

Surveillance and pandemic governance in least-ideal contexts: The Philippine case

Eula Bianca Villar¹  | John Pascual Magnawa²

¹Stephen Zuellig Graduate School of Development Management, Asian Institute of Management, Makati, Philippines

²Department of Development Studies, Cavite State University, Cavite, Philippines

Correspondence

Eula Bianca Villar, Stephen Zuellig Graduate School of Development Management, Asian Institute of Management, 123 Paseo de Roxas, Legazpi Village, Makati 1229 Metro Manila, Philippines.

Email: ejvillar@aim.edu

Funding information

None

Abstract

This paper inquires how surveillance manifests in least-ideal contexts (LICs), that is, countries with resource constraints, poor governance and proclivity for populism during COVID-19, and its implications for crisis governance. Using the Philippines as a case, we advance three arguments. First, LICs can become spaces where inappropriate surveillance is undertaken. Second, liminal surveillance practices can become permanent policy fixtures in LICs. Finally, when a prevailing crisis approach of a government is perceived to be inconsistent with the needs of the public, it can lead to a self-help system among various societal groups and actors. This self-help system may not necessarily be aligned with the general direction of the national government. As a result, it can perpetuate a disjointed and maladaptive crisis governance approach, where main actors like national governments, and complementary actors like private sector firms, local government units and citizen organizations pursue goals independent of one another.

KEYWORDS

COVID-19, crisis governance, least-ideal contexts, Philippines

1 | INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to cause large-scale disruptions across the globe, and governments are scrambling to get the right formula to manage it. Unlike traditional crises where spatial and temporal characteristics can be clearly delineated, COVID-19 is best described as a *transboundary* (Boin, 2009) and *creeping* crisis (Boin, Ekengren et al., 2020). It is transboundary in nature because its impacts could not be constrained within a single geographical space but instead spread globally (Boin, Lodge et al., 2020). Transboundary crises also tend to 'jump functional boundaries', and involve multiple actors with potentially conflicting responsibilities, and sometimes conflicting targets (Boin, 2009). Given that the impacts of COVID-19 are not constrained within the health sector, experts and policy-makers from the health, economic, educational and even security sectors tend to have contending positions regarding the best policy approach, and find themselves in constant negotiating processes regarding which policies need to be prioritized by national

governments. Additionally, COVID-19 has a long incubation period and unclear temporal parameters (i.e., ambiguous and uncertain future). This 'creeping' and 'slow-burn' nature of COVID-19 can expose the limitations of crisis governance, especially in systems that are 'not prepared to deal with crises that do not crystallize in sudden outbursts' (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2020).

To curb the spread and manage the uncertainties caused by the pandemic, the policy direction of most governments has leaned on imposing controls (He et al., 2020). A concrete manifestation of control is through the exercise of various surveillance measures, which include the collection of public health data, contact tracing and lockdowns (Amit et al., 2020a; Eck & Hatz, 2020; He et al., 2020; Shaw et al., 2020; Wenger et al., 2020). The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended scaling up surveillance capacities, with the goal of reducing the transmission of the virus and limiting associated morbidity and mortality (WHO, 2020). Several successful cases reinforce the benefits of rigorously employing various types of surveillance (Bremmer, 2020). Notable among these cases are Taiwan,

South Korea, and Singapore, which leveraged smart city technologies and employed aggressive contact tracing, mass testing, and in certain instances, mobile SIM-tracking to ensure compliance (Shaw et al., 2020; Sonn & Lee, 2020; Summers et al., 2020).

While surveillance is acknowledged as a critical aspect of managing the pandemic, the benefits of surveillance are not applicable to all contexts. Indeed, the pandemic surfaced inequalities that are nested within regions and countries (Bailey et al., 2020; Finn & Kobayashi, 2020; Patel et al., 2020). Boersma and Fonio (2017) highlight the unintended consequences of surveillance and challenge crisis scholars to critically engage surveillance practices in the field of crisis management. They argue that while surveillance can provide better 'operational pictures' in crisis environments, they also create tensions and negative implications that are rarely unpacked (Boersma & Fonio, 2017). These include securitization of health and encroachment of personal privacy and civil liberties in the guise of control. This paper is a response to the challenge of unpacking surveillance in the context of crisis management. We specifically anchor this paper on the varied impacts of the pandemic on different countries, but more specifically against the least ideal contexts (LICs). LICs are characterized by resource constraints, poor governance, and populist tendencies. Using the Philippines as a case, we inquire the following, 'what is the face of surveillance in LICs, and what are its implications for crisis governance?' Given that the pandemic is pushing both scholarly and policy discourse to revisit assumptions surrounding surveillance and crisis governance, it is important to emphasize the experience of LICs in managing COVID-19.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revisits pandemic governance literature in LICs and demonstrates the need to assess how resource constraints, poor governance and populist tendencies encourage maladaptive crisis approaches. Section 3 outlines the methodological strategy adopted and includes the contextual underpinnings of the Philippines as an LIC. Section 4 presents the key findings, while Section 5 lays out a critical analysis and discussion. Section 6 closes the paper with the conclusion, contributions, limitations and avenues for future work.

2 | LITERATURE REVIEW

For over a year, COVID-19 laid bare various governmental approaches to pandemic management. The first few months were arguably experimental, as governments tried to make sense of the novelty of the virus. However, as more information became available, governments started to iterate on templates for action to address the surge in cases. These included different forms of surveillance.

Epidemiological surveillance is an expected measure to be undertaken in a pandemic (Holmes et al., 2018; Thomas, 2014) but COVID-19 also enabled other forms of surveillance to be exercised (Eck & Hatz, 2020; Wenger et al., 2020). Examples include technological surveillance using contact tracing apps (Shaw et al., 2020; Sonn & Lee, 2020), community-based surveillance through systematic community reporting especially in hard-to-reach regions

(Ratnayake et al., 2020), and security surveillance via increased uniformed presence (Chretien et al., 2007; Kalkman, 2020).

Observations show that certain countries manage the pandemic better than others. Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and New Zealand are among those often cited to have employed effective measures (Bremmer, 2020). These instances demonstrate the best-case scenario, and it must be noted that these may also be predicated on certain parameters that include resource abundance, good governance (World Bank, 2020b), and a political system that has a low proclivity for populism.

This is not necessarily the case for countries that experience resource scarcity, poor governance and populist tendencies. Studies note that developing economies are disadvantaged in terms of harnessing science and technology needed to manage the pandemic, and that they do not necessarily have prior investments that enable the implementation of disease surveillance (Frerichs, 1991; Gerard et al., 2020). It has also been observed that countries exhibiting poor governance tend to use surveillance as a policy window to legitimize controls that curtail civil liberties which can precede human rights violations (Eck & Hatz, 2020; Sekalala et al., 2020).

Moreover, countries that exhibit populist tendencies fuel a divisive social narrative between model citizens versus the 'dangerous others' (Lasco & Curato, 2019; Lasco, 2020). Through this narrative, populist political leaders are able to consolidate control, which may manifest in pandemic denial, conspiracy theories or in more extreme circumstances, heavy policing at the expense of a science and health-driven response to the pandemic (Bayerlein et al., 2021; Cepaluni et al., 2021; McKee et al., 2020).

The combination of the three characteristics—resource scarcity, poor governance and populist tendencies—make for the least ideal scenarios in managing the pandemic. We argue that the co-occurrence of these characteristics is a necessary condition that defines LICs, as opposed to countries that only exhibit one of the characteristics. For example, the United States, a resource-abundant country, resorted to a populist narrative under the leadership of Trump (Lasco, 2020), but was able to effectively rollout the vaccine plan in the transition period from Trump to Biden (Gerber & Gail, 2021). Meanwhile, despite their resource constraints, low- to middle-income countries like Vietnam, Bhutan, Mongolia and Thailand managed to keep their cases down through early preventive action (Babu et al., 2020; Dorji, 2020; Erkhembayar et al., 2020; Kaweenuttayanon et al., 2021; Van Nguyen et al., 2020).

Taking the perspective of LICs, where resource scarcity, poor governance and populist tendencies are present, helps provide a nuanced understanding of pandemic governance. In these conditions, countries find it more difficult to adopt appropriate public health policy interventions (Kaufmann, 2020). Moreover, it has also been observed that such contexts could use COVID-19 as a precedent to employ surveillance measures, which may be legitimized as policy (Akbari, 2021). Such is the case in the Philippines, which imposed the longest lockdown, and also managed to enact the anti-terror law amidst the pandemic (Amit et al., 2020a, 2020b; Hapal, 2021; Joaquin & Biana, 2020).

Unpacking how governments in LICs employ surveillance policies helps explain the prevalence of certain governance practices. Moreover, seeing the prevailing dynamics of managing the pandemic in LICs informs our view that while a crisis like the global pandemic has a blanket effect on almost all aspects of the society, its impacts will be differentiated as a result of certain parameters. Therefore, the coping mechanisms of the country as a whole, will be different.

3 | METHODOLOGY

3.1 | Research design

This paper uses case narrative (Sunday et al., 2020; Webster, 2007) to provide a critical analysis of how surveillance is exercised in the Philippines as an example of an LIC: a lower-middle income, resource-constrained, developing country, mired in corruption as well as populist government. The case narrative is built using publicly available documents that include laws, presidential reports to the joint congressional oversight committees, local and national news reports and government press releases that became pertinent during the pandemic. These allow us to build a chronological timeline of the Philippine response to COVID-19, from March 2020 to January 2021.

We follow a three-step process in building the narrative. First, we map the multisectoral crisis landscape in the Philippines, allowing us to track the relevant actors that play a role in systematically responding to COVID-19. Second, we track the policy actions of the national government, specifically on surveillance and juxtapose it with the actual status of the COVID-19 cases and other pertinent events occurring during the pandemic. Third, we capture the emergent actions of complementary actors (CAs) (i.e., actors beyond the national government, including local government units, private actors and civil society organizations). Consequently, this allows us to surface the overall dynamics of crisis governance in the country.

3.2 | The Philippines as an LIC: Contextual underpinnings

The Philippines is an archipelagic country in Southeast Asia that embodies the characteristics that define an LIC:

- a. *Resource Constraint.* The World Bank categorizes the country as a 'low middle-income country' (World Bank, 2020a). Prepandemic, 17 million Filipinos lived below the poverty line, whose per capita income is insufficient to meet their basic food and nonfood needs (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2019). With the pandemic, the World Bank projects that 2.7 million more Filipinos will sink into poverty (De Vera, 2020). In terms of resource capacity to address a pandemic, the country had limited bed capacity prepandemic (German et al., 2018), and one doctor for every 33,000 Filipinos (Abalos et al., 2020). Before the crisis, the Philippines already faced challenges in terms of health governance and health infrastructure (Dayrit et al., 2018).
- b. *Governance Deficit.* The Philippines is a democratic state that accords civil liberties to the people and the freedom to democratically elect its government. Despite this, poor governance remains prevalent, as manifested in weak institutions and prevalent corruption (Mendoza et al., 2017)—a corruption perception index score of 35 out of 100 as of 2021 (Transparency International, 2021). Meanwhile, the 2019 world governance indicators from the World Bank reveals that the Philippine percentile rank in 'control of corruption' decreased by approximately 9.5 percentile points from 43.60 in 2013 to 34.13 in 2018. The same downward trend is observed in other governance indicators that include 'rule of law' (World Bank, 2020b).
- c. *Rising Populism.* The prevailing rhetoric of the current Duterte administration is militant in nature, characterized by policies anchored on heavy policing which has laid down a precedent for excessive vigilantism and abusive police behaviour (Curato, 2017). The populist political style of Duterte (Teehankee, 2021) persists in his administration's pandemic approach, that is, 'medical populism' (Lasco, 2020). This pandemic populism is largely hinged on state surveillance measures (Amit et al., 2020a), with heavy policing to create a clear depiction of the 'perpetual enemies of health and order' as embodied by the *pasaway*, those who go against the hard measures of control to curb COVID-19 (Hapal, 2021). This has also led to violations of civil liberties and worsening cases of violence and impunity (Agojo, 2021), mostly at the expense of vulnerable communities (Bekema, 2021).

4 | FINDINGS

4.1 | The Philippines in a time of pandemic

As of January 2021, the Philippines reflected the second largest number of cumulative cases of COVID-19 in Southeast Asia since March 2020 (WHO, 2021). The country entered the crisis period shortly after the WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic in March 2020. From that point on, the national government became the central decision-making body for managing COVID-19.

Figure 1 highlights the different phases in which the national government imposed various versions of community lockdowns. Between March 2020 and January 2021, the country never exited lockdown but was placed in versions of varying stringency from hard (i.e. Enhanced Community Quarantine [ECQ]) to soft (i.e., General Community Quarantine [GCQ] and Modified General Community Quarantine [MGCQ]). In an official statement, the government characterizes the MGCQ, which is also the least stringent, to be the path that will lead the country to the 'new normal' (Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2020).

The following sections expand on each phase in detail. We highlight key findings regarding the actors involved in the pandemic response and their respective roles, the prevailing surveillance policy approach of the national government as a central actor in managing the pandemic, and the emergent actions of CAs, which altogether informs our analysis of what crisis governance may look like in LICs.




FIGURE 1 Philippine narrative of COVID-19 crisis management in phases—February 2020 to January 2021 (Data Source: Department of Health nCOV Tracker)

4.2 | Phase 1: State of calamity and the dawn of state surveillance—March to April 2020

This phase occurred between March and April 2020, when there were a lot of uncertainty surrounding the virus, and when the immediate goal of the government was to control its spread. The national government activated the Interagency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF) as the central policy decision-making body led by the Department of Health. To oversee the operational and administrative implementation of the IATF's regulations, the National Task Force (NTF) was created and is led by the Department of National Defense. The NTF is composed of retired Generals from the Philippine Army. To aid in the enforcement of the protocols, the Joint Task Force COVID-19 Shield was created and consists of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), The Philippine Coast Guard, the Bureau of Fire Protection and Barangay Enforcers.

With a team comprised heavily of police and military personnel, the national government declared an 'ECQ' which severely restricted the movement of the population. The ECQ was initially applied in Luzon, the centre of political and economic power. Under ECQ, all nonessential businesses were mandated to close, public transportation was restricted, and curfews were imposed. The government also highlighted the 'heightened presence of uniformed personnel to enforce community quarantine protocols' (IATF, 2020). Intercity travel was prohibited and checkpoints were established to limit the movement of people, stranding thousands of individuals in Metro Manila. Many local governments also established an authorization system, where only a single individual from each household was allowed to travel outside the residence for activities such as going to the market or pharmacy.

The ECQ was intended to last for only 14 days but was extended twice. During this phase, the Bayanihan to Heal As One Act (2020) was enacted into law by the Philippine Congress. This accorded the President emergency powers to manage the pandemic. The legality of certain aspects of this law have been questioned (Constitutional Law Cluster—UP College of Law, 2020). These included penal provisions for offences that included 'disobeying quarantine policies or directives set by the national government'.

Two actors are defined in this phase: main and complementary. The main actor is the national government, as represented by the task forces (i.e., IATF, NTF, JTV COVID-19 shield). The President heads the national government, and the member agencies of the task forces are primarily the Department of Health, PNP, AFP, the Department of Interior and Local Government, and related agencies from the executive branch. The main actor is the central decision-making body for the management of the pandemic. The strategic direction for managing COVID-19, including resource allocation and deployment, falls under the purview of the main actor.

CAs include local governments, the private sector, and community sectors which comprise of the academe, grassroots organizations and nongovernment organizations that are critical in implementing the strategic vision of the national government.

During this phase, national government anchored its policy approach to the pandemic on the Bayanihan Act as a legal instrument. This was enacted through heavy policing that, while falling short on other provisions, would address the more immediate needs in the health sector, including increased testing capacity, quarantine and isolation centres, medical equipment and an integrated data system to effectively undertake epidemiological and technological surveillance systems. While the Bayanihan Act allowed the release of funds to address the resource constraints of the country, many of these constraints were addressed and funded by the CAs (Lopez, 2020). Another important observation from this phase is that the surveillance system used by the national government relied on security surveillance and limited epidemiological or technological surveillance. In contrast, CAs self-organized to undertake technology, community-based and epidemiological surveillance.

4.3 | Phase 2: Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine—May to July 2020

Cases continued to rise during Phase 2. In spite of this, the national government slightly eased the restriction through the Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine (MECQ), citing 'consideration of Science and Economics' in any further changes that will be

undertaken through the lockdown measures (CNN, 2020b). This quarantine version differs from the earlier ECQ by permitting the following: limited outdoor exercise, gatherings up to a maximum of five people, and inbound international travel of returning Filipinos. Noting that the rise in COVID-19 cases was localized to certain areas, the national government placed various parts of the country in MECQ (primarily in the area of Luzon), while the rest of the country was placed in GCQ, a slight variation of the MECQ.

The Bayanihan Act expired at the end of June, but state surveillance continued to be exercised. One of the significant events that occurred during this phase included the signing of the Anti-Terror bill into law. The Anti-Terror Law was expedited by the national government and was heavily criticized for potentially unconstitutional provisions (e.g., warrantless arrests), broadened definitions of terrorism, its ill-timing since it was prioritized over management of COVID-19, and the risk of abuse by implementing agencies (La Vina & Reyes, 2020). This event set a precedent for the legitimization of state surveillance in the country.

Two critical observations emerged from this phase. First, the national government pursued bolder security surveillance, and where possible, made public examples of their capability to arrest violators of the quarantine protocols (Cabato, 2020) as well as those critical of the administration on social media (Buan, 2020). Second, while the national government pursued a robust security surveillance policy, the prevailing resource constraints in terms of testing capacity, availability of medical facilities, and data management system were primarily being provided by the CAs who played a crucial role in reinforcing the limited capacity of the national government to deploy other nonpharmaceutical interventions to manage COVID-19 (CNN, 2020a; Tayao-Juego, 2020).

As early as Phase 2, a fragmented approach to COVID-19 started to manifest with critical resources deployed primarily by CAs, while the national government attempted to control the situation with tighter security policies.

4.4 | Phase 3: Finding the path to GCQ—August to September 2021

The number of COVID-19 cases peaked during this phase, while, ironically, the government tried to find a path towards GCQ. Hospitals were packed and health practitioners called for a return to stricter quarantine measures, citing that the health sector is burned out and hospitals are at full capacity. In August, it was estimated that 5000 health practitioners contracted COVID-19 while approximately 39 front-liners succumbed to the disease (Tomacruz, 2020). Policymakers deliberated a return to ECQ, and the discussions were framed around balancing health and economic interests. Health practitioners called for a change in approach from a 'military, fascist measures' to 'public health, pro-people response. (Luna, 2020). The national government responded to this call by reverting the quarantine status of high-risk areas in the country from GCQ to MECQ.

The Bayanihan Act was extended, labelled Bayanihan 2 Act, resulting in additional financial resources to support the economy. Additionally, Proclamation 1021 was enacted, which placed the Philippines under an extended state of calamity until September 2021.

During this phase, a former antifraud legal officer from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) made his resignation public due to alleged corruption in the government-owned insurance corporation. The allegations included theft amounting to 15 billion Philippine Pesos (~300 million US Dollars) by executives which allegedly covered the unauthorized release of reimbursement mechanisms for funds allocated for the pandemic to hospitals that have no records of COVID-19 cases. The whistleblower in the case mentioned that he was tasked by PhilHealth executives to coordinate with the Presidential Anticorruption Commission 'to amend a pending case involving the agency's overpriced COVID-19 testing kits' (Jalea & Peralta, 2020).

Amid these scandals, CAs continued to address the shortcomings of the national government. The national government also utilized collaboration with CAs to augment the resources necessary to manage the pandemic. For example, the national government adopted the StaySafe.ph app, an initiative led by the academe and private sectors, as the official contact tracing app in the country (Paunan, 2020). The role of local government as CA became more prominent in securing their locals from COVID-19. In many instances, local governments resorted to bricolage and self-organization to keep up with the resources required by their constituents. At this point, the national government, despite being the main actor that was granted exigent powers to manage, provide and deploy resources, played the role of an enforcer of the legislative instruments put in place to manage COVID-19.

4.5 | Phase 4: MGCQ and the search for 'New Normal'—October to November 2020

With the exception of certain provinces, COVID-19 cases began to subside and most of the country was placed in MGCQ. Curfews remained in force, and section 8 of the Omnibus Guidelines tasked local governments 'to enact the necessary ordinances to enforce curfew for non-workers in jurisdictions placed in MECQ, GCQ, and MGCQ, [...] and to penalize, in a fair and humane manner, violations of restrictions on movement of people'. Even as the country entered the least stringent quarantine, the prevalent approach of the national government in managing COVID-19 remained grounded on state surveillance. Note, also, that one of the manifestations of this expanding state surveillance is the prevalent red-tagging campaign of the PNP and the AFP on individuals who actively support human rights advocacies, specifically targeting students (Talabong, 2020).

From October 14 to 27, the Philippine Red Cross suspended COVID-19 testing due to the failure of PhilHealth to settle their existing debt. This reduced the national testing capacity by approximately 30% (Santos & Limpot, 2020). Mired by allegations of mismanagement, the

national government continued its crisis approach according to the tone set in previous phases. Meanwhile, CAs started to take more independent initiatives in managing the pandemic within their respective jurisdictions. For example, some local governments exercised bricolage in sourcing out vaccines, creating quarantine facilities, community-based surveillance and contact tracing, as well as leveraging technology to curb the COVID-19 cases (Rappler, 2021). Meanwhile, grassroots and nongovernment organizations continued to deliver necessary resources to affected communities.

4.6 | Phase 5: The looming permanence of the MGCQ and the self-help system of CAs—December 2020 to January 2021

Most of the Philippines had been placed in MGCQ, and Filipinos started to settle in with the protocols, including curfews and regular provision of health and personal data. Domestic travels resumed, and the learning curve of private actors in living with MGCQ were starting to be normalized. In December 2020, many developed countries expedited the emergency process for approval of newly developed COVID-19 vaccines. In the Philippines, no clear national government strategy was evident regarding the procurement and phased deployment of the vaccine.

A whistleblower also announced that COVID-19 vaccines were administered to select few members of the military, sans the approval of the National Food and Drug Administration (Limpot, 2020). Amid criticisms from the public and lawmakers, the national government defended the unauthorized inoculation and urged Filipinos to ‘just accept that it is important [that] soldiers are safe from COVID so they can do their jobs’, while the President admitted on national media that many in his social circle were inoculated using Chinese-developed vaccine, Sinopharm (Punzalan, 2020).

The prevailing concerns in this phase were vaccine procurement and a clear inoculation strategy. To this end, CAs took bolder steps in self-organizing and finding ways to get hold of vaccine supplies. In many ways, this phase became revelatory of the self-help system that private actors and local governments undertook as a way of coping with the shortcomings of the national government. Large corporations and local governments started to systematically establish agreements with vaccine distributors (Rappler, 2021). The national government later announced that cities could do this if they had the financial resources, while those without would have to settle with what the national government procures.

5 | ANALYSIS

5.1 | The face of surveillance and crisis governance in LICs

The findings above demonstrate various aspects of what surveillance could look like in an LIC. We acknowledge that surveillance is a

critical component in managing the COVID-19 crisis, and best-case scenarios manifest in advanced economies that employ surveillance strategies which are proportional to the need of managing COVID-19 (Renda & Castro, 2020; Robert, 2020; Shaw et al., 2020). However, in LICs like the Philippines, surveillance practices may be exercised disproportionately without necessarily addressing the needs of society. As demonstrated above, the national government relied heavily on state security surveillance, leaving CAs to fill in the gaps in pandemic management. These observations surface three points of analysis in relation to surveillance:

a. LICs become spaces of inappropriate surveillance policies during crisis

One of the debates in pandemic governance is the extent to which surveillance, especially state-controlled movements, threaten civil liberties and human rights. Celermajer and Nassar (2020) argue that one way to resolve this is to draw on the concept of ‘appropriateness’ where the justification is grounded on achieving the collective well-being of the society. They argue further that *appropriateness* rests on ‘infrastructure and history of experience of cooperative decision-making’ and ‘trust in institutions’ (Celermajer & Nassar, 2020). As demonstrated by the Philippine case, these circumstances tend to be absent in LICs. Moreover, restrictive security surveillance practiced in the Philippines do not necessarily lead to better social, political, and economic health (Agojo, 2021; Bekema, 2021). Thus, LICs may become spaces where inappropriate surveillance policies are undertaken by national governments during a crisis and do not contribute to the achievement of collective well-being for the society.

b. LICs become spaces where liminal surveillance practices turn into permanent policies

A related point of analysis is how liminal surveillance facilitates the permanence, and legitimization, of certain surveillance practices (Boersma, 2013). In the Philippines, the crisis opened a policy window for the national government to strengthen its militaristic and police-driven surveillance. Note that while the Philippines adopted various forms of community quarantines, it never really exited the state of lockdown throughout the crisis. This contrasts with the recommended approach of rolling, instead of ‘sustained’, lockdowns for low-income and middle-income economies (Chowdhury et al., 2020).

In LICs, resource constraints are used to justify surveillance as a crisis management tool. For instance, the Bayanihan Act granted the national government access to emergency funds intended to mobilize COVID-19 response and relief. Despite this, Duterte enjoined his government to find more funding because the money was ‘not enough’—in a televised address, he tasked his Secretary of Finance to generate funding, ‘steal, borrow, I don’t care. Produce the money’ (Gregorio, 2020). Compounded with populist tendencies, national governments may use the crisis to strengthen societal control by

means of a bifurcated narrative of model versus *pasaway* citizens. Prepandemic, Duterte's brand of leadership was known to favour the use of punishment and violence in the guise of reinforcing discipline (Curato, 2017). This continued to be the preferred policy approach during the pandemic (Agojo, 2021; Hapal, 2021).

Heightened security surveillance was initially considered liminal while the government tried to get hold of other resources necessary to manage COVID-19. Over time, however, security surveillance only strengthened while CAs began to enact other forms of surveillance policies necessary to manage COVID-19. Security surveillance also became the dominant policy approach of the government, and this extended to other crises that the government is facing (e.g., terrorism). This was legitimized by the passing of the Anti-Terror Law and increases doubt as to its appropriateness given that science- and/or technology-based approach might be more effective for specific types of crisis (e.g., climate crisis, pandemic).

On a related note, Boin, Ekengren et al. (2020) argue that one of the main challenges that policymakers face in creeping crises like the pandemic is its potential to undermine the legitimacy of public institutions. The sudden outburst of a creeping crisis can be interpreted as 'willing ignorance on the part of public institutions that were designed to protect citizens', and can subsequently lead to their delegitimization (Boin, Ekengren et al., 2020). We opine that one way to preserve legitimacy is by means of control, with the intention of striking a fine balance between the care and control elements of surveillance (Boersma & Fonio, 2017; Finn et al., 2017). In LICs, however, such control may be excessively done at the expense of care, as demonstrated by the Philippine case. This may be counter-productive for the national government, in that instead of gaining legitimacy regarding their role in managing the pandemic, they only spur discontent from CAs, which in turn find ways to exercise self-organization (see next point).

c. *Self-help system as a form of crisis governance occurs in LICs*

Finally, we see the emergence of a self-help system among CAs. During the early stages of the crisis, CAs augmented the resource constraints of the national government through bricolage of available resources. Ideally, one would expect a collaborative partnership among the actors to enable an effective and seamless deployment of resources (Moynihan, 2009). In the Philippine case, this seemed to be the path that CAs initially wanted to pursue. Indeed, as seen across all phases, CAs tried to augment limited government resources especially during crucial moments in Phases 1 and 2. Instead, the government only started to integrate the resources of the CAs (e.g., adoption of StaySafe.ph) in Phase 3. The lapse in time between phases pushed CAs to pursue their own means of coping with the crisis which may not be aligned with the crisis approach of the national government. The propensity of CAs to undertake self-help system is further reinforced by corollary events that include mismanagement of already scarce resources, corruption, and scandals. As a result, LICs like the Philippines perpetuate an uncoordinated system of crisis governance where, on the one hand,

the government pursues a crisis approach that is ineffective in addressing the needs of its constituents, and on the other, various CAs pursue a self-help system to address the government's shortcomings. We link this with the analysis of Boin (2009) regarding the task of crisis leaders to 'offer credible answers' in creeping crises. If policymakers fall short in providing a convincing logic to explain the crisis, they fail to rally the support of their constituents (Boin, 2009). This is a very likely scenario in LICs as demonstrated by the Philippine case, which enabled self-organization as a leadership configuration (Buchanan & Hällgren, 2019) that can likely undermine the capacity of public leaders to exercise focused leadership. The end result is the prevalence of two crisis approaches from two groups, that is, main actors and CAs, that conflict (instead of mutually reinforce) with one another.

6 | CONCLUSION

This paper provides a closer look at how LICs navigate the pandemic. The pandemic surfaced the need for surveillance practices and we expect that future crises might require similar controls. As hazards become more complex, the kind of crisis policies necessary to manage them will inevitably require good surveillance practices (Blondin & Boin, 2020; Boin et al., 2014). Yet despite the positive implications of surveillance in the practice of crisis management, it is also crucial to unpack its unintended (and likely negative) consequences (Boersma & Fonio, 2017). To this end, crisis scholars problematize the 'Janus-faced' nature of surveillance in crisis (Finn et al., 2017), and this paper demonstrates how the dark side of surveillance can manifest in LICs.

By looking at the perspective of LICs, we demonstrate that prescribed policy approaches to address a crisis which has transboundary effects, can take a different, often contentious, face. While best-case examples show ideal contexts where surveillance function as intended, the opposite is true for LICs. The case of LICs encourages the misuse of surveillance which, in turn, may be formalized through legal instruments. Consequently, LICs also allow a self-help governance system among CAs to emerge. Optimistically, CAs will consolidate at the earliest phase and pursue a collaborative crisis governance aligned with the approach of the national government. Pessimistically, they may create a divergent self-help system that could unintentionally deepen societal inequities due to differentiated access to resources.

This paper is not without limitations. We emphasized the need to take the perspective of LICs to highlight the differentiated impacts of COVID-19 on different countries. We characterize LICs as those that jointly exhibit resource constraint, poor governance systems, and proclivity to populism. However, we acknowledge that there might be other parameters that define LICs. Future research should address this gap to allow for a controlled comparison of crisis management in ideal contexts vis-a-vis LICs. Future research should further investigate the dynamics of a self-help system among CAs and the extent that this creates adaptive versus maladaptive crisis governance structures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are grateful for the valuable comments of the anonymous reviewers in the earlier versions of this work, as well as the editorial guidance of Kees Boersma, Monika Buescher, and Chiara Fonio. The authors did not receive funding for the undertaking of this study.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The author has provided the required data availability statement, and if applicable, included functional and accurate links to said data therein

ORCID

Eula Bianca Villar  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5489-7173>

REFERENCES

- Abalos, J., Cruz, G., Ogena, N., Kabamalan, M. M., Laguna, E., & Marquez, M. P. (2020, August). *Human resource for health in the time of COVID-19 pandemic: Does the Philippines have enough?* (UPPI/DRDF Research Brief No. 8). University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI) and Demographic Research and Development Foundation, Inc. (DRDF). <https://www.uppi.upd.edu.ph/sites/default/files/pdf/COVID-19-Research-Brief-08.pdf>
- Agojo, K. N. M. (2021). Policing a pandemic: Understanding the state and political instrumentalization of the coercive apparatus in Duterte's Philippines. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 37(3), 363–386. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X21996832>
- Akbari, A. (2021). Authoritarian surveillance: A corona test. *Surveillance & Society*, 19(1), 98–103. <https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v19i1.14545>
- Amit, A. M. L., Pepito, V. C. F., & Dayrit, M. M. (2020a). *Lessons learned during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines*.
- Amit, A. M. L., Pepito, V. C. F., & Dayrit, M. M. (2020b). The Philippines in the time of COVID-19: Early experiences and challenges of a resource-limited country.
- Babu, G. R., Khetrupal, S., John, D. A., Deepa, R., & Narayan, K. V. (2020). Pandemic preparedness and response to COVID-19 in South Asian countries. *International Journal of Infectious Diseases*, 104, 169–174. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.12.048>
- Bailey, D., Clark, J., Colombelli, A., Corradini, C., de Propriis, L., Derudder, B., Fratesi, U., Fritsch, M., Harrison, J., Hatfield, M., Kemeny, T., Kogler, D. F., Lagendijk, A., Lawton, P., Ortega-Argilés, R., Otero, C. I., & Usai, S. (2020). Regions in a time of pandemic. *Regional Studies*, 54(9), 1163–1174. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2020.1798611>
- Bayanihan to Heal As One Act, R.A. 11469 (2020). <http://legacy.senate.gov.ph/Bayanihan-to-Heal-as-One-Act-RA-11469.pdf>
- Bayerlein, M., Boese, V. A., Gates, S., Kamin, K., & Syed Mansoob, M. (2021). Populism and COVID-19: How Populist Governments (Mis) Handle the Pandemic. (Series 2021: 121). Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg.
- Bekema, J. D. L. C. (2021). Pandemics and the punitive regulation of the weak: Experiences of COVID-19 survivors from urban poor communities in the Philippines. *Third World Quarterly*, 42, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1913407>
- Blondin, D., & Boin, A. (2020). Cooperation in the face of transboundary crisis: A framework for analysis. *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, 3(3), 197–209. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ppmgov/gvz031>
- Boersma, K. (2013). Liminal surveillance: An ethnographic control room study during a local event. *Surveillance & Society*, 11(1/2), 106–120. <https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v11i1/2.4451>
- Boersma, K., & Fonio, C. (2017). *Big data, surveillance and crisis management* (pp. 1–16). Routledge.
- Boin, A. (2009). The new world of crises and crisis management: Implications for policymaking and research. *Review of Policy Research*, 26(4), 367–377.
- Boin, A., Ekengren, M., & Rhinard, M. (2014). Transboundary crisis governance. In J. Sperling (Ed.), *Handbook of governance and security*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Boin, A., Ekengren, M., & Rhinard, M. (2020). Hiding in plain sight: Conceptualizing the creeping crisis. *Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy*, 11(2), 116–138.
- Boin, A., Lodge, M., & Luesink, M. (2020). Learning from the COVID-19 crisis: An initial analysis of national responses. *Policy Design and Practice*, 3(3), 189–204.
- Bremmer, I. (2020, June 12). The best global responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. *TIME*. <https://time.com/5851633/best-global-responses-covid-19/>
- Buan, L. (2020, May 12). NBI arrests teacher who posted about reward to kill Duterte. *Rappler*. <https://www.rappler.com/nation/nbi-arrests-teacher-posted-reward-kill-duterte>
- Buchanan, D. A., & Hällgren, M. (2019). Surviving a zombie apocalypse: Leadership configurations in extreme contexts. *Management Learning*, 50(2), 152–170.
- Cabato, R. (2020, July 28). Duterte turns to drug war tactics to fight pandemic in the Philippines. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/duterte-turns-to-drug-war-tactics-to-fight-pandemic-in-the-philippines/2020/07/28/7f1dfbda-ca67-11ea-99b0-8426e26d203b_story.html
- Celermajer, D., & Nassar, D. (2020). COVID and the era of emergencies: what type of freedom is at stake? *Democratic Theory*, 7(2), 12–24. <https://doi.org/10.3167/dt.2020.070203>
- Cepaluni, G., Dorsch, M., & Dzebo, S. (2021). *Populism, plitical regimes, and COVID-19 deaths. Populism, political regimes, and COVID-19 deaths*. Available at SSRN. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3816398>
- Chowdhury, R., Luhar, S., Khan, N., Choudhury, S. R., Matin, I., & Franco, O. H. (2020). Long-term strategies to control COVID-19 in low and middle-income countries: An options overview of community-based, non-pharmacological interventions. *European Journal of Epidemiology*, 35(8), 743–748. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10654-020-00660-1>
- Chretien, J. P., Blazes, D. L., Coldren, R. L., Lewis, M. D., Gaywee, J., Kana, K., Sirisopana, N., Vallejos, V., Mundaca, C. C., Montano, S., Martin, G. J., & Gaydos, J. C. (2007). The importance of militaries from developing countries in global infectious disease surveillance. *World Hospitals and Health Services: The Official Journal of the International Hospital Federation*, 43(4), 32–37. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0042-96862007000300009>
- CNN (2020a, April 5). 2GO vessels to be converted into COVID-19 quarantine ships for returning seafarers, OFWs. https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/5/DOTr-2GO-quarantine-ship-seafarers-OFW-COVID-19.html?fbclid=IwAR3yU52CddxrI2WfBgDJaPBdXTISOfZ65f6_cU9w-Lmmu8cYfJR-FCKs2gs
- CNN. (2020b, May 4). 'Science, economics' to determine possible modification of COVID-19 lockdown—Roque. *CNN Philippines*. <https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/5/4/COVID-19-modified-localized-quarantine-ECQ-science-economics-Roque.html>
- Constitutional Law Cluster - UP College of Law. (2020). *Reflections on the Bayanihan Act or Republic Act No. 11469 ("the Act") with Matrix of Presidential Powers Under Existing Laws to Meet Emergencies Including the Covid-19 Crisis* University of the Philippines.
- Curato, N. (2017). Flirting with authoritarian fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and the new terms of Philippine populism. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47(1), 142–153. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751>

- Dayrit, M., Lagrada, L., Picazo, O., Pons, M., & Villaverde, M. (2018). Philippines health system review. In W. Patcharanarumol, & V. Tangcharoensathien (Eds.), *Health systems in transition* (Vol. 8). World Health Organization. <https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/274579>
- De Vera, B. (2020, December 8). World Bank: Pandemic to sink 2.7M more Filipinos in poverty. *The Philippine Daily Inquirer*. <https://business.inquirer.net/313528/world-bank-pandemic-to-sink-2-7m-more-filipinos-in-poverty>
- Dorji, T. (2020). The Gross National Happiness Framework and the health system response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Bhutan. *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 104(2), 441–445. <https://doi.org/10.4269/ajtmh.20-1416>
- Eck, K., & Hatz, S. (2020). State surveillance and the COVID-19 crisis. *Journal of Human Rights*, 19(5), 603–612. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2020.1816163>
- Erkhembayar, R., Dickinson, E., Badarch, D., Narula, I., Thomas, G. N., Ochir, C., & Manaseki-Holland, S. (2020). Early policy actions and emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Mongolia: Experiences and challenges. *The Lancet Global Health*, 8(9), e1234–e1241. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X\(20\)30295-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(20)30295-3)
- Finn, B. M., & Kobayashi, L. C. (2020). Structural inequality in the time of COVID-19: Urbanization, segregation, and pandemic control in sub-Saharan Africa. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 10(2), 217–220. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2043820620934310>
- Finn, R., Watson, H., & Wadhwa, K. (2017). Mining social media for effective crisis response: Machine learning and disaster response. In C. Fonio, & K. Boersma (Eds.), *Big data, surveillance and crisis management* (pp. 38–56). Routledge.
- Frerichs, R. R. (1991). Epidemiologic surveillance in developing countries. *Annual Review of Public Health*, 12(1), 257–280. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.pu.12.050191.001353>
- Gerard, F., Imbert, C., & Orkin, K. (2020). Social protection response to the COVID-19 crisis: Options for developing countries. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36 (Suppl_1), S281–S296. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/gra026>
- Gerber, B., & Gail, M. (2021, February 18). One month in, how Biden has changed disaster management and the US COVID-19 response. *The Conversation*. <https://theconversation.com/one-month-in-how-biden-has-changed-disaster-management-and-the-us-covid-19-response-155440>
- German, J. D., Miña, J. K. P., Alfonso, C. M. N., & Yang, K. H. (2018, April). A study on shortage of hospital beds in the Philippines using system dynamics. *2018 5th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Applications (ICIEA)* (pp. 72–78). IEEE. <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEA.2018.8387073>
- Gregorio, X. (2020, April 7). Duterte worries over funding needs for COVID-19 cash aid program. *CNN Philippines*. <https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/7/Duterte-eyes-more-funds-for-poor.html?fbclid=IwAR1Bj-oHWvicXBGmNTdi1L7VpyNhL3KaVWk8qW5NfKvK7f5gATIYJAVUZg>
- Hapal, K. (2021). The Philippines' COVID-19 response: Securitising the pandemic and disciplining the pasaway. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 40(2), 224–244. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103421994261>
- He, A. J., Shi, Y., & Liu, H. (2020). Crisis governance, Chinese style: distinctive features of China's response to the Covid-19 pandemic. *Policy Design and Practice*, 3(3), 242–258. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2020.1799911>
- Holmes, E. C., Rambaut, A., & Andersen, K. G. (2018). Pandemics: Spend on surveillance, not prediction. *Nature*, 558, 180–182. <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-05373-w>
- IATF. (2020). Omnibus Guidelines on the Implementation of Community Quarantine in the Philippines. Republic of the Philippines. <https://doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/health-update/omnibus-guidelines-on-the-implementation-of-community-quarantine-in-the-Philippines-0522.pdf>
- Jalea, G., & Peralta, J. (2020, August 4). Whistleblower claims P15 billion stolen by Philhealth execs in fraud schemes. *CNN Philippines*. <https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/8/4/PhilHealth-P15-billion-stolen-mafia-exec.html>
- Joaquin, J. J. B., & Biana, H. T. (2020). Philippine crimes of dissent: Free speech in the time of COVID-19. *Crime, Media, Culture*, 17(1), 37–41. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659020946181>
- Kalkman, J. P. (2020). Military crisis responses to COVID-19. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 29(1), 99–103. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12328>
- Kaufmann, D. (2020, July 10). What the pandemic reveals about governance, state capture and natural resources. *Brookings*. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/07/10/what-the-pandemic-reveals-about-governance-state-capture-and-natural-resources/>
- Kaweenuttayanon, N., Pattanarattanamolee, R., Sorncha, N., & Nakahara, S. (2021). Community surveillance of COVID-19 by village health volunteers, Thailand. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 99(5), 393–397. <https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.20.274308>
- La Vina, T., & Reyes, J. (2020, October 29). Analysis: No assurance from the anti-terror Law's rules. *Rappler*. <https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/analysis-no-assurance-from-anti-terror-rules>
- Lasco, G. (2020). Medical populism and the COVID-19 pandemic. *Global Public Health*, 15(10), 1417–1429. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2020.1807581>
- Lasco, G., & Curato, N. (2019). Medical populism. *Social Science & Medicine*, 221, 1–8. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.12.006>
- Limpot, K. (2020, December 28). Lawmakers, critics decry early vaccination of military. *CNN Philippines*. <https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/12/28/lawmakers-critics-military-early-vaccination.html>
- Lopez, M. L. (2020, April 8). Timeline: The COVID-19 response money trail. *CNN Philippines*. <https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/8/COVID-19-response-money-trail.html>
- Luna, F. (2020, August 2). 'Medical quarantine, not ECQ': Health professionals call for change in 'militaristic' lockdowns. *The Philippine Star*. <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/08/02/2032420/medical-quarantine-not-ecq-health-professionals-call-change-militaristic-lockdowns>
- McKee, M., Gugushvili, A., Koltai, J., & Stuckler, D. (2020). Are populist leaders creating the conditions for the spread of COVID-19? *International Journal of Health Policy and Management*, 10(8), 511–515. <https://doi.org/10.34172/IJHPM.2020.124>
- Mendoza, R., Olfindo, R., & Poco, L. C. (2017, January). Governance and institutions in the Philippines (ASOG Working Paper 17-002). Ateneo School of Government. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2873942
- Moynihan, D. P. (2009). The network governance of crisis response: Case studies of incident command systems. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(4), 895–915. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun033>
- Patel, J. A., Nielsen, F. B. H., Badiani, A. A., Assi, S., Unadkat, V. A., Patel, B., Ravindrane, R., & Wardle, H. (2020). Poverty, inequality and COVID-19: The forgotten vulnerable. *Public Health*, 183, 110–111. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2020.05.006>
- Paunan, J. C. (2020, September 3). Government launches game changer 'StaySafe.PH' as official COVID-19 contact tracing app. Philippine Information Agency. <https://pia.gov.ph/news/articles/1052103>
- Philippine Statistics Authority. (2019, December 6). *Proportion of poor Filipinos was estimated at 16.6 percent in 2018*. <https://psa.gov.ph/poverty-press-releases/nid/144752>

- Presidential Communications Operations Office. (2020). National, LGU, and private sector monitoring and enforcement.
- Punzalan, J. (2020, December 28). Palace tells public: Just accept that some soldiers were vaccinated vs COVID-19. *ABS-CBN News*. <https://news.abs-cbn.com/amp/news/12/28/20/palace-tells-public-just-accept-that-some-soldiers-were-vaccinated-vs-covid-19>
- Rappler. (2021, January 4). *LIST: Local governments' plans, deals, and budget for COVID-19 vaccines*. <https://www.rappler.com/nation/list-local-government-units-rolling-out-plans-free-covid-19-vaccines>
- Ratnayake, R., Tammara, M., Tiffany, A., Kongelf, A., Polonsky, J. A., & McClelland, A. (2020). People-centred surveillance: A narrative review of community-based surveillance among crisis-affected populations. *The Lancet Planetary Health*, 4(10), e483–e495. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196\(20\)30221-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(20)30221-7)
- Renda, A., & Castro, R. (2020). Towards stronger EU governance of health threats after the COVID-19 pandemic. *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, 11(2), 273–282. <https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2020.34>
- Robert, A. (2020). Lessons from New Zealand's COVID-19 outbreak response. *The Lancet Public Health*, 5(11), e569–e570. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667\(20\)30237-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30237-1)
- Santos, E., & Limpot, K. (2020, October 27). Red Cross resumes Philhealth-funded COVID-19 tests as gov't pays half its debt. *CNN Philippines*. <https://www.rappler.com/nation/senate-panel-summon-afp-parlade-hearing-red-tagging-baiting>
- Sekalala, S., Dagron, S., Forman, L., & Meier, B. M. (2020). Analyzing the human rights impact of increased digital public health surveillance during the COVID-19 Crisis. *Health and Human Rights Journal*, 22(2), 7–20. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true%26db=sih%26AN=147878794%26site=ehost-live>
- Shaw, R., Kim, Y., & Hua, J. (2020). Governance, technology and citizen behavior in pandemic: Lessons from COVID-19 in East Asia. *Progress in Disaster Science*, 6, 100090. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100090>
- Sunday, A., Ramugondo, E., & Kathard, H. (2020). Case study and narrative inquiry as merged methodologies: A critical narrative perspective. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 19, 160940692093788. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406920937880>
- Sonn, J. W., & Lee, J. K. (2020). The smart city as time-space cartographer in COVID-19 control: The South Korean strategy and democratic control of surveillance technology. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 61(4–5), 482–492.
- Summers, D. J., Cheng, D. H.-Y., Lin, P. H.-H., Barnard, D. L. T., Kvalsvig, D. A., Wilson, P. N., & Baker, P. M. G. (2020). Potential lessons from the Taiwan and New Zealand health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. *The Lancet Regional Health - Western Pacific*, 4(August), 100044. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanwpc.2020.100044>
- Talabong, R. (2020, October 28). Senate panel to summon Parlade to hearing on red-tagging. *Rappler*. <https://www.rappler.com/nation/senate-panel-summon-afp-parlade-hearing-red-tagging-baiting>
- Tayao-Juego, A. (2020, April 26). Battling COVID-19 with technology. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. <https://business.inquirer.net/295740/battling-covid-19-with-technology>
- Teehankee, J. C. (2021). The Philippines in 2020: COVID-19 pandemic threatens Duterte's populist legacy. *Asian Survey*, 61(1), 130–137. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2021.61.1.130>
- Thomas, L. (2014). Pandemics of the future: Disease surveillance in real time. *Surveillance & Society*, 12(2), 287–300.
- Tomacruz, S. (2020, August 3). PH health workers infected with coronavirus reach 5,008. *Rappler*. <https://www.rappler.com/nation/health-workers-coronavirus-cases-philippines-august-3-2020>
- Transparency International. (2021). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2020*. https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2020_Report_EN_0802-WEB-1_2021-02-08-103053.pdf
- Van Nguyen, Q., Cao, D. A., & Nghiem, S. H. (2020). The spread of COVID-19 and policy responses in Vietnam: An overview. *International Journal of Infectious Diseases*, 103, 157–161. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.11.154>
- Webster, L. (2007). Using narrative inquiry as a research method: An introduction to using critical event narrative analysis in research on learning and teaching. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203946268>
- Wenger, P. N., Halperin, W., & Ziga, E. (2020). *Public health surveillance for COVID-19: Interim guidance*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59745-326-4_13
- WHO. (2020). *Public health surveillance for COVID-19: Interim guidance* (Report No. WHO-2019-nCoV-SurveillanceGuidance-2020.8). <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-2019-nCoV-surveillanceguidance-2020.8>
- WHO. (2021). WHO COVID-19 dashboard. <https://covid19.who.int/table>
- World Bank. (2020a, April 7). The World Bank in the Philippines. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/philippines/overview>
- World Bank. (2020b). World Governance Indicators. [Data file]. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>

How to cite this article: Villar, E. B., & Magnawa, J. P. C. (2022). Surveillance and pandemic governance in least-ideal contexts: The Philippine case. *J Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 30, 22–31. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12394>