



OPEN Children's gendered expectations of moral parties

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Do children have gendered expectations of moral parties? Here we asked 5–10-year-olds ($N = 177$) in the United States to indicate whether boys or girls were agents or patients of morally good and bad actions. Children of all ages, and of both genders, showed a strong and consistent expectation that boys are perpetrators of various moral wrongs. Moreover, whereas girls expected girls to be benefactors, boys had no systematic gendered expectations regarding benefactors. As for moral patiency, children picked their own gender, regardless of valence: boys chose boys as victims and beneficiaries, and girls chose girls as victims and beneficiaries. Given the potentially far-reaching implications of such moral expectations, these findings invite further questions regarding the mechanisms and consequences of these early-emerging gendered patterns.

Keywords Morality, Gender, Agency, Patiency, Stereotypes, Development

When it comes to moral interactions, at least two parties must be involved—an *agent*, who does right (i.e., a benefactor) or wrong (i.e., a perpetrator), and a *patient*, who is the target of right (i.e., a beneficiary) or wrong (i.e., a victim)¹. This dyadic nature of morality is at the heart of the moral typecasting phenomenon, which posits that the roles of a moral agent and a moral patient are inversely related². Thus, once a person has been perceived as a moral agent, they are less likely to be perceived as a moral patient, and vice versa (e.g., if someone was seen as a thief in the past, people are more likely to think of them as an agent—good or bad—in the future). Although moral typecasting has primarily been applied to analyze the dynamics of individual moral interactions (see², for a review), it is possible that certain groups might be morally typecast as agents or as patients^{3,4}. Males and females might be two such groups. After all, gender is a social category that guides multiple facets of human behavior (e.g.,⁵), starting as early as infancy (e.g.,^{6–8}, see⁹, for a review).

Recent research has suggested that men are indeed typecast as moral agents (i.e., perpetrators)^{10,11}, and that women are typecast as moral patients (i.e., victims)¹¹. For example, when asked to identify a perpetrator of a bank robbery, fraud, or murder, college students overwhelmingly pick men over women¹⁰. In the context of workplace transgressions (e.g., bullying, verbal abuse), men are further identified as perpetrators and women as victims¹¹. Moreover, when the genders of perpetrators and victims are manipulated, male perpetrators elicit a desire for harsher punishment and are less likely to be forgiven. In contrast, female victims are perceived to experience more pain than male victims¹¹.

That said, it is essential to consider whether males are also viewed as benefactors and females as beneficiaries. After all, moral interactions are not only bad—they can also be good. Correspondingly, moral typecasting is supposed to be valence-independent; for instance, if one is typecast as a moral agent, they are subsequently expected to be either a “villain” or a “saint”¹. Yet previous research with adults has only looked at negative interactions^{10,11}, leaving open the question of whether males are *generally* perceived as moral agents and females as moral patients, or whether males are *specifically* seen as perpetrators and females as victims. Here we suggest that this phenomenon may be valence-dependent with different gendered expectations for good and bad acts, and we test this prediction in a population known to be sensitive to gender stereotypes: 5- to 10 year-old children^{12–17}.

The categorization of others as either moral agents or patients has been argued to be an automatic, general aspect of social cognition¹⁸. If so, the tendency to sort others into moral agents and patients should emerge early in development¹⁹, but it is unknown whether children engage in moral typecasting along gendered lines. It is well documented that gender influences social cognition from the earliest years of life (e.g.,⁵) and that gender categorization is automatic and persistent in adults²⁰. Classification by gender begins in the first months of life (e.g.,^{6,7}), followed by preschoolers using gender to decide with whom to affiliate, largely preferring their own gender (e.g.,^{21–23}). Such preferences are both implicit and explicit by middle childhood (e.g.,¹²), the period during which children also begin to endorse a variety of gendered stereotypes (e.g.,^{24,25}). Among such stereotypes, persisting into later childhood (e.g.,^{26,27}), are beliefs about who is nice (e.g.,^{13,14,28}) and who is agentic (e.g.,²⁹). If gendered moral typecasting is a pervasive aspect of social cognition, it should be evident among children.

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Yet past research on children's attitudes toward gender poses a challenge to the general gendered moral typecasting hypothesis: children's in-group biases toward their own gender (e.g., ^{12,14–16}, for a review, see ⁹) as well as their sensitivity to valenced stereotypes about gender ^{13,14,27,28} could shape their expectations instead. For one, children could expect kids of their own gender to be involved in morally good acts (as benefactors and beneficiaries) and kids of the opposite gender to be engaged in morally bad acts (as perpetrators and victims). Interestingly, however, in-group favoritism is consistently stronger in girls than in boys (e.g., ^{12,14,16,17}). In fact, compared to girls, 6-year-old boys are less likely to associate niceness with their own gender ²⁸, and around the same age, both boys and girls are more likely to interpret ambiguous acts of male peers in a negative light ¹⁴. Furthermore, children spontaneously associate girls with being nice and boys with being rough, a pattern present throughout early-to-late childhood and particularly pronounced in older children ¹³. A potentially more complicated picture is suggested by recent findings that children may be driven by in-group favoritism earlier on, especially when considering who should receive special treatment as a beneficiary, while gradually acquiring more complex gender stereotypes (e.g., about agency or communion) ³⁰ and prioritizing stereotypes about their own gender ²⁷. Considering these developmental trends, it is likely that children's gendered expectations of moral parties would reflect a combination of their in-group biases and adult-like stereotypes in a manner that is inconsistent with general gendered moral typecasting.

Here we sought to test whether gendered moral typecasting has its roots early in development and whether it is consistent across moral and immoral acts by examining 5- to 10-year-old children's expectations about the genders of moral parties engaged in various good and bad acts (i.e., physical, psychological, and material) since they might tap into different domains of moral judgments ³¹. Against the backdrop of different possible patterns for children's gendered moral expectations based on previous developmental research, the main hypothesis tested here was the one explicitly suggested by gendered moral typecasting ¹¹: males will be typecast as moral agents and females will be typecast as moral patients, regardless of valence.

Methods

Participants

177 five- to ten-year-old children in the United States (95 female; $M_{age}=7.98$ years, range=5.06–10.88 years) were recruited through Lookit ³², our university's Child Study Center, and at an elementary school in suburban Connecticut. Sample size was determined by a stopping rule of 90 children per condition. Three participants were excluded for not paying attention. A sensitivity power analysis was conducted for a multiple regression model with four predictors, using G*Power ³³. With $N=177$, $\alpha=0.05$, and power=0.80, the critical F is 2.42 ($f^2=0.07$). As reported by the participants' caregivers, the demographics of our sample were as follows (caregivers were able to check multiple racial categories): 67% White, 22% Asian, 8% Black or African American, 7% Multiracial, 6% Hispanic, Spanish, or Latinx, less than 1% American Indian or Alaska Native or said "Other", and 1% did not to answer.

Materials and procedure

All children were in the United States and tested individually on Zoom. Participants were randomly assigned to either a Negative condition ($n=89$) or a Positive condition ($n=88$) and told that they were going to play a game in which they had to guess who the experimenter was talking about (inspired by ²⁸). All children were presented with three scenarios: pushing, teasing, and stealing in the Negative condition, and giving a toy to someone, helping someone to get up, and saying something nice to someone in the Positive condition.

For each scenario, participants were told a short description of the act (e.g., "One kid pushed another kid" or "One kid helped another kid to get up"). All participants were asked what gender they thought the agent was (e.g., "Do you think a boy or a girl pushed?"; "Do you think a boy or a girl helped the other kid get up?") and what gender they thought the patient was (e.g., "Do you think a boy or a girl got pushed?" or "Do you think a boy or a girl got helped?"). The order in which participants were asked about agents and patients (first or second) and the order of different scenarios (for the Negative condition, pushing, teasing, stealing; for the Positive condition, helping someone get up, saying something nice to someone, giving someone toys) were counterbalanced across participants.

We also assessed children's attributions of more nuanced measures of moral agency and patency. In particular, those who are typecast as moral agents might elicit greater attributions of intentionality and responsibility for their acts ¹ and subsequently face more significant consequences ¹¹. By contrast, those who are typecast as moral patients might elicit greater perceptions of experienced feelings, whether good or bad ¹. Thus, if boys are typecast as moral agents, they should be seen as more intentional in their acts and deserving of greater punishment or reward. Conversely, if girls are typecast as moral patients, they should be seen as experiencing greater feelings of hurt or upset upon being victimized as well as greater feelings of good and happiness upon being helped.

Thus, after children were asked what gender they thought the target in each scenario was, they were asked several follow-up questions, which varied between conditions. In the Negative condition, children were asked whether the perpetrator wanted to harm the victim and whether the perpetrator should be punished (see Table S1 in the Supplemental Information file for full script details). In the Positive condition, children were asked whether the benefactor wanted to help the beneficiary and whether the benefactor should be rewarded (see Table S2 in Supplemental Information file for full script details). If participants said "yes" to any of the follow-up questions, the experimenter asked additional questions designed to assess the degree of attributed moral agency (e.g., "How much did he want to push the other kid?"; "How much did he want to help the other kid get up?").

In addition to the agent-related questions, children were asked follow-up questions about patients after they indicated what gender they thought the patient in each scenario was. In the Negative condition, children were asked whether the victim was hurt and upset. In the Positive condition, they were asked whether the beneficiary felt good and was happy. Again, if participants said "yes" to any of these questions, the experimenter asked

additional questions designed to assess the degree of attributed moral patency (e.g., “How upset was he?”; “How happy was she?”).

Following coding practices in developmental psychology^{34,35}, we coded participants’ answers to the follow-up questions as 0 if a participant answered “no,” 1 if they answered “a little” or “small,” and 2 if they answered “a lot,” “big” or “very.”

The research procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board at Emory University (STUDY00002822: “Understanding social reasoning in adults and children”). The experiment was performed in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations. Parents of participating children gave written informed consent; children also provided oral assent.

Results

Agents

Participants’ choices were coded as 0 if they selected a girl, and 1 if they selected a boy. To examine whether there were any differences among the types of acts in either Condition (Positive vs. Negative), we ran two binary logistic regressions, one for bad acts and one for good acts with a random intercept for participant to account for repeated measures. For each, we used the type of bad act (pushing, teasing, stealing) or the good act (helping, saying something nice, gifting) as predictors of the selected agent’s gender. Neither model yielded significant effects of the type of act ($p > 0.568$). Therefore, we averaged participants’ gender choices within each condition to arrive at a single score indicating their tendency to select a girl (0) or a boy (1) as the agent, which could range from 0 to 1.

A linear model with Condition, participant gender, and participant age in years as predictors indicated that there was no effect of participant age ($p = 0.761$), but there was a significant Condition \times participant gender interaction, $F(1,172) = 6.10$, $p = 0.014$, in addition to main effects of Condition, $F(1,172) = 51.35$, $p < 0.001$, and participant gender, $F(1,172) = 16.09$, $p < 0.001$. [Another way of analyzing these data is using a logistic mixed-effects hierarchical regression model. We report the results of this approach, which revealed the same patterns, in the Supplemental Information file.] Whereas participant gender did not influence responses in the Negative condition, $t(172) = 1.14$, $p = 0.257$, it did in the Positive condition, $t(172) = 4.58$, $p_{\text{holm}} < 0.001$. Specifically, both male and female participants were more likely to identify a boy than a girl as an agent (or a perpetrator, $M = 0.72$, $SD = 0.25$) in the Negative condition, $t(88) = 8.60$, $p_{\text{holm}} < 0.001$, $d = 0.91$. By contrast, in the Positive condition, female participants were more likely to identify a girl than a boy as an agent (or a benefactor, $M = 0.34$, $SD = 0.25$), $t(49) = 4.57$, $p_{\text{holm}} < 0.001$, $d = 0.65$, whereas male participants showed no systematic tendency ($M = 0.59$, $SD = 0.28$), $t(37) = 1.90$, $p_{\text{holm}} = 0.065$, $d = 0.31$ (see Fig. 1).

To assess whether male perpetrators were attributed more intention and allocated greater punishment than female perpetrators, we ran two independent samples t-tests, neither of which were significant, $p > 0.28$. Moreover, to assess whether male benefactors were attributed more intention and allocated greater reward than female benefactors, we ran two independent samples t-tests tests, which were also not significant, $p > 0.12$.

Patients

Participants’ choices were again coded as 0 if they selected a girl, and 1 if they selected a boy. To examine whether there were any differences among the types of acts in either condition (Positive vs. Negative), we ran two binary logistic regressions, one for bad acts and one for good acts. For each we used the type of bad act (pushing, teasing, stealing) or the good act (helping, saying something nice, gifting) as predictors of the selected patient’s gender. Neither model yielded significant effects of the type of act ($p > 0.109$). Therefore, we averaged participants’ gender choices within each condition to arrive at a single score indicating their tendency to select a girl (0) or a boy (1) as the patient, which could range from 0 to 1.

A linear model with Condition, participant gender, and age in years as predictors indicated that there was no effect of Condition ($p = 0.135$) or participant age ($p = 0.650$), and no Condition \times participant gender interaction ($p = 0.352$). [Another way of analyzing these data is using a logistic mixed-effects hierarchical regression model. We report the results of this approach, which revealed the same patterns, in the Supplemental Information file.] There was, however, a significant main effect of participant gender, $F(1,172) = 21.40$, $p < 0.001$. In particular, female participants were more likely to select a girl as a patient (beneficiary or victim, $M = 0.38$, $SD = 0.27$), $t(94) = 4.22$, $p_{\text{holm}} < 0.001$, $d = 0.43$, while male participants were more likely to select a boy as a patient (beneficiary or victim, $M = 0.57$; $SD = 0.28$), $t(81) = 2.24$, $p_{\text{holm}} = 0.028$, $d = 0.25$ (see Fig. 2).

To further assess whether female victims were attributed greater feelings of upset and hurt, we ran two independent samples t-tests, neither of which were significant ($p > 0.18$). We also ran two independent samples t-tests to test whether female beneficiaries were attributed greater feelings of good and happiness. Although girl victims were not different from boy victims in their perceived feelings of happiness ($p > 0.34$), they were seen as experiencing greater feelings of good than boys, $t(262) = 2.07$, $p = 0.04$.

Discussion

This study examined whether children have systematic gendered expectations about moral agents and patients. Previous work suggests that men might be morally typecast as agents and women as patients in the case of moral transgressions¹¹. Here, we examined whether children’s expectations of moral parties are explained by gendered moral typecasting or whether they are more consistent with other phenomena in social cognition (e.g., in-group preferences, valence stereotypes). Even though children’s knowledge of gender stereotypes tends to become stronger during ages 5–10 (e.g.,^{26,27,29}), there were no age-related effects in our sample. Instead, children of all ages and of both genders showed a strong and consistent expectation that boys are perpetrators of various moral wrongs. The rest of children’s moral expectations depended on children’s own gender. Whereas girls expected




Fig. 1. Boxplots and individual points showing the distribution of children's tendency to select a boy as an agent in both conditions, broken down by participant gender. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. An asterisk indicates a significant difference.




Fig. 2. Boxplots and individual points show the distribution of children's tendency to select a boy as a patient collapsed across conditions and broken down by participant gender. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. An asterisk indicates a significant difference.

girls to be benefactors, boys had no systematic expectations regarding benefactors. When it came to moral patients, children picked their own gender, regardless of valence: boys chose boys as victims and beneficiaries, and girls chose girls as victims and beneficiaries. Given that moral typecasting can have far-reaching implications for its subjects², these findings invite further questions regarding the mechanisms and consequences of these gendered patterns.

Children's tendency to identify boys as perpetrators stands out as the most robust finding of our study. Although this result is consistent with the gendered moral typecasting patterns found in adults^{10,11}, it is arguably more consistent with valenced stereotypes about genders, associating masculinity with negativity (e.g.,^{36–38}) and femininity with positivity (e.g.,^{12,39}). Indeed, while men are stereotyped as more agentic than women⁴⁰, they are also viewed as more aggressive, forceful, hostile, and unprincipled^{36,41}, which also translates into implicit associations of men with threats³⁷ as well as violence, destruction, and rage³⁸. This possibility is further supported by the fact that boys showed no tendency to select a boy as a benefactor while girls selected a girl. Thus, rather than expecting boys to be moral agents in general, children overwhelmingly expect them to be bad agents specifically, and this negative view might emerge even earlier than suggested by previous research (e.g.,^{12,14,28}).

Conversely, only girls, but not boys, showed a gendered expectation regarding benefactors, which could be explained in several ways. One possibility is that this finding reflects girls' strong in-group biases, which are present by age 5, and tend to remain stable and perhaps even grow over development (e.g.,¹²). Viewing their own gender in a positive light could explain why girls expect other girls to be positive agents. Indeed, girls' in-group favoritism is known to be stronger than that of boys (e.g.,^{12,14,16,17}), which might be behind the lack of a parallel in-group bias in boys. Yet, despite boys' in-group favoritism being relatively weaker than that of girls, this is not to say that it is non-existent: boys still typically show in-group biases during the ages we tested (e.g.,^{12,16,17}). Thus, another possibility is that children are influenced by more specific gender stereotypes such as one highlighting that girls are nice (e.g.,^{13,28}). Women are generally viewed as helpful, warm, and devoted to others, and tend to be perceived more positively than men^{12,39,41,42}, a bias known as the women-are-wonderful effect⁴³. In fact, such perceptions of women as communion-oriented have grown considerably stronger over the years⁴⁰. The fact that this knowledge is apparent only in girls might reflect children's tendency to learn and endorse stereotypes about their own gender earlier than those about the opposite gender^(24,26,27). Finally, boys' expectations of benefactors might be influenced by a combination of these competing considerations. On the one hand, boys' in-group bias might drive them to view other boys as morally good; on the other hand, they might be influenced by the pervasive women-are-wonderful (e.g.,^{39,43}) and girls-are-nice (e.g.,^{13,28}) rhetoric, which together might explain their at-chance expectations of benefactors.

Our results also diverge from past work that found that boys between ages 3 and 11 know that boys, rather than girls, should be heroes²⁷. One notable difference is that the scenarios used in our study focused on children's *descriptive* expectations (i.e., who *did* help) by asking children who they thought the agents and patients were. The earlier study²⁷, on the other hand, probed children's *prescriptive* expectations (i.e., who *should* help) by asking children who they thought the agents and patients should have been. Children's relationship to descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes might follow different trajectories⁴⁴. Whereas children's descriptive awareness of gender stereotypes becomes stronger⁹ and allows for more complex stereotypes with age (e.g.,²⁶), their tendency to endorse gender stereotypes become weaker as they age (e.g.,⁴⁵). Taken together, the results of our study and past research²⁷ suggest that despite their growing awareness of prescriptive expectations for boys to be morally good agents, children have a strong descriptive awareness of boys being the more likely morally bad agents. Since even young children view gender as inductively powerful⁴⁶ and children's gendered expectations are likely influenced by an interplay of descriptive and prescriptive gender norms⁴⁷, future work should examine this potential conflict between children's descriptive and prescriptive expectations of moral agents and their relative influence on children's subsequent attitudes and behaviors.

Contrary to the predictions made by the gendered moral typecasting¹¹, children did not uniformly expect girls to be moral patients. Rather, boys and girls selected their own gender as both victims and beneficiaries, most likely reflecting children's tendency to default to same-gender options, perhaps when in doubt⁹. Past work with adults, however, showed that people are more likely to view women as victims^{10,11} and protect them from harm, even at the expense of men^{42,48}—a tendency that likely goes hand-in-hand with benevolent sexism, or the beliefs that women require special help and protection^(49,50; for a recent review, see⁵¹). Thus, despite the reasons to suspect that adults would typecast women as patients, such gendered moral expectations may emerge after 10 years of age, perhaps when children enter adolescence and become more aware of benevolent sexism⁵². Another reason for the potential later developmental emergence is the relative importance of social information conveyed by the roles of moral agents and patients. Attending to who is more likely to harm or help may have more profound and personal consequences than attending to who is more likely to be acted upon⁵³. Relatedly, the lack of differentiation between victims and beneficiaries in our study is consistent with some recent findings that adults pay less attention to the valence of moral acts when attending to moral patients⁵⁴. Therefore, our results may reflect diminished benefits of attending to, and forming reliable expectations of, moral patients relative to moral agents.

To further shed light on what might explain the divergent developmental trajectories for children's expectations regarding moral agents and moral patients, it would be helpful to explore the mechanisms via which children arrive at these expectations. One possibility is that children are paying attention to base rates of transgressions in real life. Adult men are indeed more likely to perpetrate various crimes than adult women and to be generally more aggressive^{55,56}. Boys have also been found to engage in physical (e.g., pushing) and verbal aggression (e.g., teasing) more than girls⁵⁷ and are expected to engage in these types of aggression as young as age 3⁵⁸. But even if children form these gendered expectations based on the observed base rates, such categorizing shortcuts can easily lay the foundation for gendered stereotypes. In turn, stereotypes formed from average group

differences can be overgeneralized to innocent members of a stigmatized group, resulting in costly consequences for those who are stereotyped⁵⁹.

Growing up exposed to such stereotypes, boys may find themselves in a double bind—to be good or to be masculine. Children do not simply have gendered expectations—they also punish other children who do not live up to them, for instance by ridiculing, shunning, or misgendering^{60,61}, and this is especially pronounced for boys who violate norms of masculinity^{61,62}. If, as our results suggest, being a morally bad agent is indeed such a strong and early-emerging gendered expectation for males demonstrated by boys and girls alike, boys may be motivated to act as transgressors to comply with gendered norms and avoid ridicule or ostracism.

As boys enter manhood, they may face even more significant and grave consequences due to the diverging moral expectations for males and females⁶³. Previous work with adults has shown that people evaluate men more negatively than women when they transgress^{64,65} and are more willing to punish men than women¹¹. These findings seem to further translate into the differential treatment of men and women in the eyes of the law. Male offenders are more likely to be imprisoned and to receive longer sentences, even when controlling for other relevant factors such as prior violent criminal history⁶⁶. In fact, men are more likely than women to get to the sentencing stage in the first place⁶⁷, a trend that could be potentially explained by who law enforcers *expect* to perpetrate.

Yet, despite strong expectations of males as perpetrators, children in our study did not show differential treatment of male and female perpetrators. One possibility is that children in the age group tested here are moral absolutists^{68,69}, judging bad behaviors as always deserving of punishment (and, for that matter, good behaviors as always deserving of reward). Another possibility is that there are multiple competing forces acting on children's judgments of consequences. On the one hand, they may observe boys and men being punished more frequently given that they do transgress more frequently^{56,57,70} and thus view it as more acceptable to endorse such punishment patterns. On the other hand, the expectation of boys as transgressors may instead guide children to be more lenient toward boys—a sentiment often expressed in the phrase “boys will be boys.” Simultaneously, female transgressors may be seen as particularly counter-normative and thus deserving of even greater punishment, not only for acting in a morally bad way but also for acting in a counter-normative way^{71,72}. These various considerations may be at play in children's decision-making, ultimately resulting in an apparent lack of systematic moral consequences. Still, our findings are correlational, which opens the possibility that children's gender choices were influenced by how deserving of reward or punishment they viewed the act in the first place. Future work should manipulate the genders of moral parties and include questions targeting possible reasoning behind consequence allocation. As adult men and women clearly face different consequences for committing moral wrongs^{11,64,65,66}, perhaps the most pressing future research question is when such disparities in treatment emerge and whether they are in fact driven by gendered expectations about who is more likely to perpetrate.

Conclusion

This study examined gendered expectations surrounding moral parties in children ages 5 to 10. Our results suggest that children of both genders overwhelmingly expect boys to be morally bad agents, that girls but not boys expect girls to be morally good agents, and that children expect their own gender to be a moral patient, regardless of valence. These varied expectations emerge by age 5 and persist through age 10. Additional research is needed to uncover the mechanisms driving such moral stereotyping and their implications for later disparities in treatment based on gender. Ultimately, by understanding the roots of gendered moral expectations, we can pave the way for fostering more equitable social practices for different groups of people.

Data availability

All data are available at <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/H4G7V>

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Author contributions

A.D.G. and A.T. designed research; A.D.G. performed research and analyzed data; A.T. supervised data analyses; and A.D.G. and A.T. wrote the paper.

Declarations

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

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