



Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website.

Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.



Correspondence

Besides human booster doses: Could vaccinating highly susceptible animals to SARS-CoV-2 be the needed urgent strategic step?

Dear Editor

Animals are the source of all pathogenic human coronaviruses (CoVs) [1]. The emergence of multiple SARS-CoV-2 variants, including the mink-associated variant, and the Omicron variant with a probable mouse origin, poses a substantial danger to our attempts to contain the pandemic [2,3]. Domestic animals (dog, cat, and ferret), captive animals (tiger, lion, snow leopard, puma, otter, and gorilla), and wild and farmed minks have all been documented to have natural SARS-CoV-2 infections. Given the recently identified SARS-CoV-2 variants and the nature of coronavirus replication, other variants are likely to be circulating unnoticed in different parts of the globe. SARS-CoV-2 has emerged following cross-species jumping in animals, raising concerns about the possibility of reintroduction into human populations via interspecies transmission between people and animals [2]. Additionally, the ability of SARS-CoV-2 to infect animal populations raises concerns regarding alternate SARS-CoV-2 reservoirs in animals and the establishment of vaccine-resistant SARS-CoV-2 variants in animals.

There are currently no ongoing surveillance efforts to identify other animal species that may be vulnerable to the virus. We are currently unsure of the complete range of animals that can contract SARS-CoV-2 from people or other susceptible mammals in the absence of such attempts [4]. Banerjee et al. [4] have suggested a hierarchical model for prioritizing animal species for surveillance. Furthermore, the effects of SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals on their health are unknown. More crucially, we have no way of knowing if SARS-CoV-2 will re-emerge in certain animal species and infect humans who have been naturally exposed to or vaccinated against it [4]. The entry of SARS-CoV-2 into the feral population and subsequent transmission to wildlife may be avoided if domestic animals are vaccinated [2].

The vital step to prevent SARS-CoV-2 from re-emerging in the future and to achieve successful elimination of SARS-CoV-2 is to control transmission in all susceptible animal species. Contact with animals is of our nature and for many purposes (hunting, livelihood, ...) [5] and it is unpreventable. Certain free-living wild animals have a high susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2, suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 reservoirs could emerge in the wild [6]. Besides free-ranging wild animals, human-to-animal transmission has been reported in pets, farmed animals, and zoo animals [7–11]. Moreover, interspecies transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been reported like mink-to-cat transmission [12] and deer-to-deer transmission [13], which greatly raises the likelihood of onward spread [14].

Asian lions (*Panthera leo persica*) have been observed to be naturally infected with the lineage Delta (B.1.617.2) variant [15,16]. Three Malayan tigers at a Virginia Zoo (Norfolk, VA, USA) experienced respiratory symptoms and were infected with the Alpha (B.1.1.7) variant [17]. Adult white-tailed deer (*Odocoileus virginianus*) in the United States have

been shown to be highly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, as well as to the Alpha (B.1.1.7) variant [18]. Doe deer can transfer the virus vertically to their foetus and through direct contact [19]. North American deer mice (*Peromyscus maniculatus*) are vulnerable to SARS-CoV-2 infection, with little or no clinical symptoms, when exposed to a human SARS-CoV-2 isolate. Furthermore, SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted directly from deer mice to naive deer mice. The possibility of SARS-CoV-2 reverse zoonosis in deer mice and humans is still unknown. White-tailed deer, numbering 30 million in the United States, have been extensively infected with SARS-CoV-2 in several human-to-deer transmission events and efficient deer-to-deer transmission. The extensive widespread infection of white-tailed deer indicates that they have been established as potential SARS-CoV-2 reservoir hosts, significantly implicating the virus's ecology, long-term persistence, and evolution, as well as the risk of human spillover [20]. A recent study has reported infection of white-tailed deer with the Omicron variant in New York [21].

In Denmark, SARS-CoV-2 spillover from minks to people was linked to a reduced ability of pre-existing human antibodies to neutralize the mink variant [22], and the most dramatic scene is that at least 12.5% of all people being infected with dominated mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants in Denmark and the Netherlands were caused by human-to-human transmission [23]. Concerns about SARS-CoV-2 transmission via the fecal-oral route [24,25], which has been demonstrated in hamsters [26] and has the potential to cause respiratory infection. But, it has yet to be proven in people. Worryingly, researchers in Hong Kong have identified evidence that pet hamsters can transmit the SARS-CoV-2 Delta (AY. 127) variant to humans and have linked the animals to human infections in the city [27]. To date, pet hamsters are considered the second confirmed animal species able to transmit SARS-CoV-2 to humans, following farmed mink [28] found in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland [28–31]. Recently, the first evidence of a deer-to-human COVID-19 case has been reported in Canada [32]. They discovered a highly diverse SARS-CoV-2 lineage in a white-tailed deer that originated in humans. Interestingly, SARS-CoV-2 infection rates in white-tailed deer in North America have reached up to 70% with three distinct lineages (B.1.2, B.1.582, and B.1.596) discovered in several places [33], highlighting the risk of future variants originating from adaptation in other wild animals and transmitting to humans. Human has endless contact with animals for many purposes [5] and in many ways [1].

Owing to the worries about waning immunity and SARS-CoV-2 mutations after the advent of the Omicron variant, some governments have deployed booster doses of COVID-19 vaccines [34]. Worryingly, the waning immunity is a repeated reported issue that calls us to focus on immunosuppressed patients. However, wild, feral, and domestic

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsu.2022.106761>

Received 15 June 2022; Accepted 2 July 2022

Available online 5 July 2022

1743-9191/© 2022 IJS Publishing Group Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

animals that met the hierarchical model should not be underestimated. Therefore, active or passive surveillance frameworks for domestic, captive, and wild animals must be built to restrict the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in domestic and wild animal species. Ramping up vaccination of highly susceptible animals to SARS-CoV-2 that could be viral reservoirs is a strategy to prevent viral reintroduction into the human population. As a result, in-depth investigations of the interrelationships between animals and humans for disease transmission and spread, as well as adoption of appropriate preventative and control techniques using interdisciplinary and holistic approaches, are required. Indirectly, WHO should attempt to increase vaccine manufacturing regions, like in Africa, to aid in this regard.

Ethical approval

This article does not include any human/animal subjects to acquire such approval.

Source of funding

This study received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Author contribution

AbdulRahman A. Saied: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Visualization, Writing - Original Draft, Writing -review & editing.

Research Registration Unique Identifying Number (UIN)

Name of the registry:

Unique Identifying number or registration ID:

Hyperlink to your specific registration (must be publicly accessible and will be checked):

Guarantor

AbdulRahman A Saied <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8616-5874>.

Provenance and peer review

Not commissioned, internally peer-reviewed.

Availability of data and materials

The data in this correspondence article is not sensitive in nature and is accessible in the public domain. The data is therefore available and not of a confidential nature.

Declaration of competing interest

None.

References

- [1] A.A. Saied, A.A. Metwally, H.M.A. Mohamed, M.A.M. Haridy, The contribution of bovines to human health against viral infections, *Environ. Sci. Pollut. Res.* (2021) 1–25.
- [2] K. Sharun, R. Tiwari, A.A. Saied, K. Dhama, SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine for Domestic and Captive Animals: an Effort to Counter COVID-19 Pandemic at the Human-Animal Interface, 2021. *Vaccine*.
- [3] R. Khanda, S. Singhal, T. Alqahtani, M.A. Kamal, A. Nahed, F. Nainu, P.A. Desingu, K. Dhama, Emergence of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron (B. 1.1. 529) variant, salient features, high global health concerns and strategies to counter it amid ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, *Environ. Res.* (2022), 112816.
- [4] A. Banerjee, K. Mossman, M.L. Baker, Zoonanthropotic potential of SARS-CoV-2 and implications of reintroduction into human populations, *Cell Host Microbe* 29 (2021) 160–164.
- [5] A.A. Saied, Africa is going to develop their own health capabilities for future challenges – Correspondence, *Int. J. Surg.* 99 (2022), 106585, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsu.2022.106585>.
- [6] R.J. Delahay, J. de la Fuente, G.C. Smith, K. Sharun, E.L. Snary, L.F. Girón, J. Nziza, A.R. Fooks, S.M. Brookes, F.Z.X. Lean, Assessing the risks of SARS-CoV-2 in wildlife, *One Heal. Outlook*. 3 (2021) 1–14.
- [7] K. Sharun, K. Dhama, A.M. Pawde, C. Gortázar, R. Tiwari, D.K. Bonilla-Aldana, A. J. Rodriguez-Morales, J. de la Fuente, I. Michalak, Y.A. Attia, SARS-CoV-2 in animals: potential for unknown reservoir hosts and public health implications, *Vet. Q.* (2021) 1–31.
- [8] M. V Palmer, M. Martins, S. Falkenberg, A. Buckley, L.C. Caserta, P.K. Mitchell, E. D. Cassmann, A. Rollins, N.C. Zyllich, R.W. Renshaw, Susceptibility of white-tailed deer (*Odocoileus virginianus*) to SARS-CoV-2, *J. Virol.* 95 (2021) e00083-21.
- [9] K. Sharun, A.A. Saied, R. Tiwari, K. Dhama, SARS-CoV-2 infection in domestic and feral cats: current evidence and implications, *Vet. Q.* (2021) 1–7.
- [10] OIE (World Organization for Animal Health), COVID-19 Events in Animals, 2022. <Https://Www.Oie.Int/En/What-We-Offer/Emergency-and-Resilience/Covid-19/#ui-Id-3>.
- [11] S. Tamta, O.R. Vinodhkumar, A. Karthikeyan, Z.B. Dubal, S. Khan, A.R.A. Saied, M. Dhawan, K. Dhama, Y.S. Malik, Epidemiological profiling of SARS-CoV-2 with focus on one-health approaches in mitigating COVID-19 pandemic, *Indian J. Anim. Sci.* (2021) 791–802.
- [12] N. Oreshkova, R.J. Molenaar, S. Vreman, F. Harders, B.B.O. Munnink, R.W. Hakze-van Der Honing, N. Gerhards, P. Tolsma, R. Bouwstra, R.S. Sikkema, SARS-CoV-2 infection in farmed minks, The Netherlands, April and May 2020, *Euro Surveill.* 25 (2020), 2001005.
- [13] M. Martins, P.M. Boggiatto, A. Buckley, E.D. Cassmann, S. Falkenberg, L.C. Caserta, M.H. V Fernandes, C. Kanipe, K. Lager, M. V Palmer, From Deer-to-Deer: SARS-CoV-2 is efficiently transmitted and presents broad tissue tropism and replication sites in white-tailed deer, *PLoS Pathog.* 18 (2022), e1010197.
- [14] A.E. van Aart, F.C. Velkers, E.A.J. Fischer, E.M. Broens, H. Egberink, S. Zhao, M. Engelsma, R.W. Hakze-van der Honing, F. Harders, M.M.T. de Rooij, SARS-CoV-2 infection in cats and dogs in infected mink farms Transbound, *Emerg. Drugs* (2021).
- [15] M. Karikalan, V. Chander, S. Mahajan, P. Deol, R.K. Agrawal, S. Nandi, S.K. Rai, A. Mathur, A. Pawde, K.P. Singh, G.K. Sharma, Natural infection of Delta mutant of SARS-CoV-2 in Asiatic lions of India, *Transbound. Emerg. Dis.* (2021), <Https://doi.org/10.1111/tbed.14290>.
- [16] A. Mishra, N. Kumar, S. Bhatia, A. Aasdev, S. Kanniappan, A.T. Sekhar, A. Gopinadhan, R. Silambarasan, C. Sreekumar, C.K. Dubey, M. Tripathi, A.A. Raut, V.P. Singh, SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant among Asiatic lions, India, *Emerg. Infect. Dis.* 27 (2021) 2723–2725, <Https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2710.211500>.
- [17] P.K. Mitchell, M. Martins, T. Reilly, L.C. Caserta, R.R. Anderson, B.D. Cronk, J. Murphy, E.L. Goodrich, D.G. Diel, SARS-CoV-2 B. 1.1. 7 variant infection in Malayan tigers, Virginia, USA, *Emerg. Inf. Disp.* 27 (2021) 3171.
- [18] J.C. Chandler, S.N. Bevins, J.W. Ellis, T.J. Linder, R.M. Tell, M. Jenkins-Moore, J. J. Root, J.B. Lenoch, S. Robbe-Austerman, T.J. DeLiberto, SARS-CoV-2 exposure in wild white-tailed deer (*Odocoileus virginianus*), *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* 118 (2021).
- [19] K. Cool, N.N. Gaudreault, I. Morozov, J.D. Trujillo, D.A. Meekins, C. McDowell, M. Carrossino, D. Bold, D. Mitzel, T. Kwon, Infection and transmission of ancestral SARS-CoV-2 and its alpha variant in pregnant white-tailed deer, *Emerg. Microb. Infect.* 11 (2022) 95–112.
- [20] S.V. Kuchipudi, M. Surendran-Nair, R.M. Ruden, M. Yon, R.H. Nissly, K. J. Vandegrift, R.K. Nelli, L. Li, B.M. Jayarao, C.D. Maranas, Multiple spillovers from humans and onward transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in white-tailed deer, *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* 119 (2022).
- [21] Reuters, Discovery of Omicron in New York Deer Raises Concern over Possible New Variants, 2022. <Https://Www.Reuters.Com/Business/Healthcare-Pharmaceuticals/Discovery-Omicron-New-York-Deer-Raises-Concern-over-Possible-New-Variants-2022-02-08/>.
- [22] H.D. Larsen, J. Fonager, F.K. Lombolt, T. Dalby, G. Benedetti, B. Kristensen, T. R. Urth, M. Rasmussen, R. Lassaurière, T.B. Rasmussen, Preliminary report of an outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in mink and mink farmers associated with community spread, Denmark, June to November 2020, *Euro Surveill.* 26 (2021), 2100009.
- [23] L. Wang, X. Didelot, Y. Bi, G.F. Gao, Assessing the extent of community spread caused by mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants, *Innov. 2* (2021), 100128.
- [24] Y. Xu, X. Li, B. Zhu, H. Liang, C. Fang, Y. Gong, Q. Guo, X. Sun, D. Zhao, J. Shen, Characteristics of pediatric SARS-CoV-2 infection and potential evidence for persistent fecal viral shedding, *Nat. Med.* 26 (2020) 502–505.
- [25] X. Pang, L. Ren, S. Wu, W. Ma, J. Yang, L. Di, J. Li, Y. Xiao, L. Kang, S. Du, Cold-chain food contamination as the possible origin of COVID-19 resurgence in Beijing, *Natl. Sci. Rev.* 7 (2020) 1861–1864.
- [26] A.C.-Y. Lee, A.J. Zhang, J.F.-W. Chan, C. Li, Z. Fan, F. Liu, Y. Chen, R. Liang, S. Sridhar, J.-P. Cai, Oral SARS-CoV-2 inoculation establishes subclinical respiratory infection with virus shedding in golden Syrian hamsters, *Cell Rep. Med.* 1 (2020), 100121.
- [27] H.-L. Yen, T.H.C. Sit, C.J. Brackman, S.S.Y. Chuk, S. Cheng, H. Gu, L.D.J. Chang, P. Krishnan, D.Y.M. Ng, G.Y.Z. Liu, Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (variant Delta) from pet hamsters to humans and onward human propagation of the adapted strain: a case study, *Lancet* 399 (10329) (2022) 1070–1078.
- [28] B.B.O. Munnink, R.S. Sikkema, D.F. Nieuwenhuijsen, R.J. Molenaar, E. Munger, R. Molenkamp, A. Van Der Spek, P. Tolsma, A. Rietveld, M. Brouwer, Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 on mink farms between humans and mink and back to humans, *Science* (80-) 371 (2021) 172–177.

- [29] A.S. Hammer, M.L. Quaade, T.B. Rasmussen, J. Fonager, M. Rasmussen, K. Mundbjerg, L. Lohse, B. Strandbygaard, C.S. Jorgensen, A. Alfaro-Núñez, SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink (*Neovison vison*) and humans, Denmark, *Emerg. Inf. Disp.* 27 (2021) 547.
- [30] M. Koopmans, SARS-CoV-2 and the human-animal interface: outbreaks on mink farms, *Lancet Infect. Dis.* 21 (2021) 18–19.
- [31] L. Rabalski, M. Kosinski, N. Mazur-Panasiuk, B. Szewczyk, K. Bienkowska-Szewczyk, R. Kant, T. Sironen, K. Pyrc, M. Grzybek, Zoonotic spill-over of SARS-CoV-2: mink-adapted virus in humans, *Clin. Microbiol. Infect.* 28 (3) (2021) 451.e1–451.e4.
- [32] B. Pickering, O. Lung, F. Maguire, P. Kruczakiewicz, J.D. Kotwa, T. Buchanan, M. Gagnier, J.L. Guthrie, C.M. Jardine, A. Marchand-Austin, Highly Divergent White-Tailed Deer SARS-CoV-2 with Potential Deer-To-Human Transmission, *BioRxiv*, 2022.
- [33] V.L. Hale, P.M. Dennis, D.S. McBride, J.M. Nolting, C. Madden, D. Huey, M. Ehrlich, J. Grieser, J. Winston, D. Lombardi, SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging white-tailed deer, *Nature* (2021) 1–8.
- [34] A.A. Saied, A.A. Metwally, M. Alobo, J. Shah, K. Sharun, K. Dhamra, Bovine-derived antibodies and camelid-derived nanobodies as biotherapeutic weapons against SARS-CoV-2 and its variants: a review Article, *Int. J. Surg.* (2022), 106233, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsu.2022.106233>.

AbdulRahman A. Saied*

National Food Safety Authority (NFSA), Aswan Branch, Aswan, 81511,
Egypt
Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, Aswan Office, Aswan, 81511, Egypt

* National Food Safety Authority (NFSA), Aswan Branch, Aswan,
81511, Egypt.
E-mail address: saiied_abdelrahman@yahoo.com.