1   **Cost-effectiveness of antigen testing for ending COVID-19 isolation**

2   **Short title: Cost-effectiveness of COVID-19 de-isolation strategies**

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17   **Abstract**

18   **Background:** The Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 led to a steep rise in transmissions. Recently, as public

19   tolerance for isolation abated, CDC guidance on duration of at-home isolation of COVID-19 cases was

20   shortened to five days if no symptoms, with no lab test requirement, despite more cautious approaches

21   advocated by other federal experts.

22   **Methods:** We conducted a decision tree analysis of alternative protocols for ending COVID-19 isolation,

23   estimating net costs (direct and productivity), secondary infections, and incremental cost-effectiveness

24   ratios. Sensitivity analyses assessed the impact of input uncertainty.

25   **Results :** Per 100 individuals, five-day isolation had 23 predicted secondary infections and a net cost of

26    $33,000. Symptom check on day five (CDC guidance) yielded a 23% decrease in secondary infections (to

27   17.8), with a net cost of $45,000. Antigen testing on day six yielded 2.9 secondary infections and

28    $63,000 in net costs. This protocol, compared to the next best protocol of antigen testing on day five of

29   a maximum eight-day isolation, cost an additional $1,300 per secondary infection averted. Antigen or

30   polymerase chain reaction testing on day five were dominated (more expensive and less effective)

31   versus antigen testing on day six. Results were qualitatively robust to uncertainty in key inputs.

32   **Conclusions:** A six-day isolation with antigen testing to confirm the absence of contagious virus appears

33   the most effective and cost-effective de-isolation protocol to shorten at-home isolation of individuals

34   with COVID-19.

35

Introduction

The SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant was designated a variant of concern by the World Health Organization in November 2021, as it had several mutations that are suspected to impact its transmissibility and disease severity.[1, 2] In late December, in the US, where vaccination coverage is above 60%,[3] public health guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding isolation of COVID-19 cases were relaxed. The recommended duration of isolation was decreased from ten to five days, with no laboratory testing required to end isolation.[4] Individuals were asked to evaluate their symptoms on day five to determine whether to continue isolating for the full ten days. This guidance was received with skepticism[5-7] given the understanding that Omicron, constituting 95% of COVID-19 cases in the US,[8] was potentially more transmissible than earlier variants and less susceptible to vaccines.[1, 2] Shortages of rapid antigen tests in the US,[7, 9] economic losses associated with extended periods of isolation,[10] and the psychological effects of longer at-home isolation durations[11] were suggested as possible reasonings behind the updated guidance. However, fully elaborated scientific evidence supporting the decision was lacking.[12]

While quantitative studies on the viral kinetics and pathophysiology of the Omicron variant are underway, decision makers must offer timely guidance that balances public health and economic considerations in their COVID-19 isolation recommendations. Antigen testing could offer benefits over using symptom status as a marker of infectivity given the high rate of asymptomatic COVID-19 infections.[13] We aimed to evaluate the trade-offs between costs (including lost productivity) and secondary infections averted when adopting different protocols to end COVID-19 isolation in order to provide an evidence-base for such decisions.

Materials and Methods

Model design

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60   We modeled six different protocols for ending COVID-19 isolation. Using a customized decision

61   tree template, we compared the number of secondary COVID-19 infections that occurred when

62   individuals followed each of these different protocols. We adopted a societal perspective and a two-

63   week time horizon to capture all costs and secondary infections. The cohort consisted of 100 individuals

64   in the US who had COVID-19 (confirmed by PCR and/or antigen test) and were on the fifth day of

65   isolation. We modeled only individuals with asymptomatic or mild COVID-19; those with more severe

66   disease would be hospitalized rather than isolating at home and therefore were not included.

67   ***De-isolation protocols***

68   Interventions were selected to demonstrate current policy options as well as alternatives that

69   might reduce transmissions while also shortening isolation duration. While not exhaustive, these

70   protocols represent a variety of options that might warrant further evaluation. In all strategies,

71   individuals leaving isolation were assumed to follow best practices for infection prevention, which at the

72   time of the analysis included mask wearing. Individuals could leave their home the day after their

73   isolation ended (i.e., for a five-day isolation, they spent five full days at home and could leave on day six

74   if cleared).

75   *Five-day isolation.* Person with confirmed COVID-19 stays at home for five days, then can leave

76   without any further consideration.

77   *Ten-day isolation with symptom check on day five (i.e., the CDC guidance).* Person with

78   confirmed COVID-19 stays at home for five days. On day five, they review their symptoms. Those who

79   were asymptomatic or fever free for 24 hours can end isolation, while those with persisting symptoms

80   continue to isolate until day ten.

81   *Ten-day isolation with antigen test on day five.* Person with confirmed COVID-19 stays at home

82   for five days. On day five, they perform a rapid antigen test. Those who test negative can end isolation

83   while those who test positive continue to isolate until day ten.

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84   *Ten-day isolation with PCR test on day five.* Person with confirmed COVID-19 stays at home for

85   five days. On day five, they conduct a PCR test. Those who test negative can end isolation while those

86   who test positive continue to isolate until day ten. We assumed results are obtained within 24 hours.

87   *Ten-day isolation with antigen test on day six.* Person with confirmed COVID-19 stays at home

88   for six days. On day six, they perform a rapid antigen test. Those who test negative can end isolation

89   while those who test positive continue to isolate until day ten.

90   *Eight-day isolation with antigen test on day five.* Person with confirmed COVID-19 stays at home

91   for five days. On day five, they perform a rapid antigen test. Those who test negative can end isolation

92   while those who test positive continue to isolate until day eight instead of day ten (no re-test is done).

93   ***Key assumptions***

94   We assumed that no one in the cohort was SARS-CoV-2-naïve (i.e., all had begun isolation based

95   on true-positive test results). As such, individuals were either still carrying contagious virus or had

96   cleared all viable virus. We defined a frontloaded distribution for infectivity over ten days following

97   symptom onset (or positive test, if asymptomatic), based on empirical data on culture-positivity of

98   patient samples.[14-17] For those remaining in isolation after day five, we assumed imperfect isolation

99   effectiveness such that continued isolation led to a 95% reduction in the risk of transmission. Finally, for

100   illustration purposes, we assumed 100% testing coverage (i.e., everyone had access to the tests

101   necessary). This was varied in sensitivity analyses.

102   ***Model inputs***

103   We used data specific to the Omicron variant when available to parameterize the model.

104   Otherwise, we used data generated during the wildtype (Alpha) and B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant waves. Key

105   model inputs are presented in Table 1, with uncertainty ranges and sources.

106

107   **Table 1. Model parameters, uncertainty ranges, and sources**

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Parameter	Base-case input	Uncertainty range	Source
Health parameters			
% still infectious on day 5	90%	45% – 100%	Wolfel 2020[16]
Reduction in portion with infectious virus from day 5 to 6	22%	0% – 50%	Wolfel 2020[16]
Secondary reproduction number	1.2	0.96 – 1.4	CMMID 2022[18]
Intervention parameters			
Symptom check sensitivity	23.8%	18.4% – 33.3%	Ma 2021[19], Dinh 2021[20]
Antigen test sensitivity	79.3%	65.3% – 93.3%	Pilarowski 2021[21]; see text
PCR test sensitivity	89.0%	83.0% – 93.0%	Mallett 2020[22], Singanayagam 2020[13]
Intervention reach or adherence (same for all interventions)	100%	0% – 100%	Assumed
Effectiveness of isolation for reducing transmission	95%		Assumed
Cost parameters (per person)			
Antigen test cost	$10	$5 – $15	URMC 2022[23], Krouse 2020[24]
PCR test cost	$150	$100 – $200	URMC 2022[23]
Direct medical cost	$1436	$500 – $2000	Rae 2020[25]
Daily productivity	$200		Assumed; $25 per hour
Productivity drop in isolation	90%		Assumed

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109   *Health inputs.* The probability of carrying viable SARS-CoV-2 was 90% on day five and 70% on

110   day six, quickly dropping to zero by day ten from the start of isolation, based on studies of previous

111   variants.[13-17] The effective secondary reproduction number (R_{eff}), which implicitly accounts for

112   infection prevention measures that were in place such as mask wearing, was used to calculate the

113   number of secondary infections that occur per index case. As of January 16th, 2022, R_{eff} was estimated as

114   1.2 in the US.[18] We adjusted this value based on the probability of carrying infectious virus on each

115   day of infection to reflect the reduced transmissibility five days after the start of isolation; the "residual

116   R" was 0.26 over days six to ten if isolation was discontinued (See S1 Appendix for calculations). Similar

117   calculations were made to adjust R_{eff} for de-isolation protocols requiring longer isolation periods.

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118   *Test performance.* Forty percent of relevant COVID-19 cases were asymptomatic,[19] and of

119   those who develop symptoms, 60% had symptom resolution by day five post-symptom onset,[20]

120   yielding approximately 24% sensitivity for the symptom check protocol. Previous studies among mildly

121   symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals showed antigen tests had over 93% sensitivity for viral loads

122   high enough to be transmissible.[21] We reduced this value by 15% to account for the suspected

123   reduction in sensitivity for the Omicron variant,[1] which resulted in approximately 80% antigen test

124   sensitivity. PCR tests had 89% sensitivity.[22]

125   *Cost inputs.* Costs were calculated from a societal perspective and in 2022 US dollars. A rapid

126   antigen test cost $10, while a PCR test cost $150.[23, 24, 26] Productivity loss due to isolation was $900

127   over five days, assuming a 90% decrease in productivity and $200 per day. This is likely an overestimate

128   of productivity loss since many individuals with asymptomatic COVID-19 isolating at home can continue

129   working remotely with no or minimal loss in productivity. We therefore calculated base-case outputs

130   both with and without productivity loss. Direct medical costs incurred for secondary infections were

131     $1436 on average; this accounted for varying costs for different disease severity levels (e.g., $0 if

132   asymptomatic or no healthcare is sought vs. $61,000 if ICU admission is required; see S1 Appendix).[25,

133   27] We assumed all medical costs were incurred in year one and did not require discounting.

134   ***Model outputs and sensitivity analyses***

135   We compared the number of secondary infections, societal net costs, and, when appropriate,

136   incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) given different de-isolation protocols. De-isolation

137   protocols that led to fewer net costs and fewer secondary infections than their comparator were

138   dominant; no ICERs were calculated.

139   We conducted deterministic and probabilistic sensitivity analyses to assess uncertainty in key

140   inputs in Table 1. Since test availability and protocol adherence was arbitrarily set as 100%, these two

141   inputs were not included in one-way and multivariate (Monte Carlo) sensitivity analyses. Instead, we

142   performed threshold analyses and two-way sensitivity analyses (where inputs were varied two at a time)

143   to determine minimum necessary adherence and test availability for de-isolation protocols to be

144   effective. When test availability was not 100%, individuals left isolation after the day on which they

145   would have otherwise taken a test.

146   Additionally, we simulated three separate risk scenarios to evaluate how the environment

147   individuals are re-entering upon ending isolation would affect outcomes. The change in the risk of

148   infection due to varying vaccination rate, mask-wearing[3, 28-30], and number of contacts[31] from

149   base-case were used to adjust the transmission rate, R_{eff} (see S1 Appendix). A *low-risk scenario* was

150   defined representing the infected individual re-joining the household where everyone was fully

151   vaccinated and continued to wear masks for the next five days (R_{eff}=0.35, residual R after de-

152   isolation=0.07). A *medium-risk scenario* reflected individuals starting to see few non-household

153   members, all of whom were fully vaccinated, but mask-wearing was inconsistent (R_{eff}=1.11, residual

154   R=0.24). Finally, a *high-risk scenario* was defined in which both vaccination and mask-wearing was

155   inconsistent, and a greater number of social contacts were occurring (e.g., going to the movies, eating at

156   restaurants, attending school; R_{eff}=3.78, residual R=0.81). We did not conduct multivariate sensitivity

157   analyses on the scenarios.

158   ***Statistical analysis***

159   The model was built in Excel® (Office 365, Microsoft Corporation) and sensitivity analyses were

160   conducted using @RISK® (version 8.2, Palisade Corporation). The decision tree and all data are available

161   upon request.

162

163   **Results**

164   Base-case results from a societal perspective (i.e., including productivity loss due to isolation)

165   are presented in Table 2; all outcomes are given per 100 individuals. Ending isolation at day five without

166   further testing led to 23.0 secondary infections and \$33,100 in direct medical costs. Symptom check at

167   day five (17.8 secondary infections) reduced transmissions by 23% with a \$11,900 increase in net costs;

168   the ICER was \$2,282 per secondary infection averted.

169

170   **Table 2. Base-case results from (a) societal perspective (including productivity loss) and (b) with direct**
171   **costs only (no productivity loss).**

Optiona	Testing cost	Medical cost	Productivity loss for index infection	Net cost	Secondary infections	Incremental cost	Secondary infections averted
2a. Societal perspective (including productivity loss)							
5-day isolation, no test	\$0	\$33,086	\$0	\$33,086	23.04	n/a	n/a
Symptom check on day 5	\$0	\$25,605	\$19,368	\$44,973	17.83	\$11,887	5.21
Antigen test on day 5 (8-day isolation)	\$1,000	\$14,391	\$38,564	\$53,954	10.02	\$20,868	13.02
Antigen test on day 6	\$1,000	\$4,132	\$58,056	\$63,189	2.88	\$30,103	20.16
Antigen test on day 5	\$1,000	\$8,159	\$64,273	\$73,432	5.68	\$10,243	-2.80
PCR test on day 5	\$15,000	\$5,112	\$72,099	\$92,211	3.56	\$29,022	-0.68
2b. Direct costs only (no productivity loss)							
Antigen test on day 6	\$1,000	\$4,132	-	\$5,132	2.88	n/a	n/a
Antigen test on day 5	\$1,000	\$8,159	-	\$9,159	5.68	\$4,027	-2.80
Antigen test on day 5, (8-day isolation)	\$1,000	\$14,391	-	\$15,391	10.02	\$10,258	-7.14
PCR test on day 5	\$15,000	\$5,112	-	\$20,112	3.56	\$14,979	-0.68
Symptom check on day 5	\$0	\$25,605	-	\$25,605	17.83	\$20,472	-14.95
5-day isolation, no test	\$0	\$33,086	-	\$33,086	23.04	\$27,953	-20.16

172   Values are per 100 people. De-isolation protocols are compared to previous non-dominated protocol.

173   a Isolation duration is up to 10 days unless otherwise noted.

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174 [b] Strategy is extended dominated, i.e., a more expensive strategy (lower in the table) has a lower cost-

175 effectiveness ratio. ICERs that are not shown due to weak dominance are as follows: $2,282 for

176 symptom check on day five versus no test; $1,150 for antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation

177 versus symptom check; $1,603 for antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation versus no test; and

178 $1,293 for antigen test on day six versus antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation.

179

180 Antigen testing on day five of an eight-day isolation period cost an additional $1,150 per

181 secondary infection averted compared with symptom check. This drop in the ICER represents extended

182 dominance[32] over the symptom check. The ICER for day five antigen test versus no test was $1,603.

183 The most cost-effective de-isolation protocol was performing an antigen test on day six of a ten-

184 day isolation period. This protocol led to $63,200 in net costs and 2.9 secondary infections, yielding an

185 ICER of $1,293 per secondary infection averted versus an antigen test on day five of an eight-day

186 isolation, again representing extended dominance. Both antigen and PCR testing on day five were

187 dominated by antigen testing on day six; they led to greater net costs and more secondary infections.

188 If productivity losses were omitted, leaving just direct costs, antigen testing on day six was

189 strictly dominant (i.e., lowest net cost and fewest secondary infections) over all other de-isolation

190 protocols (Table 2).

191 ***Sensitivity analyses***

192 In one-way sensitivity analyses where key inputs were varied one at a time, antigen testing on

193 day five prevented between 51-85% secondary infections over symptom check, depending primarily on

194 antigen test sensitivity for transmissible viral loads. Secondary infections prevented with an antigen test

195 on day six versus day five was mostly related to the relative reduction in viable viral load from day five to

196 six and varied between 35-67%. Antigen test on day six, compared to the next most cost-effective option

197   (antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation) prevented between 3.6 and 8.0 secondary infections.

198   This value was most sensitive to the probability of having transmissible virus on day five (Figure 1).

199

200   **Fig 1. One-way sensitivity analyses on the number of secondary infections averted with antigen test**

201   **on day six versus next most cost-effective strategy (eight-day isolation with antigen test on day five).**

202   Base-case output is 7.14.

203

204   Probabilistic Monte Carlo analyses showed that antigen testing on day six was either dominant

205   or cost-effective with ICERs up to $3,816 per secondary infection averted, given varying inputs. This

206   outcome was most sensitive to uncertainty in the probability of a persistent high viral load, followed by

207   the community transmission rate and the direct medical cost per COVID-19 infection. Antigen test on

208   day six always prevented more secondary infections than antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation

209   but had a nearly 90% probability of having greater net costs (Figure 2).

210

211   **Fig 2. Simulated incremental costs and secondary infections averted with antigen testing on day six of**

212   **isolation versus next most cost-effective strategy (eight-day isolation with antigen test on day five).**

213   1000 iterations. Shading represents 95% confidence area for results. Percentages are the probabilities of

214   the result being in each of the quadrants.

215

216   In all three of the risk scenarios considered, antigen testing on day six remained the optimal de-

217   isolation protocol (Table 3). Both the low- and medium-risk scenario results followed base-case findings:

218   symptom check at day five, antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation, and antigen test on day six

219   were all cost-effective with ICERs increasing as transmission risk decreases. The ICER for antigen testing

220   on day six was $8,050 and $1,500 per secondary infection averted in the low- and medium-risk

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221   scenarios, respectively. In the high-risk scenario, antigen testing on day six was strictly dominant, leading

222   to $72,000 in net costs and 9.1 secondary infections, as opposed to $100,000 net costs and 72.6

223   secondary infections with a symptom check on day five.

224

225   **Table 3. Analyses of different risk scenarios. Values per 100 people.**

Option[a]	Testing cost	Medical cost	Productivity loss	Net cost	Secondary infections	Incremental cost	Secondary infections averted
Low Risk (R=0.35)							
5-day isolation, no test	$0	$9,516	$0	$9,516	6.63	n/a	n/a
Symptom check on day 5	$0	$7,364	$19,368	$26,732	5.13	$17,217	1.50
Antigen test on day 5 (8-day isolation)	$1,000	$4,139	$38,564	$43,703	2.88	$34,187	3.75
Antigen test on day 6	$1,000	$1,189	$58,056	$60,245	0.83	$50,729	5.80
Antigen test on day 5	$1,000	$2,347	$64,273	$67,620	1.63	$7,375	-0.81
PCR test on day 5	$15,000	$1,470	$72,099	$88,569	1.02	$28,325	-0.20
Medium Risk (R=1.11)							
5-day isolation, no test	$0	$30,728	$0	$30,728	21.40	n/a	n/a
Symptom check on day 5	$0	$23,780	$19,368	$43,148	16.56	$12,421	4.84
Antigen test on day 5 (8-day isolation)	$1,000	$13,365	$38,564	$52,929	9.31	$22,201	12.09
Antigen test on day 6	$1,000	$3,838	$58,056	$62,894	2.67	$32,166	18.73
Antigen test on day 5	$1,000	$7,577	$64,273	$72,851	5.28	$9,956	-2.60
PCR test on day 5	$15,000	$4,747	$72,099	$91,846	3.31	$28,952	-0.63
High Risk (R=3.78)							
Antigen test on day 6	$1,000	$13,021	$58,056	$72,077	9.07	n/a	n/a
Antigen test on day 5 (8-day isolation)	$1,000	$45,344	$38,564	$84,908	31.58	$12,831	-22.51
Antigen test on day 5	$1,000	$25,709	$64,273	$90,982	17.90	$18,904	-8.84
Symptom check on day 5	$0	$80,680	$19,368	$100,048	56.18	$27,971	-47.12
PCR test on day 5	$15,000	$16,107	$72,099	$103,206	11.22	$31,128	-2.15
5-day isolation, no test	$0	$104,251	$0	$104,251	72.60	$32,174	-63.53

226   Values are per 100 people. De-isolation protocols are compared to previous non-dominated protocol.

227   [a] Isolation duration is up to 10 days unless otherwise noted.

228   [b] Strategy is extended dominated, i.e., a more expensive strategy (lower in the table) has a lower cost-

229   effectiveness ratio. ICERs that are not shown due to extended dominance are as follows: In the low risk

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230   scenario, $11,491 for symptom check versus no test, $7,556 for antigen test on day five of eight-day

231   isolation versus symptom check, $91,131 for antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation versus no

232   test, and $8,051 for antigen test on day six versus antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation. In the

233   medium risk scenario, $2,567 for symptom check versus no test, $1,349 for antigen test on day five of

234   eight day isolation versus symptom check, $1,836 for antigen test on day five of eight-day isolation

235   versus no test, and $1,502 for antigen test on day six versus antigen test on day five of eight-day

236   isolation.

237

238   Under the base-case assumption of 100% adherence to a symptom check protocol, at least 30%

239   antigen test availability (i.e., 30% of those in isolation can access a test) was necessary for antigen

240   testing to prevent more secondary infections than the symptom check if done on day five. Similarly, PCR

241   tests had greater benefit than symptom check when test availability was greater than approximately

242   27%. In a two-way sensitivity analysis, if symptom check adherence was below 70%, then <20% antigen

243   test or <19% PCR test availability was sufficient for these tests to prevent a greater number of

244   transmissions than the symptom check protocol on day five. Notably, antigen testing on day six

245   prevented more secondary infections than symptom check on day five even when test availability was as

246   low as 1%, due to the added day of isolation.

247

248   **Discussion**

249   We compared health and cost outcomes associated with different de-isolation protocols to end

250   COVID-19 isolation for those with confirmed asymptomatic or mild COVID-19. All ICERs we calculated

251   had favorable cost-effectiveness ratios. We found that while symptom check without testing on day five

252   of isolation did reduce secondary transmissions after de-isolation by 23% compared to no testing, it still

253   led to nearly 18 secondary infections per 100 individuals and had the least favorable cost-effectiveness

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254   ratio due to high medical costs for secondary infections. The most cost-effective protocol was to remain

255   in isolation through day six and then perform an antigen test, which dominated both antigen testing and

256   PCR testing on day five. Antigen testing on day six led to an overall 87% decrease in secondary infections

257   compared to no testing and cost an additional $1,300 per secondary infection averted compared to the

258   next best option.

259   Notably, threshold analysis on antigen test availability suggested that the benefit of antigen

260   testing on day six might be primarily due to the extra day of isolation (during which the probability of

261   still carrying infectious virus quickly begins to drop), rather than the ability of the test to identify those

262   who still might have a transmissible viral load. This insight warrants further evaluation using emerging

263   data on the viral dynamics of Omicron. Moreover, antigen testing on day six was associated with lower

264   productivity loss than antigen testing on day five; even though everyone remained in isolation for one

265   more day, more individuals were cleared for de-isolation on day six than would have been on day five.

266   The four days gained by this portion of index cases offset the extra day lost by everyone. Workforce

267   shortages have been an important adverse effect of COVID-19 isolation.[33-37] Antigen testing on day

268   six generated both health and economic benefits; it minimized post-isolation transmissions while

269   allowing individuals to return to work sooner on average.

270   By modeling different risk scenarios, we demonstrated that the de-isolation environment had a

271   considerable impact on the cost-effectiveness of testing strategies. Regardless of the risk scenario, the

272   optimal protocol remained antigen testing on day six, which became dominant over other protocols in

273   high-risk situations and remained cost-effective, although cost-effectiveness was less favorable in low-

274   risk situations. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that much like other public health policy decisions

275   throughout the pandemic, de-isolation guidelines must evolve as the context of the pandemic shifts. For

276   example, potential new surges may call for more stringent policies with longer minimum isolation and

277   more sensitive tests, while declining transmissions may allow more lenient approaches. It is plausible

278   that the CDC has reached this same conclusion and proposed a symptom check rather than an antigen

279   test because of an expectation that transmissions would subside in the weeks following the

280   announcement of the new guidance. While reasonable at first glance, this could be a risky approach;

281   loosening infection prevention measures may have prevented the expected drop in transmissions,

282   leading instead to a quick rise in cases that would have prohibited the loosened guidance being put in

283   place to begin with. Indeed, our modeling of the CDC guidance resulted in a substantial number of

284   secondary COVID-19 cases given the transmission rate at the time the guidance was issued, some of

285   which were avoided with a different de-isolation approach.

286   Evidence from earlier SARS-CoV-2 variants suggest that transmissibility of the virus peaks by

287   approximately the fifth day from symptom onset, and swiftly drops afterward.[13-17, 38] However, the

288   risk of further transmission after day five is not zero, and it is highly dependent on health behavior

289   following de-isolation (e.g., continuing to wear masks, limiting the number of social contacts etc.) Given

290   the high probability of asymptomatic infection and the possibility of short-lived symptoms, a symptom

291   check to end isolation on the fifth day does not substantially reduce the risk of further transmission.

292   Antigen tests, on the other hand, allow a more accurate measure of ongoing risk. There is now evidence

293   that these rapid tests have good sensitivity for detecting high viral loads that are most likely to be

294   transmissible.[17, 21, 38, 39] As such, antigen tests are an important public health tool that can help

295   mitigate the health harms of the COVID-19 pandemic, and should be incorporated into public health

296   responses as resources allow.

297   ***Limitations***

298   This study had important limitations, especially regarding uncertainty in key inputs such as the

299   viral kinetics of SARS-CoV-2 and sensitivity of antigen tests. First, we distributed R_{eff} over the 10 days

300   following COVID-19 confirmation, but a portion of transmissions occur prior to the index case learning

301   their COVID-19 status and entering isolation. As such, we have overestimated the number of secondary

302   infections in our model and underestimated ICER values. Decreasing the residual R would increase ICERs

303   but given favorable ICERs even in the low-risk scenario, we believe the implications of our findings

304   would not be affected. More importantly, given the novelty of the Omicron variant, we had to rely on

305   studies of prior variants for these two important factors. While variance in neither of these inputs

306   changed cost-effectiveness results qualitatively, they did have an impact on the number of further

307   transmissions after isolation and thus the level of cost-effectiveness. Additional studies on the viral

308   kinetics of the Omicron variant are necessary to refine these estimates.

309

310   **Conclusions**

311   The Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 presents a new threat to public health due to its high

312   transmissibility and potential ability to evade vaccine-induced immunity. Cost-effectiveness analyses can

313   help decision makers assess the trade-offs between the economic disadvantages and health risks of

314   adopting different COVID-19 de-isolation guidance. Using a decision tree model and Omicron-specific

315   data when available, we found that ending isolation in five days given a negative symptom check left

316   substantial risk of transmission and was not the most cost-effective strategy even when high

317   productivity losses of longer isolation were accounted for. Instead, our findings suggest a baseline

318   isolation duration of six days, at which time an antigen test, if available, can be conducted to confirm

319   that the individual no longer carries transmissible SARS-CoV-2.

320

321   **Acknowledgements**

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Supporting Information

**S1 Appendix. Medical costs, transmission rates, infectivity.**

Figure 1

Figure 2