

PUBLIC HEALTH

Socioeconomic and temporal heterogeneity in SARS-CoV-2 exposure and disease in England from May 2020 to February 2023

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The impact of COVID-19 varied significantly by deprivation, ethnicity, and policy measures. We analyzed individual-level data on 12,310,485 first SARS-CoV-2 Pillar 2–PCR-confirmed infections, 439,083 hospitalizations, 107,823 deaths, and vaccination records in England from May 2020 to February 2022. Poisson regression models adjusted for demographic and temporal factors showed higher incidence rate ratios (IRRs) for severe outcomes in the most deprived areas compared to the least. We note higher IRRs for severe outcomes for all non-white relative to white ethnicities. The magnitude of IRRs for both deprivation and ethnicities declined from the wild-type to the omicron periods for severe outcomes. For infections, we observed IRRs above one for non-white ethnicities during the wild-type and alpha periods. Vaccination significantly reduced risks across all groups. For severe outcomes, preexisting health inequalities led to large and persistent disparities. For infections, measures must be structured with ethnicity and deprivation in mind early in a pandemic.

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INTRODUCTION

By December 2023, the COVID-19 pandemic had caused more than 20.5 million confirmed cases and more than 175,000 deaths in England (1, 2). The pandemic did not affect individuals equally; individual-based studies have explored the links between deprivation, ethnicity, and other factors on health outcomes to varying levels (3–8).

Past studies have explored heterogeneity in risk in England (9, 10) and Scotland (11) using the index of multiple deprivation (IMD) (12) at the lower-tier local authority (LTLA) level. LTLAs are areas where local government provides services, and the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) provides an extensive set of data, including population age distribution, ethnicity, and measures of deprivation. These measures vary substantially across LTLAs, as did the number of polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-confirmed infections, hospitalizations, and deaths reported across England over the course of the pandemic (Fig. 1). In this study, we aim to characterize this heterogeneity in COVID-19 outcomes and how it evolved during the pandemic (1, 13, 14). Similar studies on the impact of socioeconomic heterogeneities on severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections have been conducted in France (15) and Germany (16) and on outcomes in the USA (17).

SARS-CoV-2 testing in England (18) had four “pillars”: PCR testing for health and care workers and individuals with clinical needs (Pillar 1), freely available PCR (and later antigen) testing for the general population (Pillar 2), serology (Pillar 3), and targeted surveillance (Pillar 4). Pillar 2 testing increased significantly from 10 May 2020, and most testing was halted on 27 February 2022 with the introduction of the “Living with COVID” strategy (19) (see Materials and Methods and section C.4).

We additionally investigate vaccine effectiveness (VE) in the postvaccination period and the impact of vaccination on risk heterogeneity. The SARS-CoV-2 immunization program in England was one of the most rapid globally, with 89.9% of the adult population aged 20 or over receiving at least one dose and 86.6% receiving at least two doses by 27 February 2022 (20). Test-negative case-control studies (TNCCs) were the standard epidemiological tool for evaluating SARS-CoV-2 VE during the pandemic (21–23), although TNCCs can potentially suffer from biases (24). The main alternative to TNCCs used for VE estimation during the COVID-19 pandemic is large population observational cohort studies that use individual-level health care and surveillance data linked to vaccination status (25–28). Last, we investigate how risk heterogeneity was modified by the public health measures (“restrictions”) in force during the pandemic (see Materials and Methods and section C.3) (1, 14).

RESULTS

We present the breakdown of the population of England [56,427,863 people in England (Census 2021), 56,417,353 are in our synthetic population, and 56,344,410 are included in the analysis] in Tables 1 and 2, including the number of first recorded PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections (12,310,485) and associated hospitalizations (439,083) or deaths (107,823) linked to that first recorded infection from the week beginning 10 May 2020 (isoweek 18) to 27 February 2022 (isoweek 8) confirmed by a Pillar 2 PCR-positive test. These 95 weeks cover the full period for which population-wide testing was available.

We examined a total of 360 model variants, which varied by the covariates and interactions included (see section A.2 for covariate definitions considered): age, definition of deprivation, regional disaggregation, ethnicity disaggregation, and which interaction terms to include in the model. Figures S2 to S4 list the top 88 selected models for each outcome of interest. Restriction levels are based on individual policy measures, such as school closure or gathering restrictions, at each time point (sections A and C.3 and

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


Fig. 1. Maps of the population of England at the LTLA level between 10 May 2020 and 27 February 2022. (A) IMD quintile by LTLA, (B) percentage of non-white population within the LTLA by LTLA, (C) percentage of individuals vaccinated with at least two doses for all ages, (D) percentage of positive Pillar 2 PCR-confirmed first recorded cases by LTLA, (E) percentage of hospitalization by LTLA, and (F) percentage deaths by LTLA.

Table 1. Population for England with numbers of first recorded Pillar 2 PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2, hospitalizations, and deaths in England between 10 May 2020 and 27 February 2022. Population breakdown by sex, age, region, deprivation, and ethnicity.

Variable	Category	<i>n</i>	Person-days at risk	Cases (Pillar 2 PCR)	Hospitalizations	Deaths
Sex	Female	28,685,081	17,345,400,702	6,517,293	222,651	49,389
	Male	27,659,329	16,807,116,305	5,793,192	216,432	58,434
Age	Under 40	28,863,746	17,378,043,704	7,986,079	97,480	1246
	40–49	7,126,246	4,298,749,448	1,832,839	40,577	2211
	50–59	7,574,556	4,665,987,550	1,400,202	56,807	5989
	60–69	5,734,391	3,547,069,498	635,915	61,340	12,753
	70–79	4,559,170	2,762,316,669	284,970	79,674	26,508
	Above 80	2,486,301	1,500,350,138	170,480	103,205	59,116
Region	East Midlands	4,842,841	2,923,964,911	1,086,738	41,310	10,572
	East of England	6,278,538	3,821,826,715	1,296,183	43,192	12,411
	London	8,837,013	5,309,194,394	1,937,334	67,441	12,285
	North East	2,651,524	1,599,576,314	638,786	26,268	6407
	North West	7,420,784	4,455,050,061	1,849,257	78,606	19,004
	South East	9,264,652	5,678,938,650	1,890,892	59,760	16,179
	South West	5,680,938	3,491,446,658	1,050,950	28,731	7439
	West Midlands	5,894,953	3,564,918,434	1,296,108	48,408	12,840
	Yorkshire and the Humber	5,473,167	3,307,600,870	1,264,237	45,367	10,686
IMD quintile	IMD1	7,674,923	4,699,769,599	1,569,158	44,322	11,696
	IMD2	9,445,584	5,762,949,346	1,921,063	63,003	16,629
	IMD3	10,876,412	6,615,134,330	2,302,369	78,105	20,659
	IMD4	11,801,363	7,137,336,955	2,586,990	95,823	22,278
	IMD5	16,546,128	9,937,326,777	3,930,905	157,830	36,561
Ethnicity	Asian (other)	1,548,640	913,540,586	322,769	9381	1209
	Black	2,307,809	1,356,279,568	601,101	23,642	3152
	Mixed/other	2,698,916	1,643,470,031	395,571	11,892	1143
	South Asian	4,058,419	2,381,064,042	984,164	33,238	5381
	White	45,730,626	27,858,162,780	10,006,880	360,930	96,938

Table 2. Population for England with numbers of first recorded Pillar 2 PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2, hospitalizations, and deaths in England between 10 May 2020 and 27 February 2022. Breakdown by vaccination status for categories with more than 200,000 doses at the end of the study period (*n* is the count of individuals in this category at the end of the study period, person-days at risk, and counts of Pillar 2 PCR-positive cases, hospitalizations, and deaths are over the entire study period). Vaccination status categories are by vaccination type (adenovirus or mRNA), vaccine dose, and time since vaccination. The whole table is available in fig. S12. w, weeks; d, days.

Variable	Category	<i>n</i>	Person-days at risk	Cases (Pillar 2 PCR)	Hospitalizations	Deaths
Vaccination status	Not vaccinated	12,524,706	21,652,863,421	7,030,900	289,451	80,601
	First dose > 3 w, adenovirus	343,341	1,168,792,975	97,771	6782	2419
	Second dose over 18 w, adenovirus	2,781,388	1,561,139,076	1,068,220	33,061	5879
	Booster dose < 2 w, adenovirus	7,434,225	772,914,618	428,088	10,506	966
	Booster dose > 2 w, adenovirus	9,188,109	332,906,007	137,555	11,487	1522
	Booster over 18 w, adenovirus	508,392	12,907,790	5,238	661	148
	First dose < 21 d, mRNA	253,760	438,532,528	210,475	7628	2364
	First dose > 3 w, mRNA	2,462,228	1,187,931,423	542,990	8482	2388
	Second dose < 2 w, mRNA	331,407	234,175,466	47,748	627	66
	Second dose > 2 w, mRNA	1,206,396	829,053,400	113,626	1686	132
	Second dose 10–18 w, mRNA	967,000	919,526,650	373,924	4419	398
	Second dose over 18 w, mRNA	4,066,262	1,129,558,164	751,049	18,615	3765
	Booster 10–18 w, mRNA	301,068	178,424,050	168,635	1738	151
	Booster dose < 2 w, mRNA	6,054,894	586,137,083	294,073	7356	770
	Booster dose > 2 w, mRNA	5,512,367	326,242,322	207,494	14,032	1809
	Booster over 18 w, mRNA	1,954,193	43,244,152	16,974	2059	385

figs. S7 to S9). We found that less granular age categories had better 10-fold cross-validation performance (under 40s, 10-year age bands up to 70, single group for 80+). Similarly, coarse spatial disaggregation [by National Health Service (NHS) region of England] was favored, and deprivation was quantified by IMD quintiles. We disaggregated ethnicity into five groups as the results were very similar for the range of ethnicity categorizations examined. The preferred model included covariates for sex, age, NHS region, vaccine status, IMD quintile, ethnicity, and restriction level. We compared the estimates from the preferred model against the data and found a good qualitative fit examining marginal incidence rate ratios (IRRs) (fig. S1).

We investigated the impact of overdispersion for each outcome of interest using negative binomial regression models. For Pillar 2 PCR-confirmed cases, we found a moderate level of overdispersion ($k = 0.33$) during the wild-type period. We found that either very high values of k (indicating marginal overdispersion) or the Poisson model was preferred for all other periods. For hospitalization and death outcomes, the Poisson model was always preferred (section A and table S1).

Figure 2 presents the modeled IRRs for deprivation and ethnicity categories from the preferred model for each endpoint and by

period defined by variant dominance. IRRs for sex, age, and region are presented in fig. S13.

When we consider the entire period (May 2020 to February 2022), the highest IMD quintile, corresponding to the most deprived LTLAs, has an IRR (relative to the least deprived IMD quintile) of 1.64 [95% confidence interval (CI), 1.60 to 1.67] for death as the outcome, 1.53 (95% CI, 1.51 to 1.55) for hospitalization, and 1.02 (95% CI, 1.02 to 1.02) for a positive Pillar 2 PCR test. For the Pillar 2 positive test outcome, we observed substantial differences between periods defined by variant dominance. The biggest differences were observed for the Alpha variant with an IRR (for the highest quintile relative to the lowest) for that endpoint of 1.45 (95% CI, 1.45 to 1.46).

For deaths, over the entire study period, South Asian ethnicity had an IRR of 1.63 (95% CI, 1.59 to 1.68), Asian (other) ethnicity an IRR of 1.24 (95% CI, 1.17 to 1.32), and Black ethnicity an IRR of 1.49 (95% CI, 1.43 to 1.54), with white ethnicity as the reference. For hospitalization, over the entire study period, South Asian ethnicity had an IRR of 1.42 (95% CI, 1.40 to 1.44), Asian (other) ethnicity an IRR of 1.17 (95% CI, 1.15 to 1.20), and Black ethnicity an IRR of 1.56 (95% CI, 1.53 to 1.58). Using Pillar 2 PCR-positive tests as the




Fig. 2. Estimated deprivation and ethnicity IRRs. Estimated IRRs for (A) deprivation and (B) ethnicity covariates from preferred models. Deprivation was categorized by quintiles of the IMD score defined at the LTLA level (results for subcomponents are available in the Supplementary Materials), with the first (least deprived) quintile (IMD1) being the reference group (IRR = 1). Results are shown for the whole pandemic (“All”: test dates between May 2020 and February 2022) and for the time intervals within that period where specific viral variants dominated (see the Supplementary Materials for details). WT, wild type (pre-December 2020).

endpoint, over the entire study period, South Asian ethnicity had an IRR of 0.89 (95% CI, 0.88 to 0.89), Asian (other) ethnicity an IRR of 0.78 (95% CI, 0.78 to 0.79), and Black ethnicity an IRR of 0.89 (95% CI, 0.89 to 0.90). The IRRs for mixed/other ethnicity are reported in table S4.

Ethnicity differences declined for the Pillar 2 PCR-positive test endpoint throughout the pandemic. IRR for Pillar 2 PCR-positive cases declines for all non-white ethnicities (relative to white) over time, with $IRR_{WT} > IRR_{Alpha} > IRR_{Delta}$. During the Omicron period, non-white IRRs were broadly similar to those during the Delta period but typically slightly above IRR_{Delta} . For death, we observed a declining IRR over time for South Asian ethnicity, with IRR_{WT} , IRR_{Alpha} , and IRR_{Delta} exhibiting overlapping CIs but $IRR_{Omicron}$ statistically significantly lower. For hospitalization, we observed a declining IRR over time for South Asian ethnicity, with IRR_{WT} , IRR_{Alpha} , IRR_{Delta} , and $IRR_{Omicron}$ statistically significantly lower than in the previous period. Other Asian ethnicities had high IRRs (overlapping CIs) for the WT and Alpha periods and significantly lower IRRs for Delta and Omicron. Black ethnicities exhibited high IRRs up to Omicron in the range of 1.38 to 1.45 for death and of 1.16 to 1.87 for the entire period for hospitalization.

Results for deprivation were consistent for severe outcomes (hospitalization and death) throughout the pandemic, with IRRs monotonically increasing as deprivation increased, but with IRRs during the Omicron period lower than other periods. This result also applied to a more granular representation of deprivation, using deciles (fig. S15) and for the different subcomponents of the IMD measure (figs. S22 to S28). For Pillar 2 PCR-positive cases, we observed an increasing IRR with increasing deprivation for the WT and Alpha periods, but not for the Delta and Omicron periods. This resulted in the IRR for the whole period being close to 1. This result was consistent with IMD deciles and the subcomponents of the IMD index.

Figure 3 presents our VE estimates (section B.3 and table S3) for our preferred model. We obtain a VE (defined as $1 - IRR$) estimate for mRNA vaccines ranging from 86.8% (over 18 weeks after the second dose; 95% CI, 86.2 to 87.3) to 97.1% (less than 2 weeks after the booster dose; 95% CI, 96.6 to 97.6) for protection against death for individuals with at least two doses, from 84.8% (over 18 weeks after second dose; 95% CI, 84.5 to 85.0) to 93.3% (2 to 10 weeks after booster dose; 95% CI, 93.1 to 93.5) against hospitalization, and from 30.4% (over 18 weeks after booster dose; 95% CI, 29.3 to 31.5) to 84.5% (2 to 10 weeks after second dose; 95% CI, 84.4 to 84.6) against Pillar 2 PCR-positive confirmed infections for the full study period.

For adenovirus-based vaccines, we estimated VE for individuals with at least two doses, ranging from 77.2% (over 18 weeks after second dose; 95% CI, 76.2 to 78) to 95.9% (less than 2 weeks after booster dose; 95% CI, 95.3 to 96.5) for protection against death, from 78.5% (over 18 weeks after second dose; 95% CI, 78.2 to 78.8) to 94.1% (2 to 10 weeks after booster dose; 95% CI, 94.0 to 94.3) against hospitalization, and from 29.6% (over 18 weeks after booster dose; 95% CI, 27.6 to 31.5) to 68.5% (2 to 10 weeks after second dose; 95% CI, 68.3 to 68.6) against Pillar 2 PCR-positive confirmed infections for the full study period.

We found that VE was consistently lower for the Omicron period. There was little to no difference in VE estimates for severe outcomes for the Alpha and Delta time periods.

We present the estimated VE results for all variants, vaccine status, and vaccine types in table S3 with their associated 95% CIs. The CIs are narrow due to the large number of events observed (Table 2); CIs are wider for the variant period-specific estimates. A comparison with previous VE estimates is included in section D.2.

Figure 4 shows the estimated VE results obtained from an extension of the preferred model, which included an additional interaction term between vaccine status and IMD quintile. Panel (A) presents results for the period when Delta was the dominant variant,




Fig. 3. Vaccine effectiveness (VE = 1-IRR) for different vaccination statuses with not vaccinated as the reference group (IRR = 1/VE = 0). Results are shown for the whole pandemic ("All"; test dates between May 2020 and February 2022) and for the time intervals within that period where specific viral variants dominated (see the Supplementary Materials for details). Results for the second dose and booster dose categories are displayed for mRNA and adenovirus vaccines (all other results are in table S3 and fig. S14). WT, wild type (pre-December 2020). w, weeks.




Fig. 4. Vaccine effectiveness (VE = 1-IRR) for the preferred model with an additional interaction term for vaccine status and IMD, with not vaccinated as the reference group (IRR = 1/VE = 0). Results are shown for the Delta period (A) and Omicron period (B), and results for the second dose and booster dose categories are displayed for mRNA and adenovirus. w, weeks.

while panel (B) covers Omicron. For deaths and hospitalizations, we did not observe significant differences in VE between IMD quintiles, except for the period over 18 weeks post-second dose during the Delta phase for deaths, where there was a tendency for the least deprived areas (IMD 1 and 2) to have lower VE than the more deprived areas (IMD 4 and 5).

For PCR-confirmed infections, we found different results for the Delta and Omicron periods. During Delta, we typically observed the ordering of IMD quintiles was higher VE for less deprived areas than more deprived areas, particularly less than 18 weeks since the second dose. VE estimates cluster together for over 18 weeks since the second and booster doses. For Omicron, we observed little variability in VE by IMD for second and booster doses, but VE estimates were higher for less deprived areas. The exception is for over 18 weeks

since the booster dose, for which we observed higher VE for more deprived areas. Results for IRRs of all covariates for the model with an interaction term between vaccine status and IMD quintile are presented in fig. S19 and for vaccine status and ethnicity in fig. S20.

Figure 5 shows the estimated IRRs for the restriction level covariate for our preferred model. The IRRs for restriction levels were robust to regional resolution, up to and including the LTLA level (figs. S17 and S18). We estimated the IRR for restriction level over the full study period of 1.14 (95% CI, 1.12 to 1.15) for deaths, 1.15 (95% CI, 1.14 to 1.16) for hospitalization, and 1.17 (95% CI, 1.17 to 1.17) for Pillar 2 PCR-positive cases. These estimates indicate that periods of high levels of public health restrictions were associated with higher levels of risk than periods where restriction levels were lower. The estimated IRR for restriction level for the WT and




Fig. 5. Estimated IRRs for restriction levels. Results are shown for the whole pandemic (“All”: test dates between May 2020 and February 2022) and for the time intervals within that period where specific viral variants dominated (see the Supplementary Materials for details). Restriction level is a numeric covariate in the model.

Alpha periods was lower for deaths and hospitalization than for the full-time period, which includes longer time intervals with no restrictions. However, for Pillar 2 PCR-confirmed infections, we found that the IRR for restriction level was higher during the WT period and lower for the Alpha period than for the full-time period (Fig. 5). The IRRs for the Delta and Omicron periods are one, as no substantial restrictions were in place over those periods.

DISCUSSION

We considered the impact of sex, age, region, deprivation, level of restrictions, and ethnicity on the relative risk of a SARS-CoV-2 Pillar 2 PCR-positive first recorded infection, hospitalization, or death. Our proposed model was selected to provide a good fit across all three outcomes of interest. Our results extend previous work on the impact of deprivation (5) and evidence risk heterogeneity by ethnicity in England (4, 6, 8) and globally (7, 17).

We find that modeling overdispersion for Pillar 2 PCR-positive cases was necessary for the wild-type period, consistent with (13), and the value for the overdispersion that we find aligns with other estimates outside China (29, 30). We did not find overdispersion to be present for severe outcomes, and the Poisson model provides the best fit to the data. Although Pillar 2 PCR tests were available widely, this indicates that some groups, defined by higher levels of deprivation or non-white ethnicity, may have accessed testing less, leading to the observed overdispersion. This was less likely to be the case for more severe outcomes as testing would be more likely conducted due to the more severe nature of the infection.

The differences in IRRs we observe by outcome (PCR-confirmed infection, hospitalization, or death) indicate a difference between severe outcomes and infections. For severe outcomes, we observed a significant risk heterogeneity by age, with older age groups at higher risks than younger age groups at an exponential rate (fig. S13B) consistent with the variation of the infection fatality ratio by age in the pre-vaccination era (31). Increased risk was also positively associated with higher levels of deprivation (Fig. 2A), and the difference between the most deprived quintile of LTLAs and the least deprived quintile was significant for all periods considered. Similarly, we found that non-white ethnicities were at increased risk.

For Pillar 2 PCR-positive cases, the picture is more nuanced. We observed that the differences in risk between age groups were of a similar magnitude as the large differences that we observed for severe outcomes. These differences are consistent with past studies and may reflect age-specific self-protective behaviors (32) and/or variation in contact rates [fig. S8, (33)]. For deprivation and ethnicity, risk heterogeneity was similar in trends as for more severe outcomes, but

the magnitude of differences was less. The results for Pillar 2 PCR-positive cases were consistent with other studies (32, 34).

For severe outcomes, we observed less variation in deprivation- or ethnicity-related risk differences across the course of the pandemic, pointing to existing health inequalities driving the strong association between deprivation, ethnicity, and risk of severe outcomes. This held consistently for all subcomponents of the IMD, except for the living environment component, and particularly strongly for the income, employment, health, and education sub-components (figs. S22 to S28). This observation is consistent with known socioeconomic and ethnic disparities in the UK for type 2 diabetes (35), which is a known risk factor for severe SARS-CoV-2 infection outcomes. We observed a high IRR for South Asian ethnicity, for both severe outcomes and infections, which reduced over time (Fig. 2B), perhaps suggesting the metabolic component impacting outcomes being reduced for omicron and delta as individuals of South Asian ethnicity are at higher risk of metabolic disease (36).

We assessed VE, and our results broadly align with previously published VE estimates for England by the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) (21) for similar periods and VE definitions. We find VE for the mRNA vaccines is consistent with UKHSA estimates of 88.0% (95% CI, 85.3 to 90.1) for two doses of BNT162b2 for infections for persons with the Delta variant. Similarly, we find VE for the adenovirus vaccines is in line with UKHSA estimates of 67.0% (95% CI, 61.3 to 71.8) for persons with two doses of the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine. For the Omicron variant, estimates vary more widely (37) with VE against hospitalization, ranging from 50.5 to 89.2%, broadly consistent with 67.8 to 92.4% from the literature. Similarly, VE against Pillar 2 PCR-confirmed infection ranging from 17 to 69.5% compared to 11.7 to 75.3% in the literature. We note that we only consider the first recorded infections for the Omicron period, which may bias our VE estimates to be higher, which is offset by our longer study period.

We considered VE stratified by deprivation (Fig. 4). For Pillar 2 infections, observed differences in VE may be explained by differences in the propensity to seek testing, which was associated with both deprivation level and vaccination status. Later in the pandemic, the propensity to seek testing was substantially lower in the most deprived areas than the least deprived (38). Higher VE for the least deprived areas might also be due to higher levels of infection-induced immunity in more deprived areas; if mild infections were less likely to be detected in more deprived areas, then the unvaccinated group would have higher immunity levels, resulting in lower VE estimates for the most deprived IMD quintile.

The policy implications of our study are that both protective and support measures need to be structured with ethnicity and deprivation

in mind, particularly in the early stages of a pandemic. Deprivation had a particularly significant impact during the Alpha variant era for PCR-confirmed infections. For ethnicity, we observed a reduction in IRRs as the pandemic progressed (Fig. 3). This suggests that more deprived areas were less able to isolate effectively, potentially due to work, during heightened public health restrictions. Ethnic minorities were more likely to work in occupations where workplace attendance continued even during lockdowns and also had less access to savings (39), potentially exposing them to a higher risk of community transmission. This is particularly true for Bangladeshi and Pakistani men working in the hospitality, leisure, and transport sectors. South Asian and African-Black men are also overrepresented in health and social care roles in England, potentially leading to higher levels of infection risk during the pandemic (39).

Considering the impact of the public health restriction level, we found IRRs > 1 for all outcomes in the wild-type and Alpha periods. Restrictions were highest during periods of high hospitalization and death incidence (fig. S10). The higher IRR for deaths during Alpha, relative to wild type, was consistent with the hospitalization fatality ratio being higher for Alpha than wild type (40). The IRR for deaths over the entire study period was comparable to the IRR for deaths during Alpha, suggesting that vaccination during Delta and Omicron, both periods of low to no restrictions, contributed to lower risk relative to wild type and Alpha. We find an IRR greater than one for hospitalizations but higher IRRs during wild type than Alpha. Similarly to deaths, we find the highest IRRs for the entire study period, pointing to the impact of vaccination in the second half of the study period. For Pillar 2 PCR cases, we observe an IRR greater than one, with IRRs highest during wild type. The IRRs for the full study period are lower than for wild type, as we observed substantial infections in both the unvaccinated and vaccinated groups during Omicron, a period with no restrictions. We note that this IRR for the entire study period would be lower if we had taken lateral flow tests (LFTs) into account.

This highlights the impact of the different timing of restrictions between regions, as we already account for week and region effects in the model. We note that other results were not sensitive to whether restrictions were included as a predictor in the model, and the IRRs for restrictions were robust to different resolutions of the regional covariate.

A limitation is that we only considered first recorded infections in this study and did attempt to investigate reinfections. However, we note that, up to November 2021, with the arrival of the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2, 93% of all recorded infections were first infections. In addition, we only quantify incidence among those seeking tests, not underlying infection incidence. This may affect our results if the propensity to seek a test varied by age, deprivation, or ethnicity, especially if underlying true infection incidence varied substantially by those variables. Hence, for the Pillar-2 test outcome, risk and VE differences between population groups/strata may reflect true exposure differences, differences in propensity to seek a test, or both. Such considerations do not affect the hospitalization and death endpoints, as testing was universal for anyone entering hospital for the large majority of the study period. For Omicron, we only consider PCR test results and do not include LFTs.

Future research priorities include a multi-outcome survival model to incorporate infections and severe outcomes in the same model. Integrating serology and infection prevalence data is essential in addressing questions such as the impact of preexisting

comorbidities on the risk heterogeneity by ethnicity or socioeconomic group.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Data sources

UKHSA maintains a single unified database of all SARS-CoV-2-positive test results in the country, categorized by pillar. The resulting database contains a hashed version of a unique identifier (NHS number), the age, sex, ethnic group, home LTLA, symptom status, testing pillar, and date of specimen for each positive case.

Second, linked to the case database by (hashed) NHS number, UKHSA maintains a database of all deaths within 28 days of a positive PCR test for SARS-CoV-2. This database records the date of death, the date of hospital admission, and how the death was identified (e.g., via hospital reporting, death registration, or both).

Third, two NHS data sources on hospitalization were also linked by NHS number to the case database: the Secondary Uses Service data on hospital episodes and the Emergency Care Data Set on attendance at Accident and Emergency departments. An individual in these datasets was classified as hospitalized with COVID-19 if they had a positive PCR test between 14 days before admission and the day before discharge, and they were classified as an inpatient.

Last, England maintains a national vaccination register, the National Immunization Management System (NIMS) (20). Every SARS-CoV-2 vaccine dose given in England is recorded at the time of vaccine administration. The anonymized version of the dataset used here contained a unique identifier (hashed NHS number), age, sex, ethnic group, LTLA, and administration date.

We extracted data from the versions of these databases with data up to 25 July 2023. Cases with a valid NHS number were then linked to the NIMS vaccination dataset. Where a match was found, the case was classified as having received a vaccine (either before or after testing positive). Cases with no matching immunization record were classified as having not been vaccinated. In our analysis, we used the vaccination status of an individual at the time of testing. The vaccination status includes the type of vaccine, number of doses received, and time since the last vaccination.

PCR testing (Pillars 1 and 2) was initially focused on key workers in the NHS, social care, and other sectors due to limited testing capacity. From May 2020, testing was widened to individuals with symptoms in the general public, and regular asymptomatic testing of individuals working in high-risk settings, such as care homes, was introduced (41). Individuals with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test were initially advised to self-isolate for 14 days, with subsequent rules being more complex and dependent on testing (fig. S9). Limited support was available to individuals who had to self-isolate, provided that they met several criteria, such as not being able to work at home and being in receipt of at least one state benefit (42).

Population denominator data were used to calculate the number of people who neither have received a vaccine nor have been diagnosed with SARS-CoV-2 infection. We used the Census 2021 population estimates generated by the ONS (43), stratified by age, sex, and LTLA (44). We made the simplifying assumption that, in the absence of COVID-19, the size of the English population and its age distribution would have been at a steady state for our analysis period consistent with the Census 2021 estimates. Individuals with missing information on sex, age, or residence location were not included in

the analysis. We use the IMD dataset released in 2019 (12) by the UK Ministry of Housing, Local Communities, and Local Government, aggregated at the LTLA level and its subcomponents (section B.4).

The public health and social restriction level was computed from ONS LTLA data up to December 2020 (45) and the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (1) (sections A and C.3). Several non-pharmaceutical interventions were used across the course of the pandemic, including containment, school closure, and stay-at-home orders. The “roadmap out of lockdown” policy in spring 2021 had three intermediate steps between national lockdown and no restrictions. We mapped the restrictions over time onto a five-level scale based on the individual policy measures in place at each time point (section C.3).

Statistical analysis

Survival models were used to estimate IRRs, an estimate of the increased risk of a particular outcome for a specific population group relative to a reference group. We used Poisson regression using an offset to adjust for person-days at risk to generate IRRs for the different strata of interest, proving a good approximation to continuous time survival models (section A) (46). Poisson regressions are more general than Cox proportional hazard survival models, allowing for nonproportional hazards. We investigated using negative binomial regressions to account for overdispersion. We parametrically captured variation by systematically examining evidence for interactions between covariates. We conducted model selection to identify the model which performed best across all three outcomes of interest (infection, hospitalization, and deaths) by considering the average Akaike’s information criterion and coefficient of determination (R^2) (47, 48) across the three respective models.

We included terms for sex, ethnic group, vaccination status, and IMD in all models. We used a categorical IMD variable, ranking LTLAs by average IMD score and then binning them into quintiles (1 being least deprived and 5 being most). The four other covariates included in all models were geographic region (either upper tier local authority or region), age (in 10-year bands with the last band being 85+ or 10-year bands with all individuals below 40 grouped and a maximum age of 80+), restriction levels (used as a parametric covariate as restriction levels changed several times, creating non-continuous time intervals), and epidemiological week. We examined all pairwise interactions between these three variables. The combined restriction covariate was also included in the preferred model.

All survival analyses used the test specimen date as the outcome event date. Three SARS-CoV-2-related events were defined: death within 28 days of any positive PCR test, hospitalization where the individual hospitalized tested PCR-positive between 14 days before admission and the day before discharge and was classed as an inpatient, and any PCR-confirmed infection within Pillar 2. We only consider the first recorded SARS-CoV-2 infection for all three events and associated hospitalizations and deaths.

We fitted the model for all three outcomes of interest. Individuals were treated as censored after a positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR test to exclude postprimary infections and avoid bias because the UK vaccination program excluded people from being vaccinated within 28 days of a positive test.

Because the UKHSA/NHS and ONS data used different ethnicity categories, we aggregated ethnicities into five groups that could be identified consistently across all datasets: white, South Asian, Asian (other), Black, and mixed/other to be consistent across two datasets

(section B.1). Details are provided in the Supplementary Materials (section B.1). The computation of age for each individual is outlined in section B.2.

We estimated VE accounting for the type of vaccine (mRNA or adenovirus based), time since vaccination, and outcome of interest (death, hospitalization, and Pillar 2 PCR-positive case). Details are provided in section B.3. By comparing now vaccinated individuals against people who would be vaccinated in the future, we controlled for potential differences in behavior and exposure risk between those who are never vaccinated and those who eventually are. Censoring after the first recorded positive test partially mitigated estimates from being affected by the accumulation of naturally acquired immunity in the population. To investigate how estimates varied over time, for example, in periods dominated by particular variants, we restricted model fitting to data from the specific period of interest (censoring individuals with positive tests before that period).

We used negative binomial regressions as a sensitivity analysis to explore overdispersion in the count data. In all figures, we display only results with a P value of 0.05 or less.

Interactions between VE and deprivation were examined by running the preferred model with an additional interaction term for vaccine status and IMD. Similarly, we investigated associations between VE and any ethnicity by running the preferred model with an interaction term for vaccine status and ethnicity.

All analyses were undertaken in R version 4.3.1 using the H2O.ai machine learning package version 3.42.0.2 (49), which offers high-performance parallelized algorithms for fitting general linear models to large datasets. A 32-core Intel-based server with 128-GB RAM was used to conduct the analyses.

Ethics statement

Surveillance of COVID-19 testing and vaccination is undertaken under Regulation 3 of The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 to collect confidential patient information (www.legislation.gov.uk/ukxi/2002/1438/regulation/3/made) under Sections 3(i) (a) to (c), 3(i)(d) (i) and (ii), and 3(3). Data were shared with the investigators as part of the UK’s emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic via the SPI-M subcommittee of the UK Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies. Ethics permission was sought for the study via Imperial College London’s standard ethical review processes, and the study was approved by the College’s Research Governance and Integrity Team (ICREC reference: 21IC6945).

Supplementary Materials

This PDF file includes:

Sections A to E
Figs. S1 to S28
Tables S1 to S6
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Acknowledgments

Funding: We acknowledge funding from the Medical Research Council (MRC) Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis (MR/X020258/1) funded by the UK MRC and carried out in the frame of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking supported by the EU; the NIHR for support for the Health Research Protection Unit in Modelling and Health Economics, a partnership between the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Imperial College London, and London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (grant code NIHR200908); and a philanthropic donation from Community Jameel supporting the work of the Jameel Institute. S.B. acknowledges support from the Novo Nordisk Foundation via The Novo Nordisk Young

Investigator Award (NNF20OC0059309). S.B. acknowledges the Danish National Research Foundation (DNRF160) through the chair grant. S.B. acknowledges support from Schmidt Sciences via the Schmidt Polymath Award (G-22-63345), which also supports C.M. The funders of the study had no role in the study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. **Author contributions:** Conceptualization: N.M.F., C.M., and S.B. Data curation: C.M., W.H., and P.N.P.G. Formal analysis: C.M. and N.M.F. Funding acquisition: N.M.F. and S.B. Investigation: C.M., N.M.F., and S.B. Methodology: C.M., T.R., S.B., and N.M.F. Project administration: C.M., N.M.F., and S.B. Resources: C.M., N.M.F., and S.B. Software: C.M., W.H., and N.M.F. Supervision: N.M.F. and S.B. Validation: C.M., P.N.P.G., N.M.F., and S.B. Visualization: C.M. and S.B. Writing—original draft: C.M., N.M.F., and S.B. Writing—review and editing: C.M., T.R., S.B., and N.M.F. All authors discussed, edited, and approved the final version of the manuscript. All authors had final responsibility for the decision to submit the manuscript for publication. **Competing interests:** P.N.P.G. has performed paid consulting for Pfizer and Munich Re in matters related to pandemic modeling; neither entity had any form of involvement in the present study. The authors declare that they have no other competing interests. **Data and materials availability:** While all data used in this analysis were anonymized, the individual-level nature of the data used risks individuals being identified or being able to self-identify if it is released publicly. Requests for access to the underlying source data should be directed to UKHSA. The access to protected data request is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications/accessing-ukhsa-protected-data/accessing-ukhsa-protected-data. All other data needed to evaluate the conclusions in the paper are present in the paper and/or the Supplementary Materials. Codes are available in Github (https://github.com/cm401/covid19_risk_heterogeneity_england) and Zenodo (<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15202350>).

Submitted 26 November 2024

Accepted 16 April 2025

Published 21 May 2025

10.1126/sciadv.adu8678