

1 **Short Title:** Behavioral economics and COVID-19

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3 **Integrating Operant and Cognitive Behavioral Economics to Inform Infectious Disease**

4 **Response: Prevention, Testing, and Vaccination in the COVID-19 Pandemic**

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18 We have no known conflicts of interest to disclose. Dr. Strickland's work was supported
19 by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) of the National Institutes of Health (T32 DA07209).

20 Dr. Reed's work was supported by a General Research Fund award from the University of
21 Kansas. Dr. Johnson's work was supported by NIDA grant R01 DA042527.

22 Limited data set and code to replicate primary analyses is available at
23 https://osf.io/wdnmx/?view_only=37323f9431aa4c91a0e7209054058dbe.

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Abstract

The role of human behavior to thwart transmission of infectious diseases like COVID-19 is evident. Yet, many areas of psychological and behavioral science are limited in the ability to mobilize to address exponential spread or provide easily translatable findings for policymakers. Here we describe how integrating methods from operant and cognitive approaches to behavioral economics can provide robust policy relevant data. Adapting well validated methods from behavioral economic discounting and demand frameworks, we evaluate in four crowdsourced samples (total N = 1,366) behavioral mechanisms underlying engagement in preventive health behaviors. We find that people are more likely to social distance when specified activities are framed as high risk, that describing delay until testing (rather than delay until results) increases testing likelihood, and that framing vaccine safety in a positive valence improves vaccine acceptance. These findings collectively emphasize the flexibility of methods from diverse areas of behavioral science for informing public health crisis management.

Key words: COVID-19; behavioral economics; demand; discounting; public policy

42 **Integrating Operant and Cognitive Behavioral Economics to Inform Infectious Disease**

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44 The COVID-19 pandemic has spurred important conversations in nearly all sciences [1-
45 3]. While scientists scramble to find ways to address the crisis, a salient role for behavioral science
46 has emerged. Robust evidence documents how human behavior is central to disease spread
47 insofar as reduced travel and social distancing are predictive of lower infection incidence [4, 5]
48 and face mask use effectively mitigates airborne transmission [6, 7]. As of this writing, only
49 remdesivir has been approved by the FDA as an approved safe and effective pharmaceutical.
50 Importantly, remdesivir and other therapeutics are designed for the treatment of existing COVID-
51 19 symptoms rather than for prophylactic prevention, leaving nonpharmaceutical interventions as
52 critical for flattening the curve of transmission [8]. Furthermore, while effective vaccines have been
53 developed and approved under emergency use authorizations, behavioral science remains
54 necessary for ensuring necessary vaccination rates by informing the development of public health
55 programs to counteract factors like vaccine mistrust, skepticism, and apathy [9, 10].

56 Theoretical commentaries have emphasized the role of understanding human behavior to
57 thwart the transmission of infectious diseases like COVID-19 [11]. Yet, many areas of behavioral
58 science and their accompanying experimental approaches may be limited in the ability to mobilize
59 research to address exponential spread or provide easily translatable findings. For example,
60 methods commonly used in behavioral psychology and the experimental analysis of behavior are
61 limited due to a focus on steady state behavior and within-subject methods [12, 13]. Such designs
62 are hallmarks of rigorous science, to be certain, but these methodological features are sometimes
63 at odds with and constraints on the need for rapid and scalable behavioral solutions. Other
64 behavioral science methods can provide critical data for COVID-19 response, but rely on technical
65 procedures without direct or readily accessible applications that policymakers can act upon [14].

66 Here, we sought to address these shortcomings by showing how well-validated behavioral
67 economic procedures developed in operant psychology frameworks may be combined with more

68 widely recognized cognitive psychology approaches to provide robust behavioral insights, policy-
69 relevant data, and research methods that are helpful to stakeholders during the COVID-19
70 pandemic, specifically, but also for infection disease response, more broadly.

71 Behavioral economics may be defined as an approach to understanding behavior and
72 decision making that integrates behavioral science (commonly psychology) with economic
73 principles [15]. As typically described in the scientific and popular press, this approach
74 emphasizes the contributions of psychology to economics or the *behavior of economics*. Such a
75 behavioral economic tradition often examines how mechanisms described by cognitive
76 psychology can explain systematic deviations from neo-classical economic predictions (e.g.,
77 status quo biases; loss aversion) [16-19]. Less often considered, but equally relevant, is the
78 reciprocal integration – the contributions of economics to psychology theory or the *economics of*
79 *behavior* [20, 21]. Research in this tradition has applied economic principles to understand
80 decision making using methods developed within operant psychology frameworks (e.g.,
81 purchasing of competing goods from an economist’s perspective may be the division of operant
82 behavior among competing reinforcers from a behavioral psychologist’s perspective). This
83 approach involves evaluation of behavioral mechanisms including delay discounting (i.e., the
84 devaluation of an outcome by delay), probability discounting (i.e., the devaluation of an outcome
85 by probability/certainty), and behavioral economic demand (i.e., relationship price and
86 consumption that considers this relation may differ across individuals and contexts) to determine
87 how these measurable factors influence choice and behavioral allocation as well as individual
88 difference variables impacting these relationships.

89 The unique lens by which behavioral economics is used to describes behavior not only
90 provides novel means of interpreting socially important concerns, but also the various facets of
91 the dependent variables generated in these experiments render them especially useful for
92 informing translational public policy [20, 22-24]. For example, operant arrangements can quantify
93 the effective price at which demand for a commodity shifts from inelastic (when a one unit increase

94 in price is met with less than one unit decrease in consumption) to elastic (when a one unit
95 increase in price is met with more than one unit decrease in consumption) for the consumer, while
96 also modeling expected revenue on the part of the supplier. Moreover, comparisons of demand
97 metrics have the potential to determine how imposing different environmental contexts (e.g.,
98 availability of reinforcer substitutes, closed economics, framing effects) alters the basic reinforcing
99 value of the commodity for an individual as well as individual factors predictive of that influence.
100 Similarly, discounting procedures can identify the effective delay [25] or probability [26] at which
101 behavior is altered to a given level of performance; for example, the delay associated with, say,
102 a 50% reduction in the value of procuring a COVID-19 test. Such metrics are ripe for modeling
103 policy effects and can provide novel and important behavioral information that is directly relatable
104 to policy makers considering a behavior change program [23, 27, 28].

105 To date, researchers considering the *behavior of economics* and *economics of behavior*
106 have remained largely independent. We argue that this separation is not of theoretical necessity
107 and that there are many shared interests in cognitive-behavioral factors affecting decision making.
108 A primary goal of this paper is to provide a clear demonstration of how these approaches when
109 integrated can provide scalable behavioral solutions for public health crisis mitigation. To this end,
110 we provide examples that relate to policy designed to reduce transmission and improve treatment
111 within the COVID-19 pandemic. We translated behavioral economic discounting and demand
112 assays widely used and validated in behavioral psychology [29-34] to study 1) engagement in
113 social distancing, 2) cooperation with face mask use, 3) procurement of diagnostic testing, and 4)
114 intentions for vaccination. Within these examples, we evaluate specific experimental
115 manipulations well characterized by cognitive psychology approaches to behavioral economics
116 (e.g., framing effects) to provide clear and translatable implications for public policy design.

117

118 **General Methods**

119 **Sampling and Study Overview**

120 This paper summarizes a programmatic series of seven experiments conducted across
121 four samples recruited during the COVID-19 pandemic (Sample 1 N = 133; Sample 2 N = 414;
122 Sample 3 N = 497; Sample 4 N = 322). Sampling occurred asynchronously in March 2020
123 (Sample 1), May 2020 (Sample 2), July 2020 (Sample 3), and September 2020 (Sample 4). All
124 samples were recruited using crowdsourcing (Amazon Mechanical Turk) with checks used to
125 verify fidelity of responding. One experiment was formally pre-registered (Experiment 7;
126 <https://osf.io/56f2z>) while others followed standard analyses based on the experimental design.
127 Methods and Results will be presented thematically from prevention behavior to diagnostic testing
128 to vaccination following a general summary of the experimental methods and data cleaning
129 processes.

130 Across all studies, we required participants to be age 18 or older and have United States
131 residence. Additional attention and validity checks were included for each sample. All studies
132 were reviewed and approved by local Institutional Review Boards (University of Kansas or Johns
133 Hopkins University). Participants reviewed a study cover letter to provide electronic informed
134 consent prior to participation.

135 **Sample Characteristics and Systematicity Checks**

136 *Sample 1 (Experiment 1 and 4)*

137 Sample 1 was recruited from 13 March 2020 to 17 March 2020. Participants were required
138 to have a 95% or higher approval rate, 100 or more previously approved tasks, and current United
139 States residence to view and complete the study. Compensation for full study completion was \$1
140 USD. A total of 227 participants completed the full assessment.

141 Data cleaning consisted of evaluation of behavioral economic tasks for systematic
142 responding as well as evaluation of qualitative responses for English language proficiency and
143 comprehension. Probability discounting task (Experiment 1) and behavioral economic demand

144 tasks (Experiment 4) were evaluated using standardized systematic data checks [35, 36]. A total
145 of 31 participants failed checks on the probability discounting procedure, 18 on the demand
146 procedure, and 44 on both procedures. These results closely corresponded to flagged responses
147 on the qualitative data checks with only one additional participant removed based on inattentive
148 qualitative responses. This resulted in an analyzed sample of 133 participants. The analyzed
149 sample was an average of 39.5 years old (SD = 12.1), 59.8% female, and 80.6% White.

150 *Sample 2 (Experiment 5)*

151 Sample 2 was recruited from 13 May 2020 to 10 June 2020. Participants were required to
152 have a 95% or higher approval rate, 100 or more previously approved tasks, and current United
153 States residence to view and complete the study. Compensation for full study completion was \$1
154 USD. A total of 499 participants completed the full assessment.

155 Data cleaning included evaluation of the diagnostic test delay discounting task
156 (Experiment 5) for reversals (i.e., reversing from stating “No” they would not get a test to “Yes”
157 they would get a test). Any participant with one or more reversal on any task was removed (i.e.,
158 1 task = 7 participants; 2 tasks = 8 participants; 3 tasks = 9 participants; 4 tasks = 61 participants).
159 This resulted in an analyzed sample of 414 participants. The analyzed sample was an average of
160 32.6 years old (SD = 10.9), 58.3% female, and 71.5% White.

161 *Sample 3 (Experiment 2, 3, and 6)*

162 Sample 3 completed the assessment from 4 August 2020 to 12 August 2020. Participants
163 were initially recruited from mTurk in March 2020 as a part of a longitudinal cohort with repeated
164 assessments throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were required to have a 97% or
165 higher approval rate, more than 100 previously approved tasks, and current United States
166 residence to enroll in the parent study. Data collection for this project occurred in Wave 3 of data
167 collection and included 531 participants who completed the full assessment. Participants were
168 compensated \$3.50 USD for completion of this assessment.

169 Data cleaning included evaluation of social distancing discounting tasks (Experiment 2)
170 and vaccine demand tasks (Experiment 6) for systematic responding. Discounting tasks were
171 evaluated using standardized criteria [35] and demand tasks were evaluated for reversals from a
172 “No” response. A total of 12 participants failed checks on the discounting procedure, 12 on the
173 demand procedure, and 6 on both procedures. An added attention check was included asking
174 about recent use of a fake drug (“oxypentone”) that an additional 6 participants endorsed. This
175 resulted in an analyzed sample of 497 participants. The analyzed sample was an average of 40.0
176 years old (SD = 11.4), 56.9% female, and 78.7% White.

177 *Sample 4 (Experiment 7)*

178 Sample 4 was recruited from 12 September 2020 to 23 September 2020. Participants
179 were required to have a 95% or higher approval rate, 100 or more previously approved tasks, and
180 current United States residence to view and complete the study. Compensation for full study
181 completion was \$1 USD. A total of 485 participants completed the full assessment.

182 Data cleaning included evaluation of the vaccine demand tasks (Experiment 7) for
183 systematic responding. Tasks were evaluated for reversals from a “No” response, which were
184 considered non-systematic (i.e., indicating “No” for intention to get a vaccine and then reversing
185 to “Yes” at a lower efficacy). A total of 163 participants failed checks. This resulted in an analyzed
186 sample of 322 participants. The analyzed sample was an average of 38.8 years old (SD = 11.6),
187 44.5% female, and 76.7% White.

188 **Experiment Methods and Data Analysis**

189 All experimental materials are available in the Supplemental Materials. Data were
190 collected via Qualtrics and analyses conducted in R Statistical Analysis (see
191 https://osf.io/wdnmx/?view_only=37323f9431aa4c91a0e7209054058dbe for limited datasets and
192 code for primary analyses).

193

194

Social Distancing

195 Social distancing is a first-line prevention strategy for reducing COVID-19 transmission. In
196 Experiments 1 and 2 we evaluate how the likelihood of engaging in social distancing varies as a
197 function of probabilistic community COVID-19 risk. In Experiment 1, participants completed a
198 probability discounting task evaluating the likelihood of attending a large social gathering given
199 varying probabilities of community risk for a hypothetical disease under varying symptom framing
200 conditions. In Experiment 2, participants completed a probability discounting procedure
201 evaluating the likelihood of engaging in a social activity based on community COVID-19 risk under
202 different risk framing conditions based on a widely disseminated risk assessment infographic from
203 the Texas Medical Association [37].

204 Methods

205 *Experiment 1 (Sample 1)*

206 Participants completed a probability discounting task to evaluate likelihood of attending a
207 large social gathering given the probability of disease risk in the community. The study vignette
208 described a situation involving planned attendance at a large social event. The task included two
209 experimental manipulations related to the symptoms' description. First, the *symptom type*
210 comprised a within-subject manipulation. A "Mild" version of the task described symptoms
211 including dry cough, fatigue, fever, shortness of breath, and headache. A "Severe" version of the
212 task included these symptoms in addition to difficulty breathing (requiring a medical ventilator).
213 All participants completed these two task manipulations with a randomized order of completion.
214 Second, the *symptom framing* was a between-subject manipulation. Half of participants saw the
215 two task symptom variations with corresponding labels for the symptom severity (e.g., "this group
216 of symptoms is classified as [mild/severe]") in the "Label" condition (n=69). The other half of
217 participants saw the same symptoms, but with no labels included in the "No Label" condition
218 (n=64). Participants rated their likelihood of attending the social event at varying probabilities that
219 someone in their community was presenting the symptoms described. Participants emitted

220 responses on a visual analog scale (VAS) from 0 (extremely unlikely to attend) to 100 (extremely
221 likely to attend). Symptom probabilities included 0%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 95%, and
222 100%.

223 Group discounting data were analyzed and plotted using the hyperbolic discounting
224 equation that includes a non-linear scaling parameter [38]. Individual discounting data were
225 analyzed as area under the curve (AUC) to provide a model free estimation of the impact of
226 symptom probability on the discounting of event attendance [39]. Lower AUC values indicate
227 greater sensitivity to risk (the desirable outcome from a social distancing standpoint). We
228 standardized responses to the 0% likelihood value to isolate the impact of symptom probability
229 from no-risk event attendance. We used an ordinal variation of AUC, here and throughout, to
230 address concerns with normality and disproportional influence of delay or probability steps [40].
231 AUC values were analyzed using a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with the between-subject factor of Label
232 (No Label versus Label) and within-subject factor of Symptom Type (Mild versus Severe).
233 Generalized linear mixed effect models were used to test the likelihood of 100% likelihood of
234 attendance at 0% community transmission risk (a bimodal distribution was observed; therefore,
235 this outcome was dichotomized for analysis).

236 *Experiment 2 (Sample 3)*

237 Similar to Experiment 1, participants completed a probability discounting task to evaluate
238 likelihood of engaging in a social activity based on community COVID-19 risk. Participants were
239 first asked to select a preferred social activity from a low-to-moderate risk category (i.e., play golf
240 with others, go to a library or museum, or walk in a busy downtown) and from a high risk category
241 (i.e., go to a sports stadium, go to a movie theater, or attend a religious service with 500+ other
242 worshipers). These groupings were based on the risk categorizations made by the Texas Medical
243 Association in June 2020 [37]. Participants then read a vignette describing the opportunity to
244 engage in that activity. A *risk framing* manipulation (between-subject) varied risk categorization
245 with half of participants (N=246) completing task that included labels for the risk severity (e.g.,

246 “According to health authorities in your area, this activity is of [Low/High Risk]”) and the other half
247 of participants (N=251) receiving no risk information. The two risk categories were completed in
248 a randomized order. Participants rated their likelihood of going to the social activity at varying
249 probabilities that someone at the activity was displaying COVID-19 symptoms. Participants
250 emitted responses on a VAS from 0 (definitely would not go) to 100 (definitely would go).
251 Symptom probabilities included 0%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 99%, and 100%.

252 Group discounting data were analyzed and individual AUC values calculated as in
253 Experiment 1. AUC values were analyzed using a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with the between-subject
254 factor of risk Label (No Label versus Label) and within-subject factor of Risk Level (Low-to-
255 Moderate versus High). Generalized linear mixed effect models were used to test the likelihood
256 of 100% likelihood of attendance at 0% community transmission risk.

257 **Results**

258 *Experiment 1: Framing Effects of Symptom Severity for a Hypothetical Disease*

259 Responding at an aggregate level showed systematic and expected decreases in
260 attendance likelihood based on community symptom risk (Figure 1). Individual AUC values
261 revealed a significant main effect of Symptom Type, $F_{1,131} = 12.75$, $p < .001$, reflecting higher
262 AUC values for the Mild than Severe symptoms, $d_z = 0.31$. The main effect of Label, $F_{1,131} = 2.87$,
263 $p = .09$, or Symptom Type by Label interaction, $F_{1,131} = 0.01$, $p = .91$, were not statistically
264 significant. Generalized linear mixed effect models testing the likelihood of attendance at 0%
265 community risk also showed no significant differences by Label or Symptom Type, p values $> .09$.

266 *Experiment 2: Framing Effects of Activity Risk for COVID-19*

267 Responding at an aggregate level showed systematic and expected decreases in social
268 activity likelihood based on community symptom risk as in Experiment 1 (Figure 2). Standardized
269 AUC values revealed a significant main effect of Risk Level, $F_{1,495} = 113.62$, $p < .001$, and a Risk
270 Level by Risk Framing interaction, $F_{1,495} = 26.47$, $p < .001$. This interaction reflected no significant
271 between-subject effect of Label for the Low Risk activity, $t_{495} = 0.067$, $p = .95$, $d = -0.01$, but in the

272 Label group significantly lower AUC values (i.e., greater sensitivity to risk) for the High Risk activity
273 than the Low Risk activity, $t_{495} = 2.967$, $p = .003$, $d = -0.27$. A significant Risk Level by Risk Framing
274 interaction was also observed at the 0% probability of a symptomatic attendee, $b = -2.59$, $p <$
275 $.001$. This interaction reflected no differences by Risk Framing in the likelihood of attendance at
276 0% risk for the Low Risk Activity, $OR = 0.84$, $p = .40$, but a lower likelihood of attendance for the
277 High Risk Activity for the Label Risk Framing condition, $OR = 0.48$, $p < .001$.

278 **Discussion**

279 These findings collectively show that social distancing can be effectively modeled using
280 probability discounting procedures. Social activity was systematically devalued by likelihood of
281 non-specific (Experiment 1) and COVID-19 specific (Experiment 2) community disease risk.
282 Importantly, we found that a framing manipulation modeled after popular public health messaging
283 targeting social distancing increased sensitivity to risk likelihood for a high-risk activity while not
284 appreciable changing behavior for a low-risk activity. This is important given the potential for risk
285 framing to have an untoward effect of reducing risk sensitivity for low-risk settings when presented
286 in these kinds of behavioral contrasts (i.e., boomerang effects) [41].

287 **Facemask Use**

288 Consistent face mask use in social interactions is one of the most widely recommended
289 and effective means of reducing COVID-19 transmission [6, 7]. Despite this effectiveness, the use
290 of face masks remains controversial and underutilized [42]. Evaluating individual and contextual
291 factors that influence face mask use may help to identify areas for intervention – either at a
292 population level (stemming from between-person differences) or at a contextual level (stemming
293 from within-person differences).

294 In Experiment 3 (Sample 3) we evaluated the role of social factors in determining face
295 mask use. The notion that face mask use may relate to social context is reasonable given that
296 one of the primary benefits of mask use is prevention of transmission to others. With respect to
297 behavioral economic theory, social discounting is a well-described behavioral mechanism by

298 which the value of an outcome is devalued by the “social distance” or subjective “closeness” of a
299 person to the participant (e.g., a co-worker would be more socially distant than a sibling or parent).
300 Empirical work on social discounting finds that the value of an outcome is hyperbolically devalued
301 by social distance in a way that is mechanistically similar to delay and probability discounting [43-
302 45]. Participants in Experiment 3 completed a traditional social discounting task using monetary
303 consequences and a novel social discounting task with face mask use as the consequence.

304 **Methods**

305 *Experiment 3 (Sample 3)*

306 Participants completed social discounting tasks evaluating responding for face mask and
307 monetary outcomes [45]. Prior to completion of the social discounting tasks, participants were
308 asked to think of the 100 people closest to them with 1 being the dearest friend or relative in the
309 world and 100 being a mere acquaintance. Participants were then asked to record their relation
310 to people at numbers 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 on this list, all of which were people instructed to be
311 someone they did not live with or see in the past month. This information was included in the
312 response options to personalize responding. In the face mask version of the task, participants
313 were instructed to report their likelihood of wearing a face mask when interacting with people at
314 each of these social distances using a 100-point VAS. Three conditions were presented including
315 1) when the participant was COVID-19 asymptomatic, 2) COVID-19 symptomatic without a
316 positive test, and 3) COVID-19 symptomatic with a positive test. These conditions were presented
317 in that order as a means to model the progression that a person may experience in decision-
318 making (i.e., asymptomatic to positive). Participants also completed a social discounting task for
319 money based on prior methods [43]. In this task, participants were asked to select between
320 receiving an amount of money for themselves alone or \$75 USD for the N person on the list.
321 Participants completed this task for the 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 on their social list. Participants were
322 also asked about responding for a stranger in each task.

323 Non-systematic data were removed for Experiment 3 specific to Experiment 3 rather than
324 for all experiments using Sample 3 data. This was done given the unorthodox nature of the social
325 discounting task and unusual pattern of response consistently observed (see below), meaning
326 that non-systematic responding was less likely to represent non-specific responding. Of the 497
327 participants in the Sample 3 analyzed set, 45 showed non-systematic responding on any of the
328 social discounting tasks for face masks for an Experiment 3 analyzed sample of 452 participants.
329 Group discounting data were analyzed as in Experiment 1. Generalized linear mixed effect
330 models were used to test the likelihood of using a face mask across all social distances as a
331 function of condition (asymptomatic, symptomatic no test, symptomatic test).

332 **Results**

333 Prior to data collection, we expected that the likelihood of using a face mask would be
334 devalued by social distance such that the greater the social distance, the lower likelihood of mask
335 use. Surprisingly, an opposite pattern of behavior was observed – participants reported *greater*
336 likelihood of mask use with increasing social distance in an orderly fashion (Figure 3; bottom
337 right). These data suggesting a systematic discounting pattern, but only if the discounted outcome
338 was social interaction *without* a face mask rather than use of a face mask. In fact, when recoding
339 responses to measure likelihood of interaction without a face mask, a systematic discounting
340 pattern was observed with the likelihood of interacting without a mask discounted hyperbolically
341 by social distance (Figure 3; bottom left). Critically, responding on the monetary social discounting
342 task followed an expected and typical pattern in which the amount of money foregone to a social
343 partner was systematically and hyperbolically discounted by increasing social distance (Figure 3
344 top panel).

345 A clear effect of symptomatic status was also observed such that face mask use was more
346 likely (i.e., likelihood of forging a mask was lower) when a participant was symptomatic whether
347 with or without a positive test (Figure 3). This pattern of response was attributable, in part, to an
348 increase in the proportion of participants reporting they would wear a mask when interacting with

349 any social partner in the asymptomatic condition (44.9%) to the symptomatic condition (78.8%,
350 OR = 32.1, $p < .001$) and positive test condition (94.0%, OR = 604.1, $p < .001$).

351 **Discussion**

352 These findings collectively show that face mask use is sensitive to social factors well
353 described by social discounting and behavioral economic procedures. Our assumption based on
354 existing social discounting research was that one would be more likely to wear a mask with those
355 who are interpersonally close given concern about infecting those they care about. However, it
356 appears that the increased value of maskless interaction with those one is interpersonally closer
357 to may overshadow any additional concern for that person's safety. Unsettlingly, these findings
358 suggest that the value of mask-less social interaction is the more salient factor considered when
359 deciding whether to use or not use a mask based on social relations to others. Relevant to note
360 is that participants were asked to respond to these questions for people that they had not seen in
361 the past month and did not live with. Therefore, these findings cannot be accounted for by
362 responding based on people who they person has already had recent close and mask-less
363 contact with. Although additional work is needed to tease apart specific factors contributing to
364 these findings, these data are in line with other literature emphasizing the value of facial
365 expression for emotional and social interaction [46, 47]. This unexpected, but systematic finding
366 emphasizes that efforts to convey the relevance of mask use even when interacting with those
367 you know well is warranted when promoting consistent face mask use.

368 **Diagnostic Testing**

369 COVID-19 testing is key for identifying infection status to prevent future transmission as
370 well as to inform contact tracing. However, difficulties in obtaining testing and subsequent delays
371 related to receiving results have been a noted criticism of COVID-19 efforts. Experiments 4 and
372 5 were designed to evaluate these testing decision-making processes. Participants in Experiment
373 4 completed a task evaluating demand for a diagnostic test following possible exposure to a
374 hypothetical disease with the symptoms of cough, fever, and shortness of breath. Experiment 5

375 was designed to build on these findings with direct applications to COVID-19 by evaluating the
376 impact of cost and delay for COVID-19 diagnostic testing.

377 **Methods**

378 *Experiment 4 (Sample 1)*

379 Participants completed a hypothetical purchase task procedure to evaluate behavioral
380 economic demand for a diagnostic testing kit for a hypothetical disease. Specifically, participants
381 read a vignette indicating that they had attended a social event with over 200 people and one
382 week later developed symptoms including cough, fever, and shortness of breath. Participants
383 were also instructed that one other person in their county had developed an infection, that a
384 nearby hospital or clinic had a testing kit, but that there were no others in the area, that this kit
385 was approved by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and that they had their
386 typical income and savings available when making these decisions. Participants were asked to
387 report the likelihood of purchasing a testing kit given a series of out-of-pocket costs (\$0 [free], \$1,
388 \$5, \$10, \$20, \$30, \$40, \$50, \$75, \$100, \$150, \$200, \$500, \$1,000, \$2,000, and \$5,000/kit).
389 Participants emitted responses on a VAS from 0 (extremely unlikely to get tested) to 100
390 (extremely likely to get tested).

391 Individual demand data were evaluated using curve observed values including demand
392 intensity (reported likelihood of consumption at zero price), O_{\max} (individual maximum expected
393 expenditure), P_{\max} (price at individual maximum expected expenditure), and breakpoint (BP1; last
394 price at which any likelihood of consumption occurred). Demand intensity was analyzed as a
395 dichotomized variable of 100% likelihood of getting a testing kit at zero price versus < 100%
396 likelihood given the observation of clustering (i.e., 81.2% of participants indicating they would
397 definitely get tested if free). O_{\max} and P_{\max} were also square-root transformed prior to analysis to
398 reduce variable skew. Bivariate correlations were conducted as Spearman correlations between
399 four preventive health behaviors (i.e., hand washing, face touching, social distancing, and
400 avoiding large groups; recorded on a 1 to 5 scale of never to all the time) and demand measures.

401 Group mean demand curve was also fit using the exponential demand equation [48] to evaluate
402 the analytical P_{\max} value reflecting the point at which a one-log unit increase in price is met by a
403 one log-unit decrease in consumption [49].

404 *Experiment 5 (Sample 2)*

405 Participants completed a delay discounting procedure in which decisions to obtain testing
406 were assessed across systematically varied delays (15 minutes to 28 days). We evaluated two
407 within-subject manipulations in a factorial design. First, *cost* was manipulated with a test as Free
408 or \$125 in out-of-pocket expenses (based on the distribution of out-of-pocket costs for COVID
409 testing at the time of the study). Second, *delay framing* was manipulated with one set of tasks
410 evaluating delay to receiving a test kit with immediate results and the other set evaluating delay
411 to receiving results after an immediate test. Delays were held consistent across these two delay
412 types such that the only stated differences were in the framing of the delay. Participants completed
413 the testing delay condition prior to the results delay condition with price randomized within these
414 two conditions. Participants were asked if they would get a testing kit given a series of delays (15
415 min, 60 min, 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, 5 days, 7 days, 14 days, and 28 days). Response options for
416 Experiments 5 as well as Experiments 6, and 7 were simplified as dichotomous yes/no choices
417 rather than the VAS used in prior tasks. This design feature was selected to streamline responding
418 and better model actual decision-making in which decisions are a discrete yes or no choice.

419 Group data were modeled as in Experiment 1. Maximum delay for each condition was
420 used as a within-subject measure and calculated as the individual median value between last
421 accepted and first rejected delay. Higher maximum delay values are indicative of acceptance of
422 longer imposed delays. Maximum delay values were analyzed using a 2 x 2 repeated measures
423 ANOVA with the within-subject factors of risk Price (Free versus \$125) and Delay Framing (Delay
424 to Test versus Delay to Result).

425

426 **Results**

427 *Experiment 4: Sensitivity of Diagnostic Testing to Cost*

428 Demand for a diagnostic test systematically decreased with increases in cost with the
429 exponential demand model describing aggregate demand well (Figure 4; $R^2 = 0.99$). The group
430 average demand curve indicated an analytical P_{\max} value of \$207 indicating the price at which the
431 demand curve shifts from inelastic or sub-proportional sensitivity of consumption to price to elastic
432 or super-proportional sensitivity of consumption to price. Evaluation of individual demand curve
433 values indicated that greater engagement in hand washing was significantly associated with
434 greater demand when free, $r = .23$, $p = .009$, and maximum expenditure for a test, $r = .21$, $p =$
435 $.015$. Similarly, greater avoidance of face touching was significantly associated with greater
436 demand when free, $r = .23$, $p = .009$, and maximum expenditure for a test, $r = .19$, $p = .027$.

437 *Experiment 5: Delay to Test versus Delay to Result in COVID-19 Testing*

438 Assessment of aggregate discounting curves showed systematic reductions in testing
439 intentions with increases in delay for each condition (Figure 5). Tests of individual subject values
440 (crossover delay from yes to no testing intention) found significant main effects of Price, $F_{1,413} =$
441 523.8 , $p < .001$, and Delay Framing, $F_{1,413} = 23.1$, $p < .001$, and a Price x Delay Framing
442 interaction, $F_{1,413} = 30.4$, $p < .001$. Evaluation of this interaction indicated that longer delays were
443 tolerated when the delay was to receive a test rather than receive results when tests were free,
444 $t_{413} = 5.64$, $p < .001$, $d_z = 0.28$, but that there were no significant differences by framing when tests
445 had out-of-pocket costs, $t_{413} = 0.73$, $p = .47$, $d_z = 0.04$.

446 These findings are highlighted in differences for ED50 values (Figure 5 vertical lines)
447 summarizing the delay at which half the population is likely to procure a test. Specifically, when
448 participants had to pay \$125 for test, ED50s of approximately 1 day (23 and 24 hours) were
449 observed in both framing conditions. In contrast, when Free, the ED50 was 4.25 days longer (102
450 hours) for the shipping delay than results delay condition with lower sensitivity to delay in the
451 shipping delay condition.

452 **Discussion**

453 Experiments 4 and 5 collectively show that diagnostic testing is sensitive to factors
454 including testing cost and delay. Importantly, these data emphasize how delays imposed on
455 receiving test results may exert a particularly strong impact for discouraging testing, emphasizing
456 how rapid testing may improve testing rates even if a delay is imposed on getting the test. That
457 responding was more sensitive to delayed results than delayed testing is possibly explained by a
458 dominant response (i.e., getting a test) outcome (i.e., receiving a result) contingency at play and
459 how delays for this response-outcome contingency are exaggerated under a delayed results
460 scenario.

461 **Vaccination Intentions**

462 Recent emergency authorization of and attempts at distribution of vaccines for COVID-19
463 have highlighted challenges related to vaccine skepticism and the role of behavior change and
464 motivation as key steps for encouraging vaccine uptake. Experiment 6 evaluated demand for both
465 a COVID-19 vaccine and an influenza vaccine based on the efficacy of those vaccines. We used
466 an experimental vignette in which the participant was at a health care provider and could “bundle”
467 an additional vaccine with the one they were already receiving. Experiment 7 evaluated a choice
468 framing condition in which COVID-19 vaccination safety was framed positively or negatively.

469 **Methods**

470 *Experiment 6 (Sample 3)*

471 Participants read vignettes describing a scenario in which approved influenza and COVID-
472 19 vaccines were available. The instructions indicated these vaccines would be the only ones
473 available, that they would be free of cost, would have to be administered now, and were approved
474 by the FDA. Scenarios were presented to model going to a healthcare provider for one vaccine
475 and having an option to bundle another vaccine at that visit. Participants responded across a
476 series of efficacies defined as percentage reduction in influenza/COVID-19 symptom risk (100%
477 to 0% effective in 10% increments). Participants were randomized to complete different *choice*

478 *framing* conditions (between-subject). In an opt-in condition, the response option was preselected
479 as “No” and participants were required to change the selection to “Yes” if they wanted the vaccine
480 (n = 245). In an opt-out condition, the response option was preselected at “Yes” and participants
481 were required to change the selection to “No” if they wanted the vaccine (n = 252). All participants
482 also completed a version in which no response was preselected and were randomized to
483 complete this before or after the choice framed condition.

484 Group data were modeled using demand methods as in Experiment 4. Individual values
485 for minimum required efficacy for each vaccine task were calculated as the individual median
486 value between last accepted and first rejected vaccine efficacy. Individuals who rejected the
487 vaccine at all values were assigned a value of 100 and those accepting at all values were
488 assigned a value of 0. Higher minimum required efficacy values are indicative of a need for higher
489 vaccine efficacy for vaccine intention. Minimum required efficacy were first analyzed using a 2 x
490 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with the within-subject factors of risk Vaccine Type (COVID-19 and
491 Influenza), Response Type (Default versus No Default) and the between-subject factor of Framing
492 Condition (Opt-In versus Opt-Out). A secondary analysis was conducted with only the first framing
493 condition completed as a 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA with the within-subject factor of Vaccine Type
494 (COVID-19 versus Influenza) and Response Condition (No Default, Opt-In, and Opt-Out).

495 *Experiment 7 (Sample 4)*

496 Experiment 7 was conducted with a preregistration (<https://osf.io/56f2z>). Participants
497 completed demand tasks in which we varied *development timeline* (within-subject) as either a 7-
498 month (for late October 2020 delivery) or 12-month (for late March 2021 delivery) process to
499 model scenarios presented in news media at the time of data collection (September 2020).
500 Participants were randomized to a *safety framing* condition (between-subject) in which safety was
501 described using a positive framing (“95% of the scientific community declares the vaccine safe”;
502 n = 161) or a negative framing (“5% of the scientific community declares the vaccine unsafe”; n =

503 161). Assignment was stratified based on endorsement of receiving a flu vaccine in the past three
504 years to ensure balance in general vaccination behavior between the two conditions.

505 Group data were modeled using demand methods as in Experiment 4 and individual
506 required minimum efficacy calculated as in Experiment 6. Minimum required efficacy data were
507 first analyzed using a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with the within-subject factors of risk Development
508 Timeline (7-month versus 12-month) and the between-subject factor of Framing Condition
509 (Positive versus Negative Framing). A secondary analysis was conducted with only the first task
510 completed as the same 2 x 2 ANOVA with Development Timeline as a between-subjects factor.
511 A sensitivity analyses was also conducted including the covariates of age, gender, and
512 conservatism (Social and Economic Conservatism Scale) [50]. This analysis used a linear mixed
513 effect model including these covariates, the fixed effects of Development Timeline and Framing
514 Condition, and a random intercept term. A deviation from the preregistered analysis plan was
515 made for this sensitivity analyses because education was not collected in the survey, and
516 therefore, not available to include as a covariate.

517 **Results**

518 *Experiment 6: Opt-In and Opt-Out Procedures for COVID-19 and Influenza Vaccine Bundles*

519 Aggregate demand curves showed systematic decreases in demand for a vaccine with
520 decreases in efficacy (Figure 6). The exponential demand model described aggregate demand
521 well across each demand curve and allowed for estimation of vaccine coverage at a critical
522 threshold (e.g., 70% coverage) [51]. Analysis of individual cross-over efficacies (i.e., the efficacy
523 at which a participant went from intending to not intending vaccination) revealed a significant main
524 effect of Vaccine Type, $F_{1,495} = 39.3$, $p < .001$, reflecting vaccine acceptance at lower efficacies
525 for a COVID-19 vaccine than an influenza vaccine. Main effects and interactions involving the
526 framing condition were not significant, $p > .10$.

527 *Experiment 7: Development Timeline and Safety Framing for COVID-19 Vaccination*

528 Aggregate demand curves showed systematic decreases in demand for a vaccine with
529 decreases in efficacy across each condition (Figure 7). At an individual level, significant main
530 effects of Development Timeline, $F_{1,320} = 9.04$, $p = .003$, and Safety Framing, $F_{1,320} = 14.86$, $p <$
531 $.001$, were observed. These effects reflected acceptance of less effective vaccines under a
532 positive framing condition, $d = 0.33$, and when developed for longer, $d_z = 0.22$. Controlling for age,
533 gender, and political conservatism did not change the results of these findings. Evaluation of these
534 effects with only the first development time completed (i.e., a purely between-subject design)
535 indicated a similar main effect of Safety Framing, $F_{1,318} = 7.32$, $p = .007$, but found that the
536 Development Timeline effect was no longer significant, $F_{1,318} = 2.31$, $p = .13$. Post-hoc analysis of
537 this possible carryover effect indicated that the Development Timeline effect was statistically
538 significant for participants that completed the 12-month condition first, $t_{160} = 4.77$, $p < .001$, $d_z =$
539 0.38 , but not the 7-month condition first, $t_{160} = 0.73$, $p = .47$, $d_z = 0.06$.

540 **Discussion**

541 Experiments 6 and 7 found that vaccination intentions were systematically related to
542 efficacy, both for a COVID-19 vaccine and an influenza vaccine. Experiment 6 did not reveal a
543 significant effect of choice framing, which is possibly due to the online setting and limitations of
544 modeling these kinds of opt-in/opt-out procedures. A substantive framing effect for vaccine safety,
545 however, was observed such that intentions were lower under a negative than positive framing.
546 These findings are relevant in that news sources – even when presenting the same data – may
547 focus on either positive (% of scientists approve) or negative (% of scientist disapprove) framings
548 when conveying this information to its readership or viewership [for similar issues in climate
549 change messaging see 52]. The current findings show how such framings could adversely impact
550 the likelihood of obtaining a vaccine and ways in which public health messaging should be
551 optimized to avoid such biases.

552

553

General Discussion

554 The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasized how behavioral science is critical to informing
555 public health crisis management. In the current study, we sought to determine how behavioral
556 economic approaches developed from cognitive psychology and operant behavioral psychology
557 traditions can be integrated to address existing and emerging issues in public health – doing so
558 in a rapid and scalable manner. Adapting well validated methods from behavioral economic
559 discounting and demand frameworks, we evaluated behavioral mechanisms contributing to the
560 engagement in preventive health behaviors relevant to infectious disease transmission, namely
561 those associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. We also evaluated how framing manipulations
562 can alter decision-making in ways relevant to public health and policy implementation. These
563 findings collectively emphasize how merging behavioral economics methods can rapidly generate
564 empirical data to inform public health crisis management while retaining a strength informed by
565 foundational conceptual frameworks for health behavior change.

566 The present study advances behavioral science in several ways with each contribution
567 emphasizing its ability to address critical and acute public health crises that may not be amenable
568 to prototypical experimental methods. First, this study translates operant discounting and demand
569 methods to simulate decision-making in an uncommon context for which an individual has no
570 direct experience. The COVID-19 pandemic is a public health crisis, the likes of which have never
571 been experienced by anyone alive today. Although hypothetical discounting and demand tasks
572 are presumed to reflect verbal behavior shaped by histories of consequences in similar choice
573 contexts [53, 54], some decisions lack formal similarity with actual experience. Decisions
574 regarding social isolation, diagnostic testing, or vaccinations for an infectious disease pandemic
575 are relatively novel and require participants to consider generalized decision-making repertoires,
576 such as deciding to take precautions in avoiding individuals with the common cold or influenza
577 virus. A small, but growing, literature suggests that these kinds of tests of novel or as-yet-
578 unexperienced contexts can nonetheless significantly relate to real-world behavior of interest. For

579 example, in the public health domain, studies on sexual discounting relate to HIV-risk behavior
580 [55, 56] and simulated purchasing of a novel fake ID relate to experienced negative alcohol
581 outcomes in underage drinkers [57]. Moreover, there is evidence that tasks such as hypothetical
582 sexual discounting [58] or hypothetical purchase tasks for drugs [59, 60] significantly predict
583 domain-specific outcomes or behavior beyond general monetary discounting or demand for
584 common commodities. The current study adds to this literature while extending to the study of
585 infectious disease and pandemic response.

586 Second, the data provided by this approach permits safe modeling of potential public
587 health policies. Hursh [20] previously outlined proposed strategies for how behavioral economics
588 can inform health policy, suggesting the quantification of commodity valuation in behavioral
589 economic analyses lend well to informing policy-making. Specifically, experimental research
590 permits controlled and accurate measurement, which may lend new behavioral insights into
591 econometric analyses of market behavior. This information may then inform the creation of
592 experimental model projects to measure scalable policy-level interventions at the community-
593 level. Successful results thereby lead to policy formation, implementation, and evaluation; if there
594 are failures, such results form a feedback loop wherein behavioral scientists can seek to modify
595 procedures and policies to re-evaluate such effects. Related work in psychology and related fields
596 has harnessed hypothetical discounting and demand techniques to provide novel lenses by which
597 to view population-level effects for hard-to-study behavioral questions – from a direct operant
598 perspective, at least – such as tornado warnings [61], incremental cigarette taxation [27], texting-
599 while-driving interventions [62], and happy-hour pricing for alcohol [63]; such findings speak
600 directly to potential population-level decisions and have an added benefit of providing accurate
601 quantitative markers for policy development and targets [20, 22, 23].

602 Finally, this study has consequences for understanding behavioral phenomena directly
603 concerning the spread of COVID-19: social distancing, face mask use, testing procurement, and
604 vaccination intentions. Across several examples, we found that framing manipulations impacted

605 the pattern of response on the discounting and demand tasks used. Precisely, framing of high
606 risk social activities increased sensitivity to risk for social distancing, framing delay as a delay to
607 result increased sensitivity to delay for test procurement, and framing vaccine safety in a negative
608 valence increased sensitivity to efficacy (thereby more steeply reducing vaccine acceptance). The
609 use of simulated discounting and demand tasks, furthermore, provided a substantive benefit over
610 traditional single discrete-choice forms of assessment (e.g., “Would you get a COVID-19 test?).
611 Such single discrete-choice methods fail to isolate and control for factors that may contribute to
612 differences observed between and within-people (e.g., differences in hypothesized delays, risk,
613 efficacy, or safety). Responding under such methods may therefore be attributable to any of these
614 uncontrolled factors with differing implications for public policy based on the specific
615 mechanism(s) impacted.

616 These contributions should be considered within the limitations of this study. For one, we
617 restricted sampling to a crowdsourced platform. An extensive body of literature suggests the
618 reliability and validity of data collected through crowdsourced platforms is favorable in
619 comparisons to other convenience methods like undergraduate student pools [64, 65].
620 Nevertheless, crowdsourcing approaches are still convenience sampling and present some bias
621 such that sampling favors towards younger participants [64]. Crowdsourcing in this context served
622 as an ideal data collection method for generating a large and geographically diverse sample in
623 the face of a rapidly changing public health context in which in-person study was challenging, if
624 not impossible, for this purpose. Some tasks were also evaluated in the same sample of
625 participants as noted for each analysis throughout. A relatively high number of participants
626 displayed non-systematic responding, which may be related to the use of a comparably low prior
627 task approval rate and/or the use of a one-step rather than two-step (i.e., screener and survey)
628 sampling approach [66-68]. Relevant to the specific contributions of these data for COVID-19 and
629 related pandemic responses, our findings are potentially limited by the use of a between-subject
630 manipulation, specific features of the vignette, and collection at a single point in time. Decisions

631 on what was a between- and within-subject manipulation came after careful consideration to
632 maximize a preference for within-subject designs while recognizing design options likely to result
633 in substantive carry-over bias. These findings are also limited to the hypothetical scenarios used
634 and it is likely that variations of these scenarios would produce further variations in behavior [69-
635 71]. Although the tasks presented were hypothetical in nature, extensive work have found
636 hypothetical versions of these tasks are a reasonable proxy for procedures using real
637 consequences [32, 72-75]. The flexibility of these procedures and ability to evaluate hypothetical
638 decision-making for which incentivized responding is either unpractical or unethical is a major
639 strength insofar as they afford the opportunity to evaluate and compare in short succession a
640 variety of potential contexts relevant to public health response.

641 The COVID-19 epidemic has challenged a spectrum of sciences to reconsider their ability
642 to quickly translate methods to understand, model, and mitigate contagion. The field of behavioral
643 and decision-making science has a rich and productive history addressing issues of societal
644 importance including disease prevention and health promotion. Behavioral economics is,
645 perhaps, a prime aspect of how behavioral science can leverage its methods toward this end,
646 given its ability to address difficult-to-measure behavior and quantify outcomes that are readily
647 translatable to public health researchers and officials. Here we show how merging conceptual
648 ideas from a cognitive and operant psychology behavioral economics using both discounting and
649 demand methods to provide novel understanding to behavioral components of a global pandemic
650 (COVID-19). Ultimately, these data provide an example of the adaptability and translational utility
651 of behavioral economics when current and future public health crises necessitate behavioral
652 insight and solutions.

653

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
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
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827 **Figure 1. Probability Discounting of Social Event Attendance by Symptom Framing**

828 **(Experiment 1).** Plotted are group discounting curves by severity (mild = blue circles; severe =
829 red circles) and label type (no label = open circles, dotted line; label = closed circles, solid line).

830 Curves are plotted using the hyperbolic discounting equation including a non-linear scaling
831 parameter [38].

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835 **Figure 2. Probability Discounting of Social Event Attendance by Risk Framing (Experiment**


836 **2).** Plotted are group discounting curves by risk (low risk activity = blue circles; high risk activity =

837 red circles) and label type (no label = open circles, dotted line; label = closed circles, solid line).


838 Curves are plotted using the hyperbolic discounting equation including a non-linear scaling

839 parameter [38].

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 843 **Figure 3. Social Discounting for Face Mask Use and Monetary Outcomes.** Plotted are group
 844 discounting curves for money (top panel) and face mask use (bottom panels). Three face mask
 845 use conditions are presented: asymptomatic (red open circles, dotted line), was symptomatic
 846 without a COVID-19 test (red open circles, dotted line), and 3) was symptomatic with a positive
 847 COVID-19 test (red closed circles, solid line). Curves are plotted using the hyperbolic discounting
 848 equation including a non-linear scaling parameter [38]. S = stranger.
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


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852 **Figure 4. Behavioral Economic Demand for Diagnostic Testing (Experiment 4).** Plotted are
853 group mean data and individual data points for behavioral economic demand of diagnostic testing
854 recorded on the hypothetical purchase task. Demand curve data are plotted using the exponential
855 demand function [48]. The dotted line is the price representing shifts from inelastic or price
856 insensitive to elasticity or price sensitive demand (P_{max}).

857



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859 **Figure 5. Delay Discounting of COVID-19 Diagnostic Testing by Delay Type and Cost**

860 **(Experiment 5).** Plotted are group discounting curves by delay type (delay to receiving a test with


861 immediate feedback = red circles; delay to receiving results from an immediate test = blue circles)

862 and cost (Free = open circles, dotted lines; \$125; closed circles, solid lines). Curves are plotted

863 using the hyperbolic discounting equation including a non-linear scaling parameter [38]. Vertical

864 lines are estimated ED50 or the delay at which half of the population is likely to procure a test.

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
868 **Figure 6. Vaccine Acceptance by Efficacy, Type, and Choice Framing.** Plotted are group

869 discounting curves by vaccine type (COVID-19 = red; flu = blue). Demand curve data are plotted

870 using the exponential demand function [48]. Vertical lines plot the efficacy needed to reach a

871 critical coverage of 70%.

872



873

874

875 **Figure 7. COVID-19 Vaccine Acceptance by Development Timeline and Safety Framing.**

876 Plotted are group discounting curves by safety framing (positive = red; negative = blue). Demand

877 curve data are plotted using the exponential demand function [48].