been fully defined.

6 **Methods.** We compared viral loads and clinical signs in Syrian hamsters after infection with
7 BA.1, BA.2, or D614G variant. A competitive transmission model and next generation
8 sequencing were used to compare the relative transmission potential of BA.1 and BA.2.

9 **Results.** BA.1 and BA.2 caused no apparent clinical signs while D614G caused more than
10 10% weight loss. Higher viral loads were detected from the nasal washes, nasal turbinate
11 and lungs of BA.1 than BA.2 inoculated hamsters. No aerosol transmission was observed for
12 BA.1 or BA.2 under the experimental condition that D614G transmitted efficiently. BA.1 and
13 BA.2 were able to transmit among hamsters via direct contact; however, BA.1 transmitted
14 more efficiently than BA.2 under the competitive transmission model. No recombination was
15 detected from direct contacts exposed simultaneously to BA.1 and BA.2.

16 **Conclusions.** Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 demonstrated attenuated pathogenicity and reduced
17 transmission potential in hamsters when compared to early SARS-CoV-2 strains.

18

19 **Keywords:** SARS-CoV-2; Omicron; BA.1; BA.2; pathogenicity; transmission; Syrian
20 hamsters.

21

1 INTRODUCTION

2 Since the first report of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-
3 CoV-2) in December 2019, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has been sustained by the
4 emergence of multiple variants of concern (VOC) that differ in their capacity to spread [1, 2],
5 cause severe disease [3], or evade vaccine-induced immunity [4-8]. While the dynamics and
6 the factors driving the emergence of VOC are not fully understood, it is anticipated that novel
7 VOC will continue challenging our existing countermeasures [9-11] and diagnostic methods
8 [12].

9 VOC Omicron (Pango lineage B.1.1.529) was first detected in Southern Africa in
10 November 2021 and swept through the world within weeks [13]. Omicron has evolved into
11 several major sub-lineages, with BA.1 as the initial dominant Omicron sub-lineage. The
12 detection frequency of BA.2 has increased since early 2022 [14]. Omicron is genetically
13 distinct from the prototype SARS-CoV-2 virus or other VOC that have previously spread
14 regionally or globally. Compared to the prototype SARS-CoV-2 virus, Omicron VOC is
15 characterized by more than 30 amino acid differences in the spike (S) glycoprotein and
16 additional changes in the structural proteins (E, M, N), non-structural proteins (NSP3, 4, 5, 6,
17 12, 14), and accessory protein (ORF8)[14]. Detailed mutagenesis study using pseudoviruses
18 has confirmed that multiple amino acid changes located at the receptor-binding domain
19 (RBD) and the N-terminal domain (NTD) in Omicron may confer resistance to neutralizing
20 monoclonal antibodies [15] and evasion to infection or vaccine-induced immunity [16, 17].
21 However, the effect of changes in RBD on viral attachment to human ACE2 has been under
22 debate [18, 19].

23 Epidemiological data showed that infection with Omicron BA.1 was associated with
24 reduced risk of hospitalization in South Africa where prior infections by SARS-CoV-2 were
25 prevalent [20]. Experimental data showed that Omicron BA.1 exhibit reduced susceptibility to
26 TMPRSS2 cleavage which reduced viral entry via fusion at plasma membrane [21].
27 Comparable replication of Delta and BA.1 was reported in human nasal epithelial cells [21],
28 while BA.1 showed reduced replication in human lung ex vivo culture when compared to the

1 prototype or Delta viruses [22]. It is not clear if the differential expression of TMPRSS2 in
2 nasal and lung tissue or if additional host factors have affected BA.1 replication efficiency at
3 upper and lower airway. Omicron BA.1 also caused attenuated replication in mice and
4 Syrian hamsters when compared to other VOC, with reduced viral replication detected in the
5 upper (mouse nasal turbinate) and lower respiratory tissues (mouse and hamster lungs) [23,
6 24].

7 While BA.2 is genetically related to BA.1, there are substantial differences in the S, M
8 and N structural proteins, non-structural proteins (NSP1, 3, 4, 6, 13, 15) and accessory
9 proteins (ORF3a and ORF6). Clinical severity and the risk of hospitalization were found to
10 be comparable after BA.1 and BA.2 infections [25]. Prior vaccination and infection history
11 may confound the transmission dynamics of VOC in the human population, and it is not clear
12 if the increased detection frequency of BA.2 since February 2022 is due to an intrinsic
13 fitness advantage of BA.2 over BA.1. Syrian hamsters have been reported to be a suitable
14 animal model to study pathogenicity and transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 [26-29]. Prototype
15 SARS-CoV-2 replicates efficiently in the upper and lower respiratory tract and infected
16 Syrian hamsters may lose 10-15% body weight [26-29]. In addition, SARS-CoV-2 may
17 transmit efficiently among hamsters via multiple routes, among which transmission via
18 aerosols was more efficient than via fomites [28, 29]. To study if there is an intrinsic fitness
19 advantage of BA.2 over BA.1, we compared the pathogenicity and transmission potential of
20 the two subvariants in Syrian hamsters.

21 **METHODS**

22 **Cells and viruses.** Vero E6 cells over-expressing transmembrane serine protease 2 (Vero-
23 E6/TMPRSS2) were purchased from the Centre For AIDS Reagents (National Institute for
24 Biological Standards and Control) and was maintained under condition as described
25 previously [30, 31]. Omicron BA.1 (hCoV-19/Hong Kong/VM21044713_
26 HKUVOC0195P3/2021) [16], and BA.2 (hCoV-19/Hong Kong/VM22000135_
27 HKUVOC0588P2/2022) were isolated from the pooled nasopharyngeal and throat swabs of
28 imported cases. Viruses were isolated and propagated 2 to 3 times in Vero-E6/TMPRSS2.

1 The consensus sequences of the stock viruses were validated to be identical to the original
2 clinical specimens by next generation sequencing.

3 **Transmission experiments in Syrian hamsters.** Male Syrian hamsters (AURA) at 4-8
4 weeks old were obtained from Laboratory Animal Services Centre, Chinese University of
5 Hong Kong and from the Centre for Comparative Medicine Research, The University of
6 Hong Kong. All experiments were performed at the BSL-3 core facility, LKS Faculty of
7 Medicine, The University of Hong Kong. The study protocol has been approved by the
8 Committee on the Use of Live Animals in Teaching and Research, The University of Hong
9 Kong (CULATR # 5323-20).

10 To evaluate aerosol and contact transmission potential of D614G, Syrian hamsters
11 were anesthetized with ketamine and xylazine and inoculated intranasally with 10^5 TCID₅₀ of
12 SARS-CoV-2 in 80 μ L PBS. On 1-day post-inoculation (dpi), one naïve hamster was
13 exposed to an inoculated donor in an individually ventilated cage (IVC) for 8 hours (h) (eg.
14 aerosol transmission model), with the animals separate by stainless-steel wires to prevent
15 physical contact. After exposure, the D614G-inoculated donors were each co-housed with
16 one naïve hamster for 24h (eg. from 32h to 56h post-inoculation) (eg. direct contact
17 transmission model). To evaluate competitive transmissibility of BA.1 and BA.2 via aerosols,
18 donors were anesthetized and separately inoculated with 1×10^5 TCID₅₀ of BA.1 or BA.2 in
19 80 μ L PBS. Aerosol and direct contact transmission experiments were performed as
20 described above, except that each naïve animal was simultaneously exposed to two donors
21 inoculated with BA.1 and BA.2, respectively. The aerosol and contact transmission
22 experiments were independently performed in duplicates or in triplicates. After exposure, all
23 hamsters were single-housed in separate IVC cages until the end of the experiment. Weight
24 changes and clinical signs were monitored daily. Nasal washes were harvested every other
25 day from donors and exposed naïve hamsters. On 4 dpi, donors were euthanized to monitor
26 viral replication in respiratory tissues. Nasal turbinate and lung (left) were homogenized in 1
27 mL PBS for viral load determination.

1 **Quantitative Real-time RT- PCR.** Viral RNA was extracted using QIAamp Viral RNA Mini
2 Kit (Qiagen). RNA was extracted from 70 μ L of nasal washes and eluted with 60 μ L elution
3 buffer containing poly(A) carrier (AVE buffer) or from 140 μ L of tissue homogenate and
4 eluted with 60 μ L AVE buffer. TaqManTM Fast Virus 1-Step Master Mix was used to
5 determine N gene copy number with 4 μ L of extracted RNA, following the conditions
6 described previously [32].

7 **Virus titration.** Confluent Vero-E6/TMPRSS2 cells in 96-well culture plates were inoculated
8 with 35 μ L of serially half-log diluted samples in quadruplicate. Cytopathic effect of SARS-
9 CoV-2 infection was observed under light microscope three days after infection, and the
10 TCID₅₀ was calculated using the Reed-Muench method [33].

11 **Histopathology and immunohistochemistry.** Respiratory tissues, including head in
12 sagittal cut, trachea, and right lung lobes were fixed in 10% neutral buffered formalin and
13 were processed for paraffin embedding. For immunohistochemistry, SARS-CoV-2 viral
14 proteins were detected using rabbit anti-N polyclonal antibody (#40143-T62, Sinobiological),
15 mouse anti-N monoclonal antibody (#40143-MM05, Sinobiological), or rabbit anti-S1
16 monoclonal antibody (#99423, Cell Signaling) and counter-stained with hematoxylin. Images
17 were captured using Nanozoomer slide scanner and viewed with NDP View software. To
18 quantitatively compare the area with N protein detection, the percentage of positive pixels
19 against the negative ones were calculated under 2.5x magnification using Aperio
20 ImageScope (ver. 12.4.3).

21 **Plaque reduction neutralization (PRNT) assay.** Post-infection or post-exposure sera were
22 heat-inactivated at 56°C for 30 min and were initially diluted 1:10 followed by serially 2-fold
23 dilution using DMEM. Diluted sera were incubated with 30 plaque-forming units of SARS-
24 CoV-2 for 1 h at 37 °C. The virus–serum mixtures were added to confluent Vero-
25 E6/TMPRSS2 cells in 24-well plates and incubated 1 h at 37 °C. The inoculum was removed
26 and the plates were overlaid with 0.5% agarose in culture medium and incubated for 3 days.
27 The plates were fixed with 10% formalin and stained with 0.3% crystal violet to determine
28 the number of plaques formed in the presence and absence of hamster sera. The serum

1 dilution that resulted in > 50% reduction in the number of plaques was recorded as the
2 PRNT₅₀ titers.

3 **Next generation sequencing and data analysis.** The virus genome was reverse
4 transcribed with multiple gene-specific primers targeting different regions of the viral
5 genome. The synthesized cDNA was then subjected to multiple overlapping 2-kb PCRs for
6 full-genome amplification. PCR amplicons obtained from the same specimen were pooled
7 and sequenced using iSeq 100 sequencing platform (Illumina). The sequencing library was
8 prepared by Nextera DNA flex. The sequencing reads generated were trimmed by fastp [34]
9 with adapter and quality filters and were mapped to a reference virus genome (Genbank
10 accession: MN908947.3) by BWA-MEM2 (<https://github.com/bwa-mem2/bwa-mem2>).
11 Potential PCR duplicates were identified and removed by samtools markdup
12 (<https://www.htslib.org/doc/samtools-markdup.html>). The genome consensus sequence was
13 generated by iVar with the PCR primer trimming protocol (minimum sequence depth >10
14 and minimum Q value of 30) [35]. The variants in the samples were called by bcftools v1.14
15 (<https://samtools.github.io/bcftools/howtos/variant-calling.html>). The number/frequency of
16 different mutations were deduced from results of pysamstats
17 (<https://github.com/alimanfoo/pysamstats>). The mutations frequencies at different genomic
18 sites were curated and visualized using custom R scripts (available on Github:
19 <https://github.com/Leo-Poon-Lab/BA.1-BA.2-competitive-transmission-hamster>).

20 **Statistical analyses.** Two-sided Mann-Whitney test was performed to compare the mean
21 values of two groups, and Kruskal-Wallis test and Dunn's multiple comparisons post hoc test
22 were used to compare the mean values of multiple groups. Spearman's rank correlation
23 coefficient analysis was performed to evaluate the correlation between infectious virus load
24 in oral swabs and nasal washes. Data were analyzed in Microsoft Excel for Mac, version
25 16.28 and GraphPad Prism version 8.4.1 for Windows (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, USA).

26

1 RESULTS

2 **Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 are less pathogenic in hamsters than the D614G variant.** To
3 compare the pathogenicity of Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 with an early D614G variant of SARS-
4 CoV-2 virus (hCoV-19/Hong Kong/VM20109236/2020, EPI_ISL_2477019), hamsters were
5 inoculated intranasally with 10^5 TCID₅₀ of viruses. While D614G-inoculated hamsters
6 showed the maximal average weight loss of -13.00% on 6 dpi, hamsters inoculated with
7 BA.1 or BA.2 showed minimal weight loss, with maximal average weight loss at -3.90% (1
8 dpi) and -4.55% (6 dpi), respectively (Figure 1A). On 2 dpi, comparable infectious viruses or
9 viral RNA were detected from the nasal washes of BA.1- and D614G-inoculated hamsters,
10 which were significantly higher than those detected from BA.2-inoculated hamsters (Figure
11 1B). On 4 dpi, the infectious viral loads in the nasal washes were comparable. In addition,
12 there was a positive correlation between infectious viral load detected in the nasal washes
13 and oral swabs (Spearman $r = 0.592$, $p = 0.046$), although the virus titers detected in the oral
14 swabs were around 2 logs lower than those detected in the nasal washes (Figure 1C). The
15 mean infectious viral load detected in the nasal turbinate and lungs of BA.1-inoculated
16 hamsters were higher than those of BA.2-inoculated hamsters, although the differences
17 were not significant (Figure 1D).

18 Histopathological examination and immunohistochemistry were performed on nasal
19 and lung tissues collected on 4 dpi. Since BA.1 and BA.2 differ by amino acid changes in the
20 S and N protein, we compared the use of rabbit anti-N polyclonal antibody, mouse anti-N
21 monoclonal antibody, and mouse anti-S monoclonal antibody in detecting BA.1 and BA.2
22 viral antigens in the lungs. Importantly, the mouse anti-S monoclonal antibody was able to
23 detect BA.1 but not BA.2 viral antigen, highlighting the potential antigenic difference between
24 the two S proteins. Rabbit anti-N polyclonal antibody that demonstrated best sensitivity for
25 both BA.1 and BA.2 infected lungs was selected for subsequent analysis (Figure 2A). Viral
26 antigens were detected in the nasal epithelial cells from BA.1 and BA.2 inoculated hamsters
27 with minimal inflammation (Figure 2B). In the lungs, SARS-CoV-2 N protein was detected in
28 focal bronchial epithelial cells and pneumocytes, accompanied with infiltration of

1 mononuclear cells and lung consolidation. By calculating the percentage of positive pixels
2 against the negative ones, higher percentages were detected in BA.1 than BA.2 infected
3 nasal turbinates and lungs (Figure 2B), which is consistent with the detection of more
4 infectious virus being detected in the nasal turbinates and lungs of BA.1 inoculated hamsters
5 (Figure 1D). Overall, these results showed that BA.1 and BA.2 caused non-apparent clinical
6 signs in Syrian hamsters when compared to the early SARS-CoV-2 D614G variant. BA.1
7 replicated more efficiently than BA.2 in both upper and lower respiratory tissues.

8 **BA.1 and BA.2 cannot be transmitted in hamsters via aerosols.** The D614G variant
9 transmitted efficiently to exposed contact hamsters under the aerosol or direct contact
10 transmission models (Figure 3A). Infectious virus and viral RNA were detected from the
11 nasal washes of 2/2 aerosol contact hamsters at 1- and 3-days days post-exposure (dpe)
12 and 2/2 direct contact hamsters at 1 dpe. The maximal weight loss (ranged from -6.5% to -
13 14.8%) were detected from aerosol and direct contact hamsters on 7 to 8 dpe (Figure 3B).
14 With the same experimental setting, we further evaluated the transmission potential of
15 Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 under a competitive condition. Each naïve hamster was
16 simultaneously exposed to two donor hamsters separately inoculated with 10^5 TCID₅₀ of
17 BA.1 or BA.2. Under the experimental condition that support efficient aerosol transmission of
18 D614G variant, we observed no transmission of BA.1 or BA.2. Specifically, no viral RNA was
19 detected from the nasal washes (Figure 3C) and no seroconversion was detected from the
20 aerosol contacts. Instead, transmission by direct contact was observed in 3/3 replicates, with
21 infectious virus and viral RNA detected from the nasal washes of direct contact hamsters on
22 1 dpe (Figure 3C). No apparent weight loss was observed from the direct contact hamsters
23 infected with BA.1/ BA.2 viruses (Figure 3D). Seroconversion was detected on 18 dpe, with
24 all direct contact hamsters developing higher neutralizing antibody titers against BA.1
25 (PRNT₅₀ geometric mean titer at 179.3) than against BA.2 (PRNT₅₀ geometric mean titer at
26 57.7). Higher infectious viral loads, approximated by calculating the area under the curve
27 (AUC), were shed by the D614G-exposed direct contacts (21.1 ± 0.8 , mean \pm SD AUC) than

1 the BA.1/ BA.2-exposed direct contacts (18.4 ± 1.6 , mean \pm SD AUC) (Mann-Whitney test,
2 $p=0.20$). Taken together, no aerosol transmission was observed for BA.1 and BA.2 viruses
3 under the experimental condition that the D614G virus transmitted efficiently to naïve
4 hamsters.

5 **BA.1 transmits more efficiently than BA.2 in hamsters by direct contact.** Next
6 generation sequencing was performed to delineate the competitive transmission potential of
7 BA.1 and BA.2 in direct contact hamsters. Using the SARS-CoV-2 isolate Wuhan-Hu-1
8 (GenBank: MN908947.3) as the reference, a total of 40 unique molecular markers were
9 identified that differentiate BA.1 (N=14) and BA.2 (N=26) viruses after excluding mutations
10 shared in common between BA.1 and BA.2. We first analyzed the nasal wash samples
11 collected from BA.1 or BA.2 inoculated donors on 2 dpi (Figure 4A). High frequencies (\geq
12 91.73%) of BA.1 specific mutations and low frequencies ($\leq 1\%$) of BA.2 specific mutations
13 were detected from BA.1 inoculated donors. In contrast, high frequencies ($\geq 95.66\%$) of
14 BA.2 specific mutations and low frequencies ($\leq 1\%$) of BA.1 specific mutations were
15 detected from BA.2 inoculated donors. The NGS result suggests there was minimal
16 secondary infection of BA.1 and BA.2 inoculated donors after co-housing for 32 h. In the
17 nasal washes collected from direct contact hamsters on 1 and 3 dpe, we detected high
18 frequencies ($\geq 91.31\%$) of BA.1 specific mutations and low frequencies ($\leq 1.39\%$) of BA.2
19 specific mutations, suggesting that the direct contact hamsters were preferentially infected
20 by BA.1 virus.

21 Since BA.1 was the dominant virus transmitted under the competitive model, it is
22 important to further confirm if BA.2 can transmit among hamsters via direct contact. After co-
23 housing with donors inoculated with 10^5 TCID₅₀ of BA.1 or BA.2 on 1 dpi, infectious virus and
24 viral RNA were detected from BA.1-exposed or BA.2-exposed contact hamsters on 1 dpe
25 (Figure 5A, 5B). The maximal weight loss were recorded from BA.1-exposed hamsters (-
26 1.41% and -1.58%) (Figure 5C) and BA.2-exposed hamsters (-1.75% and -2.46%) (Figure
27 5D) between 5 to 8 dpe. Higher viral loads were detected in the nasal washes of BA.1-

1 exposed contacts (16.3 ± 0.9 , mean \pm SD AUC) than BA.2-exposed contacts (11.1 ± 0.6 ,
2 mean \pm SD AUC) (Mann-Whitney test, $p=0.33$). Taken together, the result demonstrates that
3 both BA.1 and BA.2 are able to transmit among hamsters via direct contact; however, BA.1
4 transmits more efficiently than BA.2 in a competitive transmission model.

5 **DISCUSSION**

6 Since its first detection in November 2021, Omicron variant that is capable of evading
7 neutralizing antibodies elicited after prior infections or vaccinations has rapidly replaced
8 previously circulated SARS-CoV-2 VOC. In the present study, we evaluated the
9 pathogenicity and transmission potential of Omicron sub-lineages BA.1 and BA.2 in Syrian
10 hamsters. Compared to the early D614G virus that caused $> 10\%$ weight loss in inoculated
11 hamsters, both BA.1 and BA.2 caused minimal weight changes and no apparent clinical
12 signs in inoculated hamsters. Lower viral load was detected in the nasal washes of BA.2-
13 inoculated hamsters than BA.1- or D614G- inoculated hamsters. Under the experimental
14 conditions that D614G transmitted efficiently among Syrian hamsters via aerosol or direct
15 contact transmission models, BA.1 and BA.2 was able to transmit among hamsters via direct
16 contact alone. Furthermore, BA.1 transmitted more efficiently than BA.2 via direct contact
17 under a competitive transmission model. Our result is consistent with previous studies that
18 reported attenuated pathogenicity of BA.1 in hamsters when compared to previous SARS-
19 CoV-2 strains [23], and that BA.2 is no more pathogenic than BA.1 in the Syrian hamster
20 model [36]. The differential detection of BA.1 and BA.2 viral antigens by the anti-S
21 monoclonal antibody highlights the potential antigenic differences in the S protein. Caution
22 may be needed on the use of reagents to detect antigens of Omicron, and the use of
23 polyclonal anti-N antibodies may provide less biased results across different SARS-CoV-2
24 variants.

25 Syrian hamsters have been a useful model to study SARS-CoV-2 transmission via
26 multiple transmission routes [28, 29]. Interestingly, Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 lacked the ability
27 to transmit in hamsters via aerosols under the experimental condition that the DD614G

1 variant transmitted efficiently. The furin cleavage site at the S1/S2 junction was previously
2 demonstrated to be required for SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the ferret model [37] and
3 amino acid changes in proximity to the furin cleavage site may enhance viral fusion and
4 pathogenicity [38]. Both omicron BA.1 and BA.2 contained N679K and P681H amino acid
5 changes near the furin cleavage site. These changes were previously identified in other
6 VOC and were associated with increased prevalence of Gamma sub-lineages in Brazil [39].
7 Omicron is different from previous SARS-CoV-2 in its reduced dependence on TMPRSS2
8 cleavage that facilitates fusion and entry at plasma membrane [21]. Instead, endosomal
9 entry pathway is used by Omicron. In addition, by removing the furin cleavage site from
10 SARS-CoV-2 or by introducing the furin cleavage site into SARS-CoV-1, it was shown that
11 furin-cleavage site of S protein determines viral dependence on TMPRSS2 [40]. The furin-
12 TMPRSS2 inter-dependence is also supported by the detection of variants with deletion in
13 the furin cleavage site after passaging in Vero-E6 cells that lack TMPRSS2 [41]. Further
14 studies are required to understand if the reduced TMPRSS2 dependence of Omicron has
15 any effect on S1/S2 cleavage by furin in humans and in different animal models.

16 In a competitive transmission model, we observed that BA.1 transmitted more
17 efficiently than BA.2 by direct contact. This may be due to less efficient viral replication of
18 BA.2 in Syrian hamsters, as noted in viral load detected in nasal washes, nasal turbinates,
19 and lungs. While both BA.1 and BA.2 may separately transmit to naïve direct contacts, it is
20 interesting to note that NGS data suggest co-infection of BA.1 and BA.2 was infrequent
21 under the competitive model. Specifically, high frequencies ($\geq 91.31\%$) of BA.1 specific
22 mutations and low frequencies ($\leq 1.39\%$) of BA.2 specific mutations were detected in the
23 nasal washes of direct contact hamsters on 1 and 3 dpe and no recombination of BA.1 and
24 BA.2 was noted. Our experiments are limited by a small sample size, which may not fully
25 recapitulate the viral dynamics in humans.

26 While animal models provide helpful insights on SARS-CoV-2 pathogenicity and
27 transmissibility, the absence of aerosol transmission in hamsters appears to differ from what
28 is epidemiologically observed in humans. This may limit the ability to extrapolate

1 transmission data in hamsters to humans. However, the reduced pathogenicity of Omicron in
2 Syrian hamsters is concordant to data observed in humans. It remains to be investigated if
3 Omicron with multiple changes in the S protein has changed the ability to infect a wide range
4 of mammalian species [42], although viral RNA of Omicron was recently detected in white-
5 tailed deer [43].

6 In conclusion, Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 showed reduced pathogenicity and
7 transmission potential when compared to prototype or D614G SARS-CoV-2 viruses in
8 Syrian hamsters. Furthermore, BA.1 demonstrated transmission advantage over BA.2 via
9 direct contact in hamsters. The reduced transmission potential of BA.1 and BA.2 in Syrian
10 hamsters in comparison to previous SARS-CoV-2 provides a research opportunity to study
11 host factors and virus-host interaction critical for SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

12

13 **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

14 This study was supported by National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the
15 National Institutes of Health, USA (U01AI151810 and 75N93021C00016), RGC Theme-
16 based Research Schemes, Hong Kong SAR, China (T11-712/19-N and T11-705/21-N).

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1 **FIGURE LEGENDS**

2 **Figure 1. Pathogenicity of Omicron BA.1 and BA.2 in Syrian hamsters.** Syrian hamsters
3 were intranasally inoculated with BA.1(N=7), BA.2 (N=5) and D614G (N=8), respectively. *A*,
4 Weight changes in inoculated do nor hamsters, mean \pm SD are shown. *B*, Infectious viral
5 load (\log_{10} TCID₅₀/mL) and viral RNA (\log_{10} RNA copies/mL) detected in nasal washes on 2, 4
6 dpi. *C*, Infectious viral load detected in oral swabs of inoculated donors on 2, 4 dpi. *D*,
7 Infectious viral load detected in the nasal turbinates and lungs of inoculated donors on 4 dpi.
8 Kruskal-Wallis test and Dunn's multiple comparisons were performed to compare weight
9 changes and viral loads of BA.1, BA.2, and D614G inoculated hamsters at each time point
10 (*A, B*). Mann-Whitney test was performed to compare viral loads of BA.1 and BA.2
11 inoculated hamsters (*C,D*). Spearman's rank correlation coefficient analysis (right) was
12 performed to evaluate the correlation between infectious virus load in oral swabs (X axis)
13 and nasal washes (Y axis). Experiments were independently performed 2-3 times. The limit
14 of detection is shown with the dashed line.

15 **Figure 2. Detection of BA.1 and BA.2 viral antigens in the lungs and nasal cavity of**
16 **inoculated Syrian hamsters by immunohistochemistry.** *A*, Lung tissues collected on 4
17 dpi from BA.1 or BA.2 inoculated hamsters were stained with rabbit anti-N polyclonal
18 antibody, mouse anti-N monoclonal antibody, or mouse anti-S monoclonal antibody and
19 counter stained with haematoxylin. *B*, Detection of N protein in nasal turbinates and lungs
20 collected on 4 dpi of BA.1 (N=3) or BA.2 (N=3) inoculated hamsters using the rabbit anti-N
21 polyclonal antibody and counterstained with haematoxylin. The percentage of positive pixels
22 against the negative ones were calculated under 2.5x magnification using Aperio
23 ImageScope (ver. 12.4.3).

24 **Figure 3. Transmissibility of D614G, BA.1 and BA.2 in Syrian hamsters.** Donors were
25 intra-nasally inoculated with 10^5 TCID₅₀ of SARS-CoV-2 virus. On 1 dpi, naïve hamster was
26 exposed to donors for 8h without physical contact (eg. aerosol transmission). Subsequently,
27 donors were co-housed with another naïve hamster for 24h (eg. direct contact transmission).

1 A, Infectious virus ($\log_{10}\text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$) and viral RNA ($\log_{10}\text{RNA copies/ml}$) were detected in the
2 nasal washes of D614G-exposed aerosol and direct contact hamsters. B, Weight changes of
3 D614G-exposed aerosol contact and direct contact hamsters. C, Under a competitive
4 transmission model, infectious virus ($\log_{10}\text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$) or viral RNA ($\log_{10}\text{RNA copies/ml}$)
5 were detected in the nasal washes of BA.1/BA.2-exposed direct contact hamsters. D,
6 Weight changes of BA.1/BA.2-exposed aerosol contact and direct contact hamsters.

7 **Figure 4. Detection of BA.1- and BA.2- specific markers by next generation**

8 **sequencing.** A, Detection frequency of BA.1- and BA.2- specific markers in the nasal
9 washes of BA.1 or BA.2 inoculated donors on 1 dpi. B, Detection frequency of BA.1- and
10 BA.2- specific markers in the nasal washes of exposed direct contact hamsters on 1 and 3
11 dpe. BA.1- and BA.2- specific markers differ from the prototype Wuhan-Hu-1 virus are
12 shown. High allele frequency of BA.1-specific markers is shown in yellow while high allele
13 frequency of BA.2 specific markers is shown in blue. Boxes with a cross denote regions with
14 < 100 reads and were not included in the analysis.

15 **Figure 5. Transmissibility of BA.1 and BA.2 via direct contact.** A, Infectious virus
16 ($\log_{10}\text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$) and viral RNA ($\log_{10}\text{RNA copies/ml}$) were detected in the nasal washes of
17 BA.1-exposed direct contact hamsters. B, Infectious virus ($\log_{10}\text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$) and viral RNA
18 ($\log_{10}\text{RNA copies/ml}$) were detected in the nasal washes of BA.2-exposed direct contact
19 hamsters. C, Weight changes of BA.1-exposed direct contact hamsters. D, Weight changes
20 of BA.2-exposed direct contact hamsters.

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


Figure 1
159x101 mm (.39 x DPI)

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




Figure 2
142x246 mm (.39 x DPI)

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Figure 3
159x129 mm (.39 x DPI)




Figure 4
159x144 mm (.39 x DPI)




Figure 5
78x138 mm (.39 x DPI)

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